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INTRODUCTION
The re-emergence of working class action in South Africa following the 
Durban strikes of 1973/74 and the subsequent growth of independent non- 
racial and Black1 trades unions in this country has prompted "the 
need for a reassessment of our view of the working class, their life, 
their culture and their organisations" (Vawda, 1984, p. 117). It is 
precisely this need which stimulated our interest in examining the 
emergence of an Indian working class and its representative organs in 
Durban between 1930 and 1950. For the forces that led to the 
proletarianisation of Indians and the emergence of a trades union 
movement and tradition among these workers has not yet been adequately 
documented or appreciated in the context of South African labour 
history.
Some research into aspects of Indian worker resistance has been carried 
out and the work of Swan [Tayal] (1984) on the 1913 Natal Indian 
strike, and Mantzaris (1983) on the Durban Tobacco Workers' Strike of 
1920 are among the more valuable contributions which have been made. 
Both, however, examine specific instances of worker action in the 
period before the Great Depression (1929-1933), when the proportion of 
Indians in industrial wage employment was relatively insignificant and 
the forces underlying workers' organisations were largely undefined. 
The period after the Great Depression was characterized by large-scale 
employment of Indians in manufacturing industry and other sectors of 
wage employment. By the second half of the 1930's no less than 60 per 
cent of Indians employed in Natal were engaged as non-agricultural 
workers by the sugar-milling and secondary manufacturing industries as 
well as by local municipalities. These changed realities, coupled with 
various other forces (which we identify in Chapter 2), led to the 
emergence of Indian working class activity and organisation either 
through predominantly Indian or non-racial trades unions by the late 
1930's and 1940's.
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There is yet no systematic account of these organisations. Their 
membership, their leaders, the issues that confronted them, their 
response to these pressures in the form of the actions and policies 
they adopted, their organisational structures, their relationship to 
other unions and uni and in some cases, the reasons underlying 
their demise and disbandment, have equally received little or no 
rigorous attention. In general we believe that there are instructive 
lessons to be learnt from the particular organisational forms which 
Indian workers evolved in the defence of their rights - organisational 
forms that were shaped by a multiplicity of pressures, amongst which 
were those emanating from structural and political constraints. An 
investigation into the role and history of Indian workers - who formed 
an integral part of the local working class - is therefore necessary 
with a view to understanding the limitations and strengths of their 
representative organs, as well as their contribution to the process of 
capital accumulation in the region.
The concentration on Durban derives from the fact that this city and 
its immediate environs was the centre of the major developments in 
Indian working class activity and organisation in the period. There 
were a few trades unions in Pietermaritzburg, including branches of the 
National Union of Leatherworkers, the Garment Workers' Industrial Union 
and the Natal Liquor and Catering Trades Employees' Union, a Chemical 
Workers' Union and the Pietermaritzburg Indian Municipal Workers' 
Union. Elsewhere in Natal, a Glass Workers' Union existed in Dundee 
and there are some sketchy newspaper references to a Natal Mineworkers' 
Union.^ The Guardian  ^ reported the formation of a Transvaal Indian 
Trades Union Congress in Johannesburg in early 1941, which according to 
the report "has offered to co-operate with the Council of Non-European 
Trades Unions (CNETU) and the Trades and Labour Council (TLC)" and 
which "declared its intention of supporting the progressive forces 
within the Transvaal Indian Congress represented by the nationalist 
bloc".^ Aside from these, the major developments occurred in Durban 
where the largest proportion of Indian workers was concentrated and 
where by February 1943 there were as many as 34 trades unions with 
significant "Indian" membership.
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Whereas just before and during the Great Depression Indian trades union 
activity and organisation had declined, the change in the objective 
economic conditions of the region and later the stimulus to economic 
activity provided by the war led to a marked revival and growth of 
Indian or non-racial trades unionism in Durban. At the end of the war 
the decline in economic growth coupled with the policies of the 
Nationalist Party on trades unions, the enactment of the Suppression of 
Communism Act (1950) and the absence of sustaining structures and a 
cohesive membership within the unions led to a sudden decline in 
working class activity and organisation. These developments, the 
emergence, growth and decline of Indian trades unionism occurred 
roughly in the period 1930-1950. The choice of the period of analysis 
therefore is not arbitrary and represents a particular phase in Indian 
working class organisation in this region. Though inevitably bounded in 
this way the analysis nevertheless remains situated within wider 
temporal (and spatial) dimensions of capital accumulation in South 
Africa.
This study is organised into 6 chapters: A brief outline of each 
chapter now follows:
Chapter 1 presents an overview of trades unionism and worker action in 
South Africa (c1880-1954). Such an overview is essential in our view to 
situate or locate the specific developments in Indian trade unionism in 
Durban during the period 1930-1950 firmly within the context of working 
class organisation and resistance in the country as a whole since the 
path to industrialization began in the 1880's. Our fairly comprehensive 
treatment of these developments arises from the assumption that there 
may be many readers who are not entirely familiar with the general 
history of the working class in South Africa. Those who are more 
familiar with this history will find parts of this chapter less 
instructive and somewhat discursive. However, woven into the fabric of 
this general history are brief analyses of some of the earlier attempts 
at worker organisation ar.d resistance among Indian workers (i.e. in the 
pre 1930-50 period) and about which little documentation exists.
Xalso reviewed in this chapter are some of the major studies that have 
been made into aspects of organisation and resistance among Indian 
workers since the days of indenture. This "literature survey" serves 
not only to identify the work that has been done to date on Indian 
workers in Natal but also to point to those issues that have as yet not 
received any systematic treatment. Those studies that deal with 
specific events in Indian worker organisation and resistance are 
mentioned chronologically as part of the overview. More general works 
are reviewed in Appendix A.
Chapter 2 examines the major structural forces and changes in the 
economy of Natal and more especially Greater Durban that may have led 
to the formation of Indian working class organisations by the late 
1930's. The chapter analyses the forces that led to the 
proletarianization of Indians, the general instability of their 
economic and social life - characterized by low wages, poor working 
conditions, unemployment and inadequate health and housing conditions - 
and also serves to indicate the contribution and involvement of Indian 
workers in the econony of the region.
Chapter 3 begins by setting out a register of Indian trades unions, 
their membership, racial composition (in the case of non-racial 
unions), dates of formation and the like. A critical analysis of the 
constitutions of these unions is then made in order to investigate the 
extent to which workers participated in, directed and controlled their 
unions.
Chapter 4 presents a register of worker action in this period and a 
detailed analysis of three major strikes that occurred in Durban in 
1937, 1942/3 and 1945/6. The issues that led to these strikes, the 
nature and form of negotiations, the role of workers and their 
leadership during the course of the strike(s), the extent and nature of 
'outside' support for these worker actions and the consequences of the 
strike(s) for working class organisation are other issues discussed.
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Chapter 5 examines the relationship between Indian workers, their 
trades unions and the political organisations/parties in Durban between 
1930 and 1950. We concentrate especially on the relationship between 
the "progressive" or "radical” wings of the Indian political 
organisations (such as the NIA/NIC) and the trades unions, as well as 
that between the Durban district branch of the Communist Party of South 
Africa (CPSA) and these unions, and examine the nature, form and 
consequences of such interaction.
Chapter 6 draws together the major issues arising from this study. 
These are critically examined to focus on the achievements and short= 
comings of trades union organisation and action in Durban in this 
period.
1.
CHAPTER ONE
AN OVERVIEW OF TRADES UNIONISM AND WORKER ACTION IN SOOTH AFRICA -
1860-1954
1.1 Indentured Labour and Resistance in the Plantation Economy
The beginnings of the modern industrial economy in South Africa may be 
traced back to the systematic exploitation of diamonds and gold in the 
late decades of the 19th century. Before this, however, the South 
African social formation rested primarily upon an agricultural and 
mercantile base concentrated in the Cape and in Natal'. Worker 
resistance in this pre-industrial economy has been documented 
elsewhere^ and is not dealt with here as the main focus of this study 
is on the emergence of industrial unionism. However it is necessary to 
touch briefly upon Indian worker resistance in the pre-industrial 
economy of Natal as it is from this historical background that the 
Indian working class later developed.
In the mid-nineteenth century the economy of Natal was based largely on 
the sugar plantation system and the success of the local sugar industry 
depended critically upon the indentured labourers introduced into the 
Colony from India between 1860 and 1911. During this period Indian 
workers had no organisational basis and the repressive network of 
controls to which they were subjected severely restricted organised 
resistance. Before 1913 instances of collective action were extremely 
rare. Accommodation far outweighed resistance. Sporadic strikes and 
work stoppages occurred, but in general, resistance took the form of 
malingering, absenteeism, desertion and sometimes, destruction of 
estate property (Swan, 1978). Although Ginwala, (1974) and Thompson 
(1952), amongst others, mention in passing such resistance by these 
indentured Indian workers. Swan's account of Indian worker resistance 
on two sugar estates in Natal between 1890-1911 remains the only 
systematic treatment of such action^.
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1.2 Gold Mines and Worker Resistance (c1880-c1924)
By the 1880's however, social and economic relations were changing, 
spurred on by developments in the gold and diamond mining industries in 
the hinterland of Southern Africa. These changes set the basis for 
industrial relations, the pace of proletarianisation and the uneven 
incorporation of different sections of the population into capitalist 
relations of production. Skilled labour needed to work the mines was 
imported from Britain, Australia and America, while unskilled 
tasks were carried out by migrants drawn from the ranks of African 
pastoralist/cultivators. In order to attract skilled miners to the Rand 
the mine owners paid them high wages, while the unskilled African 
workers received extremely low wages (Callinicos, 1981, p. 71).^ 
Thus, from its inception, the gold mining industry was characterised by 
the division of labour on the basis of skills, which initially 
coincided with divisions along 'race1 lines.
The skilled miners who came to South Africa brought with them the 
tradition of craft trades unionism from Britain and Australia. In the 
1880's and 1890's a number of crafts unions were formed on the Rand and 
in the other major centres in South Africa (Andrews, 1940, pp. 12-13). 
These unions accepted only skilled workers into their ranks and 
jealously guarded their crafts against encroachments by Black or White 
unskilled workers. These early unions were regarded with hostility by 
employers and had to fight for their existence (Andrews, p. 13).
Between the years 1900 and 1920 White workers in South Africa were 
successful in using the strike weapon to gain higher wages and improved 
working conditions. W.H. Andrews (1940) has described some of the 
actions undertaken by White workers in the major centres of South 
Africa. These actions included strikes by Rand engineers in 1889 for a 
48 hour week and higher wages; printers in Durban in 1895 for a minimum 
wage of £2.17s; Durban railway shop assistants in 1909, against 
piecework; typographical workers in Cape Town in 1911 over non-Union 
labour, as well as several strikes by mine workers on the Rand (Andrews
3.
1940, pp. 12-27). In 1911 the Transvaal Federation of Trades changed 
its name to the South African Industrial Federation (SAIF) and invited 
the affiliation of unions throughout the country. The Cape Federation 
of Trades, some of whose affiliated unions consisted mainly of Coloured 
members, rejected the 'White labour policy' of the SAIF and refused to 
affiliate. (Simons and Simons, 1983).
While the craft unions were generally able to safeguard their members 
through a monopoly of skills and limits on control exerted through the 
labour process. White workers on the gold mines found their privileged 
positions threatened by 'cheap' African labour. Davies (1979) and 
Johnstone (1978) have shown how the sensitive cost structure of the 
gold mines led to attempts by the mine owners to minimise costs and 
raise productivity by increasing the proportions of 'cheap' African 
labour employed and reorganising the labour process, respectively. In 
short, more skilled tasks were assigned to African labourers while 
White miners increasingly came to occupy supervisory positions. This 
led to bitter conflict between White workers and the mine-owners, which 
was manifested in strikes in 1902, 1907, 1913 and 1922. The most 
important of these were the 1907 strike and the 'Rand Rebellion' of 
1922, which will be dealt with later.
During the strike of 1907 the Chamber of Mines recruited unemployed 
'poor White' Afrikaners to take the place of the skilled miners, at 
lower rates of pay. Ten per cent of the skilled miners lost their jobs. 
(Callinicos, 1981, p. 72) After their defeat the craft unions on the 
mines opened their ranks to all White workers, irrespective of skill, 
but continued to exclude African workers. Thus the craft unions on the 
mines became exclusive industrial unions. Through this particular 
division in the work process White workers on the mines rationalised 
the defence of their own bargaining power by expressing it in racial 
terms. These divisions were reinforced by the job colour bar that the 
Government adopted at the insistence of White workers on the mines. In 
as early as 1893 the Transvaal Government reserved the job of blasting 
to Whites, at the insistence of the White mineworkers' unions. In 1904 
the Transvaal Ordinance, which reserved 44 skilled mining jobs for
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Whites, was passed after White miners had protested that Chinese labour 
would take over skilled jobs at lower rates of pay. The Union 
Government introduced the Mines and Works Act in 1911 which set aside 
32 types of jobs in the Orange Free State and Transvaal for Whites. The 
South African Mineworkers* Union also secured an agreement from the 
Chamber of Mines in 1918 - the Status Quo Agreement - to employ two 
Whites at skilled wages for every 17 Black workers on the mines 
(Callinicos, 1981). White mineworkers were also able to use their 
political bargaining power as a means of defending their position. The 
Labour Party, in particular, claimed to represent the White working 
class. Most Afrikaner workers, however, supported the Afrikaner 
National Party (Callinicos, 1981, pp. 75-76).
Although the African migrants employed on the mines as unskilled 
labourers did not have any experience in organising, they did resist 
the recruiting system and exploitation on the mines. Charles van 
Onselen (1976) has argued that, in this early period, African worker 
resistance on the mines must be sought "in the nooks and crannies of 
the day-to-day situation". Indeed, in the late 19th century and early 
20th century African worker resistance usually took the form of 
desertion and boycotting of mines rather than visible mass organisation 
(Moroney, 1978, p. 33). A wide-scale boycott of the mines by African 
workers after the South African War led to the importation of Chinese 
labour in 1904. About six months after the Chinese workers had arrived, 
unrest ensued on the mines. During their first year on the Rand more 
than half of the Chinese miners deserted in protest against the low 
wages and poor working conditions. After 1907 the Transvaal Government 
began to repatriate the Chinese workers and by 1910 there were no 
Chinese employed on the mines (Callinicos, 1981, pp. 67-70). The 
importation of Chinese labour seriously undermined the bargaining power 
of African mineworkers.
African workers on the mines were not slow to grasp the lessons of 
organisation from the White workers, and they too made use of the 
strike weapon. In 1j13 (the same year in which White miners had laid 
down their tools) about 9 000 African miners struck work over a period
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of three days against low wages and poor working conditions (Bonner, 
1980, p. 274). However, the strikes undertaken by African mineworkers 
during this period tended to be sporadic and appeared to coalesce along 
ethnic lines (Moroney, 1978, p. 41). The 1920 strike, however, which 
involved about 71 000 African miners and affected 21 mines, represented 
a broad working class protest. There was no permanent stable 
organisation to make effective gains in the early struggles of the 
African mineworkers* resistance to mining capitalism. Until the First 
World War there was no organised trades union movement for Black 
workers. Although there were strikes, these did not result in the 
formation of trades unions or any form of worker organisation. In Natal 
the industrial base of the economy was still small as were the number 
of Black workers in manufacturing industry. This also reflects the 
degree of industrial proletarianisation up to this point.
Although the gold mines were the centre of attention at this time, 
Black workers in other industries and regions also resisted 
exploitation e.g. Indian indentured labourers on the sugar estates in 
Durban engaged in strike action in 1906, 1907 and 1911^. In October 
and November 1913 more than 2 0 000 Indian workers in Natal, the 
majority of whom were indentured coastal sugar workers and coal miners, 
went on strike (Swan, 1984). The 1913 strike represented the first 
major collective action undertaken by Indian workers in Natal. Although 
the strike occurred after Gandhi had called for strike action in 
protest against the £3 annual tax on indentured labourers, Swan has 
shown that Indian workers struck in response to a range of exploitative 
measures to which they were subjected. However the strike itself did 
not represent any organised or disciplined working class action nor did 
it precipitate the formation of trades unions. The strike itself has 
been extensively researched by Swan (1984) and Beal and North-Coombes 
(1983). It is also mentioned in Gitsham and Trembath's history of the 
early trades union movement in South Africa (1926).
The First world War ushered in a period of militant worker action. 
Wartime industrialisation led to an expansion of the economy* After the 
war there was a rapid increase in rural migration to the mining and 
industrial areas from the reserves, which were becoming increasingly
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impoverished. Faced with rising inflation and low wages, African 
v/orkers began to act spontaneously to defend their interests. During 
this period members of the International Socialist League (ISL) 
attempted to organise Black workers. The ISL started organising Indian 
workers in Natal from 1915. In March 1917 the Indian Workers’ 
Industrial Union was formed in Durban under the chairmanship of Gordon 
Lee (Mantzaris, 1983, p. 117). Unions were also formed in the printing, 
tobacco and hotel industries as well as among dock workers. Simons and 
Simons (1983) mention these trades unions in Natal, but their analysis 
is rather superficial. Mantzaris has analysed the ISL-supported 1920 
tobacco workers strike and its significance for trades unionism in 
South Africa. Here, for the first time, organised Indian workers were 
striking out against their wages and conditions of work. A leading 
figure in this period was Bernard Sigamoney, a member of the ISL and 
General Secretary of the Durban Indian Workers' Industrial Union. At 
the 1918 ISL conference he was the first official 'non-white1 person to 
represent workers. Simons and Simons remarked that this conference was 
"a memorable occasion. Never before had the League included among its 
delegates one of the darker races. And it rejoiced at having made great 
ideological progress towards non-racial labour solidarity". (1983, p. 
203) .
It is not clear how these ISL unions were structured, the content of 
their constitutions, the actions they undertook, and the benefits (or 
lack of benefits) that rank and file workers derived from such 
organisations. No in-depth analysis of these issues has as yet been 
undertaken. Its significance in the wider context of the unionisation 
of the Black working class cannot be underestimated, particularly since 
this occurred before the formation of the Industrial and Commercial 
Workers Union (ICU), the 1920 Mine Workers' Strike, the 1922 Rand 
Rebellion and the passing of the new industrial legislation in the 
mid-1920s. Further it is not clear as yet what exactly happened to 
these unions particularly after Sigamoney became an Anglican priest and 
moved away from Durban.
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In 1917 a group of White socialists from the ISL held a meeting with 
African workers on the Rand and formed the Industrial Workers of Africa 
(IWA). African municipal workers on the Rand came out on strike, and 
were assisted by members of the IWA. In June and July 1918 the IWA 
launched a 'one-shilling-a-day' campaign on the Rand, failing which a 
general strike of African workers would be called. This resulted in 
mass unrest among African workers on the Rand in the same year. 
Although the IWA was a small and short-lived organisation, it did have 
a significant influence on African workers on the Rand and, according 
to Johnstone (1978, p. 263), may have facilitated the rise of the ICU 
in the Transvaal.
Clements Kadalie inspired the formation of the ICU in Cape Town in 
1919, against a background of increasing rural impoverishment. The 
first workers organised by Kadalie were the Cape Town dock workers. The 
ICU grew rapidly in popularity and by 1927 had reached a peak of 
100 000 members. By the end of the decade, however, the ICU had 
collapsed. In spite of its huge membership the ICU's achievements had 
been minimal. It had gained little improvement in labour conditions, 
wages remained more or less stationery and a new range of 
discriminatory legislation was introduced, such as the Native 
Administration Act of 1927, with its racial hostility clause (Roux, 
1964, p. 175, 203). The leadership of the ICU lacked a clear analysis 
of the dynamics of South African capitalism and therefore lacked a 
clear strategy. The leadership mistook protest for pressure and numbers 
for strength. Industrial organisation was neglected and the ICU failed 
to support workers who came out on strike. Kadalie placed his hope in 
political solutions and turned to the White political parties, liberals 
and the international labour movement for support. Although membership 
of the ICU was soaring and branches were being established everywhere 
from the mid-1920s, it was labour tenants working on White farms, 
rather than industrial workers who were attracted to the organisation. 
Personality conflicts within the leadership, the expulsion of the 
communists from the organisation in 1926 and the maladministration of 
funds all hastened the decline of the ICU (Bonner, 1978, pp. 115-120). 
In the final analysis, the ICU was more of a populist movement than a 
trade union, and it failed to organise the industrial work force.
1.3 The Industrial Conciliation Act, the Wage Act and the 
Reorganisation of Industry (1924-1932)
With the defeat of the 1922 White mineworkers strike on the Rand the 
White trades union movement was in a state of decline. The SAIF 
collapsed and trades union membership fell from 108 242 to 81 861 
(Lewis, 1977, p. 7). The basic structure of South Africa's industrial 
relations was established by the Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) of 
1924 and the Wage Act of 1925. The ICA gave full recognition to White, 
Coloured and Indian unions and set up industrial councils of trades 
unionists and employers which could negotiate industry-wide agreements. 
The unions' right to strike was severely curtailed by the Act. In 
addition, the practice of settling disputes within industrial councils 
encouraged a tendency towards a bureaucratization of trades union 
leadership, further alienating union officials from the rank and file. 
African workers were not recognised as employees under the ICA and thus 
could not negotiate inside the industrial councils or belong to 
registered trades unions. Under the Wage Act of 1925, however, African 
unions could petition for new wage determinations, request the sitting 
of a Wage Board and give evidence before the Board (Hirson, 1977, p. 
183) .
Between 1915/6 and 1929/30 South Africa's manufacturing industry began 
to expand under the stimulus of the First World War and the 
government's protection policy^. Because manufacturing industry was 
still in its early stages in South Africa during the 1920's, enployers 
sought the cheapest sources of labour to accumulate capital for 
investment. Furthermore, with the increased mechanisation of secondary 
industry there was a need for semi-skilled operative labour rather than 
skilled labour. Thus the labour force for secondary industry was 
recruited mainly from the ranks of the newly proletarianised Blacks and 
Whites who had been forced off the land by economic hardships, 
government policy and the growth of capitalist agriculture. The largest 
increase was that in the employment of African male and White female 
labour (Lewis, 1978, p. 124). During this period African workers 
increasingly came to occupy semi-skilled positions. Although the 
majority of African workers still remained unskilled, these changes had 
important implications for African worker organisation.
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The expansion of secondary industry and the changes in the labour 
process had far-reaching effects on trades union organisation. Crafts 
unions were no longer suited to the structure of industry, nor was the 
general workers' union. Thus the late 1920's saw the emergence of new 
industrial unions in South Africa, which organised along industrial 
lines. The Industrial Legislation Commission of 1935 noted (para. 
368),
The trend of industrial development during the past 
few decades has been such that it is much more 
convenient for employers to negotiate with one large 
union representing all classes of workers in their 
industry, rather than with a number of separate craft 
unions representing only sections of their workers.
The industrial legislation of the 1920's reinforced the change to 
industrial unionism. In order to benefit from the provisions of the ICA 
it was necessary for workers to organise along industrial lines, 
as agreements were negotiated for the industry as a whole. Similarly, 
the Wage Act encouraged the formation of African industrial unions. 
Unions were needed not only to draw up memoranda and present evidence 
before the Wage Board, but also to ensure that employers paid the full 
rates once the wage determination had been made. It must be pointed out 
that the change to industrial unionism did not signal the end of crafts 
unions. In spite of changes in the labour process crafts unions in 
certain industries e.g. engineering, were able to maintain their skill- 
scarcity and organisational form (Greenberg, 1980, pp. 291-310).
The skilled workers and their crafts unions attempted to resist this 
deskilling process. However, the rapidity with which the process 
occurred forced many of them to abandon their craft organisations and 
open their unions to all workers in the industry in order to protect 
themselves from competition and undercutting. The Witwatersrand
Tailors' Association, which later became the Garment Workers' Union 
(GWU), provides an example of the skilled workers' response (Lewis, 
1978, p. 136). After the collapse of the SAIF in 1922 the artisan 
unions had set off on their own, forming the Associated Trade Unions of 
South Africa, which supported the introduction of the ICA and the 
Apprenticeship Act of 1922. In an attempt to bring about unity within
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the White labour movement in 1924 Colonel Creswell, the Minister of 
Labour (who was also the leader of the Labour Party), convened a 
meeting of trades union officials in Cape Town and asked them to form a 
trades union co-ordinating body. A body was formed in 1925 and called 
the South African Association of Employees' Organisations. Two 
communists, W. Andrews and Frank Glass were elected onto the executive 
of the Association as treasurer and secretary respectively (Greenberg, 
1980, p. 293). However, many of the older artisan unions, as well as 
the Cape Federation of Trades, refused to affiliate to the new 
association. At its first annual conference in 1926 the name of the 
organisation was changed to the South African Trade Union Congress 
(TUC). The TUC played an important role in the formation of new 
industrial unions, and among the unions formed between 1925 and 1929 
were the Furniture Workers', Sweet Workers', Leather Workers', Canvas 
and Rope Workers' and a Reef Native Trade Assistants' Union. In 
addition, an attempt was made - for the first time - to organise women 
workers, and in 1925 the Women Workers' General Union (WWU) was formed, 
which was instrumental in organising the Sweetmakers' Union and in 
helping women workers in other trades. However, the WWC was composed 
almost exclusively of Whites (Lewis, 1978, p. 133). The new industrial 
unions fought militantly for higher wages and better working 
conditions. There were several strikes by White workers during this 
period. The GWU, one of the prominent new industrial unions, led over 
100 strikes between 1928 and 1932, two of which brought the entire 
industry to a standstill.
In the period just after the Rand Revolt and the passing of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act, there appears to be very little mention in 
any literature of Indian workers and their unions or of any actions 
they undertook. Many unions were, in any event, White trades unions 
which excluded Black membership. The organised resistance of Black 
workers outside of the ICU seems to have dropped off. In 1928 the Natal 
Indian Congress attempted to organise Indian workers. This resulted in 
the formation of the Natal Workers' Congress (NWC) which was also known 
as the Indian Trade Union Congress (ITUC). The following unions were 
formed: Durban Tinsmiths and Trunk Makers' Union; Durban and District 
Tobacco Workers' Union; Durban and District Bakers' Union; Natal Liquor 
and Catering Trades Employees' Union; and the Durban and District 
Amalgamated Union of Launderers and Dry Cleaners.
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The first African industrial unions were established early in 1927, 
through the initiative of Communist Party members such as Weinbren and 
Thebidi, Gana Makabeni, Moses Kotane and Johannes Nkosi. Among these 
first unions were the Native Laundry Workers' Union, the Native Bakers' 
Union, the Native Clothing Workers' Union and the Native Mattress and 
Furniture Workers' Union (Luckhardt and Wall, 1979, pp. 49-52). A 
number of these were established as parallel unions.^ The South 
African Federation of non-European Trade Unions (FNETU) was formed on 
the 25 March 1928 at a meeting of over 150 delegates, representing 
workers from a number of African unions. African trades unions 
continued to expand in 1928 and 1929 and a number of new unions were 
formed. It is estimated that by the end of 1928 FNETU's membership had 
reached 1 500. The late 1920's were a period of industrial militancy 
for the African working class. In 1927, 4 418 Blacks went on strike as 
compared with 740 Whites, while the figures for 1928 were 5 074 and 710 
respectively (Lewis, 1978, p. 134). By 1931, however, FNETU and, 
indeed, almost the entire African trades union movement had collapsed, 
partly as a result of the depression and partly because of internal 
conflicts within the Communist Party (CPSA). FNETU had tied itself 
too closely to the CPSA and thus was adversely affected by dissension 
within the organisation. (Lewis, 1978, p.135)
Jon Lewis (1977, p.104) argues that it is in "the peculiar 
industrialization of the 1920's that one must look for the origins of 
the radical, non-racial tradition in South African trade unionism". 
Indeed, racial demarcations within secondary industry were not as rigid 
as those in the mining industry and there was evidence of solidarity 
across colour lines. Unions in the garment, leather, furniture and 
canvas industries dropped their colour bar against Coloureds and 
Indians. The GWU and the Furniture Workers' Union held joint meetings 
with their African parallels, while the White and African Laundry 
Workers' Unions both affiliated to a joint executive committee. Under 
the influence of the new industrial unions the TUC recommended to its 
affiliated unions in 1929 the enrolment of all workers irrespective of 
'race or colour' (Lewis, 1982). In 1930 the Cape Federation of Trades 
convened a joint conference with the TUC and the two bodies amalgamated 
to form the South African Trades and Labour Council (TLC). The TLC was
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established on a non-racial basis and pledged to admit "all bona fide 
trades and labour unions" and to "promote the interests of all 
organised workers" (Simons and Simons, 1983, p. 384).
1.4 Post-Depression Period (1933-1938)
White as well as Black industrial unions were severely affected by the 
Depression. The White industrial unions which survived included the 
garment, leather and furniture workers' unions. The TLC conference of 
1936 unanimously accepted proposals to organise African workers and to 
oppose discriminatory legislation. By 1937, however, after a number of 
small African unions had joined the TLC conflict between its affiliates 
ensued over the admission of African workers. While the Furniture 
Workers' Industrial Union attacked the TLC representatives for 
neglecting African workers, the Amalgamated Engineering Union and the 
Typographical Union were opposed to the organisation of African 
workers. The issue of African unions led to persistent clashes between 
the artisan and open industrial unions (Greenberg, 1980, pp. 295-296). 
The 1930's also saw an assault by the Nationalist Party on the White 
trades union movement. In an attempt to increase both its financial 
position and its parliamentary support base the Nationalist Party set 
out to take over unions with Afrikaner workers. In 1932 the Spoorbond 
was established among railway workers and by 1942 claimed to have 
almost 30 000 members. The Nationalists also succeeded in taking over 
the Mine Workers' Union in the late 1930's. The GWU was successful in 
resisting the Nationalist assault but the union was weakened in the 
process (Labour History Group, 1983, p. 31). The Nationalists did not, 
however, achieve widespread success in their bid to take control of the 
unions.
The only African trades unions that survived the Depression were Gana 
Makabeni's Clothing Workers' Union and the African Laundry Workers' 
Union, which was revived by Max Gordon. A number of African industrial 
unions were established on the Witwatersrand in the second half of the 
1930's, largely through the initiative of Gordon.
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At about the same time several members of the CPSA (who had been 
members of the ICU) were active in organising African unions in the 
Transvaal (Gana Makabeni) and in Cape Town (John Gomas and Jimmy La 
Guma) . Gordon was able to draw on the resources of the South African 
Institute of Race Relations for his trades union work. By working 
through the Wage Board and enforcing the minimum wages laid down in 
wage determinations, Gordon was able to build African unions (Hirson,
1977, p. 185). The unions established with Gordon's help offered a 
number of benefits (e.g. legal, medical and financial assistance) in 
order to attract members. In the evenings the union's premises were 
used as night-schools, offering classes in literacy, numeracy, 
book-keeping, procedure at meetings and history. However, the police 
ordered Gordon to stop all classes. By 1940 Gordon had become secretary 
of a Joint Committee of African Trade Unions, comprising seven unions 
with a total membership of between 16 000 and 20 000 workers (Stein,
1978, p. 143). The second half of the 1930's witnessed a period of 
militancy among the emerging industrial Indian working class. Several 
unions were established during this period including the Garment 
Workers' Industrial Union, the Durban Indian Municipal Employees' 
Society, the Natal Sugar Industry Employees' Union, the Natal Iron and 
Steel Workers' Union and the South African Railways and Harbour 
Employees' Union (Indian). These developments will be dealt with later.
1.5 The War Years (1939-1946)
The 1940's were a period of rapid economic growth as a result of the 
protection from foreign competition and the stimulus to production 
afforded by the war. By 1943 the contribution of manufacturing to 
national income surpassed that of mining. The number of industrial 
establishments had increased from 6 543 in 1932 to 9 999 in 1946. There 
were also important changes in the structure of production. As a result 
of a sectoral shift within manufacturing the industrial group 
comprising metal products, machinery and transport equipment emerged as 
the leading industrial sector. This trend was reflected in the 
increasing capital intensity of the manufacturing sector as a whole
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(O'Meara, 1975, p. 61). With the increased mechanisation of production 
secondary industry increasingly required semi-skilled labour power in 
place of skilled (artisan) labour power. There was a dramatic increase 
in the employment of Black workers - in more skilled positions - which 
was intensified by the military mobilisation of White workers. 
Semi-skilled work required a more stable labour force, and also created 
opportunities for the employment of African women in industry. The 
number of African workers employed in manufacturing increased from 
156 000 in 1939 to 245 000 by 1945 (O'Meara, 1975, p. 61).
The employment of African workers in semi-skilled positions increased 
their bargaining power. Unions were established in the clothing, 
furniture, laundry, baking and in the mining industry during the war. 
This period saw the further growth of Indian trades unions in Durban as 
well as strike action in support of higher wages and better working 
conditions. An analysis of these developments forms the major focus of 
this study.
Although the African National Congress (ANC) and the CPSA had expressed 
support for the government in the 'war effort', the African working 
class disregarded ideological pressures to subordinate their interests 
to the 'war effort' (Harries, 1981). While in the period between 1930 
and 1939 a total of 26 254 Blacks had struck work for an average of 2,7 
man-days and a total loss of 71 078 man-days, the corresponding figures 
for the period between 1940 and 1945 were 52 394 Black workers on 
strike for an average of 4,2 man-days and a total loss of 220 205 
man-days (O'Meara, 1975, p. 66). The state responded to the increase in 
strike action by introducing War Measures legislation, which outlawed 
strikes by African workers, imposed severe penalties and provided for 
compulsory arbitration. However, workers continued to strike for better 
wages and improved working conditions. The 1945 Department of Labour 
Report complained that "the Natives seem to be ignoring War Measure 
145".8
A number of African unions came together in 1941 to form the Council of 
non-European Trades Unions (CNETU). Although there were plans to expand 
CNETU on a national basis, the bulk of its affiliated membership
15.
remained on the Rand. By 1945 the CNETU claimed a membership of 158 000 
in 119 unions (Luckhardt and Wall, 1979, p. 60). During the 1940's 
unions were formed in a number of industries in which African workers 
had hitherto not been organised. The ANC and the CPSA decided to work 
together to organise a union of Black mineworkers and in April 1941 a 
conference was held, to discuss the formation of the union, at which 80 
delegates from 41 organisations (including the CPSA, CNETU, ANC and the 
SAIRR) were present. The African Mineworkers' Union (AMU) was formed 
with JB Marks as president. At the same time Daniel Koza of the African 
Commercial and Distributive Workers' Union was active in organising 
workers in the coal and timber industries in the Transvaal. In Cape 
Town Ray Alexander and others were successful in forming a Food and 
Canning Workers' Union (FCWU) in 1941. Disagreements over support for 
the war effort were to lead to divisions within the CNETU. While 
elements from the ANC and the CPSA within CNETU advised workers to 
support the war effort and not engage in strike action, other 
unionists, like Daniel Koza took a militant line and argued that 
workers should continue to fight for better working conditions and 
higher wages (Harries, 1981, pp. 2-34). Daniel Koza and other 
'Trotskyists' formed the Progressive Trade Union Group (PTU) which 
established itself as a caucus in the CNETU. In 1944 differences 
between the PTU and the ANC and CPSA group within the CNETU came to a 
head and the PTU was expelled, soon after which it collapsed. By the 
end of the war the CNETU was in a weak position, partly as a result of 
the divisions within it and partly because of state repression in the 
form of the War Measures Act No. 145.
In 1946 African mineworkers on the Rand, led by the AMU, struck work 
after the Chamber of Mines had repeatedly ignored their demands for 
higher wages and better working conditions. Between 70 000 and 100 000 
African miners stopped work between the 12 and 17 August. The police 
were called in and the strike was brutally suppressed. By the time the 
strike ended about 12 miners had been killed, 1 200 injured and 88 
trade unionists had been arrested (see O'Meara, 1975). The CNETU's call 
for a general strike of all workers in its unions in solidarity with 
the miners met with little response because the organisation was weak 
and divided. There was a decline in African trades unionism from 1946. 
The re-absorption of White ex-servicemen into the economy and the
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large-scale government-sponsored European immigration to South Africa 
had resulted in the slowing down of the entrance of Africans into 
semi-skilled and skilled position in manufacturing. Moreover, the 
tightening up of influx control regulations and the removal of squatter 
communities from the urban areas placed African workers in an insecure 
position and defused their militancy {O'Meara, 1975, p. 79).
1.6 The Immediate Post-War Period (1947-1954)
The militancy of the African workers during the Second World War 
prompted the state to reassess its policy towards African trades 
unions. The United Party Government drew up the Industrial 
Conciliation Bill in 1947, which recommended the extension of some form 
of official recognition over African trades unions, under a separate 
arbitration system, rather than the Industrial Conciliation Act (Davies 
and Lewis, 1976, p. 63). However, with the electoral victory of the 
Nationalist Party the Industrial Conciliation Bill was set aside and 
the Industrial Legislation (Botha) Commission of Enquiry was appointed. 
The Botha Commission, while warning against African trades unions 
pursuing political goals, argued that the pursuance of such goals was 
more likely in the case of unrecognized and uncontrolled unions. The 
Commission then recommended a two-stage process of recognition whereby 
every union would be certified but not necessarily recognised. Although 
the United Party and Labour Party both supported these recommendations 
they were rejected by the Nationalist Party.
The Nationalist Government launched an assault against the trades union 
movement in South Africa. In 1950 the Suppression of Communism Act was 
passed. Under the Act communism was defined in broad terms: the law 
could regard as a Communist any person who "aimed at bringing any 
political, industrial, social or economic change in the country by 
unlawful acts" (Roux, 1964, p. 380). The first victims of the Act were 
trades unionists, namely, JB Marks (African Mineworkers' Union), Issy 
Wolfson (Tailoring Workers' Union) and Solly Sachs (Garment Workers'
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Union) (Roux, 1964, p. 381). The Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) 
Act was passed in 1953, which proscribed strike action by African 
workers, denied them participation in the formal channels of wage 
negotiation and set up a separate industrial conciliation machinery. 
This machinery took the form of a bureaucratic structure, comprising 
Bantu Labour Officers, Regional Bantu Labour Committees, Works 
Committees and a Bantu Central Board (Davies and Lewis, 1976, p. 65). 
The works committees were intended to replace African trades unions by 
serving as communication channels between African workers and their 
employers. However, African workers rejected the works committee system 
and by May 1960 only ten such committees had been formed in the entire 
country (Horner, 1976, p. 15).
By 1950 the divisions between the artisan and industrial unions had 
left the TLC in disarray. The artisan as well as the exclusive 
industrial unions withdrew from the TLC taking more than 50 000 
affiliated members with them. The artisan and exclusive industrial 
unions which had defected formed a separate coordinating body, the 
South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) in 1951, with 16 
affiliated unions and 80 000 members. When the introduction of a new 
industrial conciliation machinery which would split the mixed White, 
Indian and Coloured unions and provide job reservation in industry, 
became imminent, the artisan unions attempted to rebuild some unity in 
the labour movement. A Trade Union Unity Committee was formed in 1954 
under the guidance of the Typographical Workers, Boilermakers and other 
artisans unions. Most of the remnants of the established White trades 
union movement - with the exception of the exclusive industrial and 
artisan unions in state employmment - came together in 1955 to 
form the South African Trade Union Council (SATUC) (Greenberg, 1980, 
pp. 293-301).
A group of unions that were opposed to the exclusion of African unions 
from the SATUC formed the Trade Union Coordinating Committee (TUCC). 
The TUCC, in cooperation with CNETU formed a new trade union 
coordinating body in March 1955, the South African Congress of Trade 
Unions (SACTU) (Luckhardt and Wall, 1979, pp. 89-90).®
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These general developments in the history of the South African working 
class may be summarised as follows: between the years 1900 and 1920 
white workers, particularly on the mines, were successful in using 
their crafts union organisations and the strike weapon to win gains for 
themselves. This lesson was not lost on the emerging Black 
proletariat, and they too engaged in strike action in support of 
demands for higher wages. However, the absence of stable worker 
organisations limited the effectiveness of Black worker struggles in 
this early period and, although there were sporadic incidents of 
strikes by indentured Indian labourers, their resistance was largely 
spontaneous and unorganised.
The First World War laid the basis for further militant worker action 
as a result of war-time industrialisation and the expansion of the 
economy. After the war, inflation put pressure on rural subsistence 
and led to increased labour migration from the rural areas to the 
mining and industrial areas. It was against this background that the 
ICO was formed in Cape Town in 1919. The ICU grew rapidly in 
popularity and by 1927 had reached a peak of 100 000 members. However, 
a combination of internal weaknesses and state pressure had resulted in 
the decline of the ICU by 1929.
From the 1930's on there was a reorganisation and expansion of industry 
so that, while in 1939 there were 156 000 Black workers in 
manufacturing, by 1945 this figure had grown to 245 000. The 
expansion of secondary industry and the concomitant changes in the 
labour process presented a challenge to the skilled workers and their 
crafts unions, forcing many crafts unions to transform themselves into 
industrial unions. The growth of industrial unions led to the 
formation of the non-racial TLC in 1930. However, in spite of the 
TLC's non-racial stance, the organisation was plagued by conflict 
between the racist artisan and exclusive industrial unions on the one 
hand, and the open industrial unions on the other.
During the Second World War Black workers moved into more skilled 
positions, particularly as there was a shortage of skilled White 
workers. Industrial unions were established in the clothing, 
furniture, laundry, baking and gold mining industry. Despite
19
restrictions on the right to strike, these new unions, from their new 
standpoint and position of strength, made many immediate material gains 
and formed a new union federation - the CNETU. The militancy of these 
new unions reached a peak in 1946 when African mine workers came out on 
strike over wages. In Durban a number of unions were formed by Indian 
and other Black workers, especially after the Great Depression, and 
there was an upsurge in (Indian) worker action, especially in the 
period 1937-1942.
By 1950, however, both the CNETU and the TLC had dissolved. Indeed, 
the entire Black trade union movement was in a state of decline by this 
time, partly as a result of structural weaknesses within the unions and 
partly as a result of state pressure.
This then concludes the overview of trades unionism in South Africa up 
to the end of the period relevant to our study. We have at the same 
time surveyed the available literature dealing with Indian workers as 
it relates to specific instances of worker organisation and resistance 
in the years prior to 1930. Those general works which deal exclusively 
or partially with Indians in South Africa and include some account of 
Indian workers and trades unions are reviewed in Appendix A.These 
include the works of Ginwala (1974); Pahad (1972); Johnson (1973); Swan 
(1982); burrows (1952); Smith (1945); Ringrose (1951); Simons and 
Simons (1983) and Roux (1964) among others.
Having surveyed the major developments in the history of working class 
organisation and action in South Africa we now turn to examine the 
origins and growth of union organisation and resistance among Indian 
workers in Durban in the period 1930-1950. We begin in Chapter 2 with 
an analysis of the economic forces and changes underpinning the 
emergence of the Indian working class and the formation of 
organisations in defence of the interest of this class.
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CHAPTER TWO
INDIAN WORKERS IN THE ECONOMY OF NATAL : C1920-C1960
2.1 Introduction
The discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa in the latter 
decades of the nineteenth century provided the impetus for the rapid 
transformation of the South African social formation from a pastoral/ 
agrarian economy to an industrially based one. In just over one 
hundred years South Africa changed from a peripheral part of the world 
economic system to a fairly sophisticated and developed sub-metropole 
of that system. (Legassick, 1977, p.175)
Twenty-six years prior to the discovery of the major gold reefs in the 
Transvaal, the first of the indentured Indian workers who were imported 
into Natal from 1860 to 1911 landed in Durban to work as agricultural 
labourers in the then colony’s sugar estates^. 1885 saw the arrival 
from India and Mauritius of groups of Indian traders - the so-called 
passenger Indians. After the termination of their period of indenture 
'free Indians' in Natal found economic opportunities outside the sugar 
plantations at relatively higher wages and even indentured Indian 
labour began to be used increasingly outside the sugar estates - the 
raison d'etre for the original immigration to Natal. And despite the 
introduction of measures such as the £3 tax on 'free Indians' to retain 
them within the system of indenture in peri-urban estates, a steadily 
increasing number found their way or were forced into wage employment 
in coal mining, industries, the municipalities and railways.^ These 
changed occupational patterns of employment amongst other factors led 
to the emergence of a largely industrially based Indian working class 
'movement' either through 'Indian' or non-racial trade union 
organisations by the late 1930's and 1940's. This study is primarily 
concerned with these developments. However in order to understand the 
dynamics underlying such developments it is important to survey briefly 
some aspects of the demographic and socio-economic structure of the 
Indian population*.
* Appendix B reviews briefly the age, sex and educational data for 
the Indian population of Natal 1921-1951.
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In the main this survey will cover the years 1920-1960 with emphasis on 
the 1930’s and 1940's and will concentrate on Natal and more especially 
Greater Durban.
2.2 Population Distribution and Urbanisation
Since the arrival of the first Indians in South Africa their numbers 
grew from approximately 650 in 1860 to 163 000 in 1921 and 477 000 in 
1960. By far the largest concentration of Indians was in Natal. In 
1911 87,7 per cent and in 1951 81,7 per cent of all Indians lived in 
this province3. Table 2.1 shows this population distribution for 
South Africa, Natal and the Durban Municipality.
Table 2.1 Population Distribution of Indians, South Africa, Natal, 
Durban. Census Years 1911-1960.
1 2 3 4
Year South Africa Natal Durban Municipality
1911 152 094 133 000 _
1921 163 594 142 000 49 688
1936 219 691 184 000 80 486
1946 285 260 232 000 106 604
1951 366 664 299 000 147 264
1960 477 047 395 000
Source: Union Statistics for 50 years A-4.
S.A . Statistics 1974 (1.5 and 1.11)
Burrows, J.R. (1959, p. 24).
Column 4 of Table 2.1 shows the total number of Indians living in the 
Durban municipal area and indicates the increasing trend towards 
urbanization among Indians. Thus whereas in the first 50 years after 
their arrival the overwhelming majority of Indians were rural dwellers
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by 1921, one-third of the Indian population was urban and two-thirds 
rural, and by 1936 two-thirds were urbanised and only one-third was 
rural4 . And this shift had occurred in spite of the earlier attempts 
to maintain Indian labour within the sugar estates and the introduction 
of measures to limit their size and placement^ - measures which were 
designed to control and manage labour within the city (Durban) and 
surrounding areas and to restrict their economic opportunities outside 
the sugar estates. This increasing urbanization reflects not only a 
natural increase in population and changes in urban boundaries but 
also, importantly, a drift into towns as Indians were increasingly 
forced off agricultural land and employment from the turn of the 
century. In fact the proportion of the Indian population of Natal over 
15 years of age employed in agriculture fell from 26% in 1921 to 18% in 
1936 and to 10,8% in 1946, whereas amongst the same population 
industrial employment rose from 9% in 1921 to 12% in 1936 and 16% in 
1946 despite a marked slowdown in the growth of Indian employment in 
manufacturing virtually throughout the 1920's. Employment in mining for 
this population dropped from 3% in 1921 to 1% in 1936 and 0,2% in 1946, 
whereas employment in the public service and professional category fell 
from 6% in 1921 to 4% in 1936 and to 2% in 1946.^ it is to a more 
detailed analysis of this changing industrial and occupational 
structure - especially for the main categories just discussed - that 
we now turn, for it is precisely this area that is of greatest 
relevance to this study.
2.3 Employment in Agriculture
At the expiry of their contract of indenture in the sugar estates many 
Indians decided to remain in South Africa. Some of these previously 
indentured labourers took to market gardening, hawking or trading. 
Others left rural areas and moved to the towns as tailors, cooks, 
waiters, railway workers, municipal employees and domestic and personal 
service people. This trend continued until, by the 1890's, the 
ex-indentured labourers were no longer functioning as an auxiliary 
agricultural labour force but increasingly sought alternative means of 
subsistence (Swan 1984, p. 241). In order to impose greater controls
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over the movement of Indians and to retain in this way the basis of a 
cheap labour system, a tax of £3 was imposed upon Indian men, women and 
children (who indentured after 1895) and who wished to stay in Natal 
without re-indenturing. The combined effect of the annual £3 tax and 
the severely depressed economy (with widespread unemployment and 
destitution) meant that thousands of Indians were unable to pay the tax 
and were thus forced back into contract work, where payment of the tax 
was suspended for the contract period. The extent of these pressures 
maybe be gauged from the fact that in 1913, four years after the 
economic recovery, 62,5% of the indentured workforce were under second 
or subsequent terms of indenture (Swan, 1982, p. 5).
Following the 1913 strike which was directed at the abolition of the £3 
tax (among other grievances) the law was repealed and Indians were 
temporarily, at least, able to resist being forced into contract wage 
labour in the sugar estates.7 However after the First World War 
other kinds of economic pressure forced Indians to accept relatively 
low paying jobs in industry. Certainly after 1910 Indian employment in 
agriculture began to decline rapidly. A decline of Indian employment 
in general agriculture occurred from 36 238 in 1911 to 13 691 in 1946 
(Arkin, 1981, p. 141). Table 2.2 shows the numbers of Indians and 
Africans employed in the sugar estates (1910-1945).
Table 2.2: The Number of Indians and Africans Employed on the Sugar 
Estates 1910-1945
Year Indians (No.) % Africans (No.) %
1910 18 270 88 2 380 12
1925 1 1 440 29 27 873 71
1933 8 020 17 40 263 83
1945 4 500 7 55 778 93
Source: Arkin (1981 p. 143.)
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Daring the period 1910 to 1945 the proportion of Indians in the labour 
force of the sugar estates fell from 88 per cent to seven per cent, 
with the African share in the force rising from 12 to 93 per cent in 
the same time. The ending of the indenture system in 1911 was one 
factor precipitating this change. The decline in Indian employment in 
agriculture, especially the sugar estates was, however, exacerbated by 
many, often interacting, factors. Among these were the following:
1. Wages paid to Indian workers in the sugar estates were well below 
industrial and mining wages. In 1915 the money wage of field workers 
in the sugar estates was R42 per year as compared to an average wage 
per Indian employee of R50 in 'wood', R80 in 'metal' and 'textiles', 
R104 in 'printing', R98 in 'vehicles' and R92 in 'furniture' (Arkin 
1981, pp. 220-221). In addition, Indians' reluctance to work on the 
mines forced coal companies to offer higher basic wages and generally 
better conditions than in agriculture. Skilled domestic servants 
commanded wages 2-10 times those of agricultural workers (Swan, 1984, 
p. 243).
2. Conditions of housing on the sugar estates were extremely poor. By 
as late as 1929 the Protector of Indian immigrants noted that the 
'barracks on some of the estates are in very bad order and really not 
fit for human habitation', and in 1933 he reported that though 
"accommodation for Indians had greatly improved on many estates ... 
some are still given very poor quarters" (1934 Report). To the 
extremely squalid housing conditions one needs to add overwork, in 
season up to 17 or 18 hours a day, malnutrition and rampant disease 
(evident from the Protector's Reports) as factors contributing to the 
movement out of agricultural employment. This occurred especially after 
the abolition of the £3 tax in 1914 eased the pressures to re-indenture 
which had persisted until 1913. 3
3. Pernaps the most important factor underpinning the decline in 
Indian employment in agriculture was the replacement of Indians by 
African labour especially in field-work. Faced with increasing 
difficulty in competing on the world market, the sugar industry
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began to be more and more concerned with cost-cutting. And to this end 
Africans had the 'advantage' of being 'single' workers. Thus the 
Protector of Indian inuni grants notes in his report of 1933 that 
"Natives are being employed on many estates in place of Indians, a 
great deal owing to the fact that in the case of Natives the employer 
has not their wives and families to provide acommodation for as he has 
in the case of Indians." An additional 'advantage' to the sugar barons 
was that Africans did not need to be provided with 'expensive' imported 
food stuffs (Arkin 1981, p. 143). Thus contrary to the view that 
Indians abandoned agricultural employment solely because they were 
attracted to urban life, it appears that the element of 'voluntarism' 
behind these changes was limited. And even though the interaction of 
push and pull factors contributing to the decline in Indian 
agricultural employment are complex, Burrows makes the point that for 
Indians the so-called drift into towns was "due less to the offer of 
attractive employment or even of any employment at all than to economic 
pressure driving them off the land" (1940, p. 29). As long as employers 
could pay indentured Indian workers the extremely low wage determined 
by their contract they continued to employ them. And in addition, the 
indenture system was by far the most reliable recruitment operation in 
that, as Lincoln points out (1984, p. 8), "it guaranteed a minimum of 
five years of work from its subjects, who were paid at an inflexible 
rate and who were relatively easily policed". The gradual reduction in 
re-indenture after 1914, the ending of new indenture in 1911 and the 
concomitant upward tendency in the wages of free Indians (under the 
influence of alternative higher paid work outside the estates) hastened 
the switch to African labour in the sugar estates of Natal after 1911.
4. To these forces related to Indian fieldworkers in the sugar estates 
must be added the narrowing opportunities for the ex-indentured Indians 
to earn an independent livelihood as farmers. Especially after the 
depression (1929-32) as Swan (1982, p. 8) points out,
evictions by land-owners extending their own operations 
in the rural areas and by the Durban City Council as 
industrialisation advanced through the peri-urban areas 
pushed others off the land. The 1936 Sugar Agreement
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meant to protect small White cane farmers from the 
growing monopoly of large estates eliminated numbers of 
petty Indian cultivators who could not meet the quotas 
set by the Agreement (1982, p. 8).
All these factors are likely to have initiated or reinforced the 
movement of Indians out of agricultural employment. Thus poor housing 
and relatively low wages, coupled with their substitution (as field= 
workers) by Africans, interacted to determine the changing industry/ 
occupational distribution of Indians in the early decades of this 
century.
But it was not just in the sugar estates that problems of declining 
employment set in, for in addition the First World War affected 
conditions in both the coal and wattlebark industries, and by placing 
constraints on the further diversification of Indian employment, forced 
the pace of (industrial) proletarianization. The Protector of Indian 
Immigrants reports (1914)
The war has been upsetting chiefly in connection with 
coal and wattlebark industries. All mines report a 
much restricted output of coal, while one large mine 
has practically been closed down and the fall in the 
price of wattlebark has been a heavy handicap. In 
consequence fewer Indians are being employed in those 
industries and many of the Indians thus released [sic] 
are gravitating to the coast...
An analysis of employment figures in the mining industry shows that 
Indian employment fell from 3 739 in 1911 to 602 in 1946 (Arkin, 1981, 
p. 141). This decline in Indian employment in mining also reflects the 
virtual closure of employment opportunities on the gold mines of the 
Witwatersrand from about 1903/4 when control over Indian immigration to 
the Transvaal began to be tightened up.
2.4 Employment in the Service Sector
By the first few decades of this century, other sectors of the economy 
of Natal (outside agriculture) began employing Indian wage labour. 
Foremost amongst those - certainly up to 1930 was the
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services sector. Thus the Durban Corporation, for example, employed 
approximately 2 000 Indians in the 1920’s and as many as 3 000 by 
1939 mainly in the cleansing department.8 * Indian employment in the
Old Natal Government Railways stood at 6 000 in 1910. Many Indian men 
and women were employed as domestic servants in private households and 
private non-profit organizations (5 200 in 1936). Indians were also 
employed in transport services, mainly as drivers of motor vehicles and 
they also occupied an important position as employees in the Natal 
Liquor and Catering Trade. The majority of those employed in the 
professional categories were teachers. In 1936 there were some 850
Qprofessional persons of whom about 70% were teachers.
By 1951, however, Indian employment outside the private sector was 
relatively small with only seven per cent employed by the central, 
provincial and local governments or by the railways and post office. 
This declining trend in public sector employment began to set in from 
the 1920's. Thus in 1924 there were, for instance, 2 081 Indian men 
employed by the Railways but only 572 in 193318. In other 
government departments 955 Indians were employed in 1924 as against 217 
in 1934. In municipal employment displacement of Indians was less 
marked although in 1931 the Minister of Labour exhorted the Durban City 
Council to replace Indian employees by Whites, following which in 
November 1931 the Council dismissed 49 of its Indian employees11.
These dwindling employment opportunities in the service sector, 
and the fall in Indian employment in the primary sector, ie. 
agriculture and coal mining, could only have increased further the 
pressures towards full proletarianization.
2.5 Manufacturing Employment
It was only early in this century under the influence of the First
World War, the post-war protectionist policies of the 1924 Pact
government and the wake of the assault waged by the State against the
working class12, that manufacturing industry came to play an
increasingly important part in the structure of production in South
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Africa. From 1917/18 to 1945/46 the proportion of national income 
derived from agriculture, fishing and forestry declined from 21,6 per 
cent to 11,9 per cent, while the relative contribution of manufacturing 
industry increased from nine comma six per cent to 21,4 per cent13. 
From 1915/16 to 1917/18, 1 699 new factories opened, the total number 
of factories rising from 5 961 in 1919 to 12 517 in 1949/50.
Reflecting the changing attitude of the government to industrial 
development Smuts was able to say in 1919
I would ask us to recognise that the great task before us 
is no longer racial but has become industrial. The great 
world war has resulted in conditions which give us a 
unique opportunity to develop this country and to push 
ahead with a forward industrial and development policy.1,1
In 1929 the Labour department's journal stated
South Africa is in the midst of a far-reaching economic 
revolution, the keynote of which is the efflorescence 
of a great variety of secondary industries and the 
progressive industrialization of large sections of the 
population13.
The directional switch in favour of industrialization marked certain 
important changes which occurred in the intersectoral composition of 
this output - in particular the importance of consumer goods 
production. Hobart Houghton writes (1973, p. 119):
Many of the new factories were producing final consumer 
goods often from imported raw materials or from semi­
finished products. For example clothing manufacture 
from imported textiles preceded by many years the growth 
of a textile industry, inspite of the fact that South 
Africa was a major producer of wool. This bias towards 
the production of consumer goods rather than the 
processing of South African materials is to be explained 
by the size of the market, the relative amount of 
capital required and by certain technical factors.
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Manufacturing production in Natal shared in this industrial 
development, the number of factories in the province increasing from 
597 in 1915/16 to 976 in 1919/20 and to 1983 in 1950/51, of which 1 154 
were situated in the Durban-Pinetown area^. The gross value of 
manufactured output in Natal more than doubled from £9 665 505 in 
1915/16 to £21 978 325 in 1919/20^. The most important industrial 
sectors assessed in terms of the values of plant and equipment and the 
number of establishments were food and drink, vehicles, metal and 
engineering, building and contracting and chemicals . Table 2.3 
shows the gross value of output by class of industry for Durban- 
Pinetown between 1924/25 and 1953/54 and indicates that the more 
important sectors of the region over this period assessed in terms of 
the value of output were in, metal and engineering, food and drink, 
chemicals, building and construction and clothing and textiles . 
Table 2.4 indicates that the Durban-Pinetown region, with the 
additional impact of the Second World War continued to grow rapidly 
throughout the decade of the 1940s, with the number of establishments 
growing by nearly 50%, employment by 95% and net output (in nominal 
terms) by over 350%.
Of these various indices of growth and change the area of industrial 
errgployment needs more careful consideration. Table 2.5 shows 
manufacturing enployment in Greater Durban, Natal, and the Union from 
1924/25 to 1952/53.
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Table 2.3 ; Value of Gross Output of the Main Sectors of Industry In 
Durban-Pinetown - 1924/25 - 1953/54 - (Constant 1953/54 prices)
£000s
Class of Industry 1924/25 1937/38 1953/54
Chemicals 3 590 (2)* 6 532 (2)* 33 212 (2)
Clothing, Textiles,
Footwear and Leather 657 2 782 22 665 (3)
Metal and Engineering 1 633 (4) 5 025 (3) 13 105 (4)
Transport 245 620 8 776
Food, Drink, Tobacco 5 324 (1) 12 005 (1) 36 130 (1)
Printing and Paper 817 1 970 8 050
Wood and Furniture 1 043 1 959 4 117
Non-metallic minerals 277 885 1 838
Building and Construction 1 897 (3) 3 543 (4) 8 721
Total private industry 16 655 42 676 147 964
*1 Private industries only *2 Ranking
Source: Katzen (1961, p. 132)
Table 2.4: Industrial Establishments, Employment and Net Output for
the Durban-Pinetown Metropolitan Area 1938-1952
Years No. of Estab. Employees Net Output (£1000)
1938-9 863 38 499 11 204
1945-6 934 58 894 24 461
1946-7 947 60 079 27 396
1949-50 1 191 78 888 40 722
1950-51 1 154 71 768 42 814
1951-52 1 120 75 056 48 167
Source: Leo Kuper, Watts & Davies, (1958, p. 48)
31.
Table 2.5: Manufacturing Employment: in Greater Durban and in Natal and 
the Union, 1924/25 - 1952/53
CENSUS
YEAR
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 
EMPLOYMENT IN
DURBAN AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF
UNION NATAL DURBAN UNION NATAL
1924/25 ...... 191 598 43 561 25 595 13 59
1929/30 ...... 218 298 44 833 26 013 12 58
1934/35 ...... 265 848 47 229 28 146 11 60
1939/40 ...... 360 456 65 070 41 074 11 63
1944/45 ...... 488 661 86 401 57 873 12 67
1949/50 ...... 712 103 113 033 78 888 11 70
1952/53 ...... 819 640 135 390 89 695 11 66
Source: Burrows (1959, p. 176).
It is evident from Table 2.5 that manufacturing employment in Natal and 
Durban grew only marginally in the decade of the 1920s; probably fell
in the years of the great depression and rose rapidly in the pre- and 
20post-war expansions. The war years, as Burrows notes (1959,
p.176), were perhaps
the most crucial period in the growth of South African 
industrial employment for although the rate of increase 
was neither materially accelerated or decelerated, the 
- peculiar and short-lived shortages and needs of a 
war-time economy brought about dramatic and permanent 
changes in the industrial structure and in its race and 
sex composition.
But in addition the growth of manufacturing employment proceeded at 
different rates as Table 2.6, which shows the growth of employment in 
manufacturing industry by class of industry for Greater Durban, 
indicates. Thus while the major sectors (clothing, construction, 
chemicals, engineering and food) accounted for 56 per cent of 
employment in 1925, this rose to 70 per cent in 1954. The share of the 
smaller industries (transport, paper, furniture), on the other hand,
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Table 2.6: Growth of Employment in Manufacturing Industry by Class of Industry
Durban, 1924/25 - 1953/54
CLASS 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1954
N U M B E R S
Clothing, etc. 1 557 2 066 4 325 6 014 8 693 12 721 15 988
Construction 3 166 3 378 3 450 5 579 6 647 10 008 14 505
Chemicals 2 760 3 202 3 058 4 231 6 898 10 018 12 461
Engineering 2 296 2 733 3 016 5 191 10 447 10 904 11 016
Food 3 391 3 837 3 819 4 756 6 696 8 270 10 167
Transport 579 834 832 1 620 1 706 3 070 5 282
Paper 843 1 095 1 192 1 848 1 823 3 368 4 347
Furniture 1 835 1 886 1 862 2 193 3 179 '3 709 3 945
Others 1 215 1 310 1 950 2 880 4 089 4 416 5 951
Total, Private 17 642 20 341 23 504 34 312 50 178 66 484 83 662
Total, Public 7 953 5 672 4 642 6 762 7 695 12 404 8 523
TOTAL, INDUSTRY 25 595 26 013 28 146 41 074 57 873 78 888 92 185
P E R C E N T A G E S
CLASS 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1954
N U M B E R S
Clothing, etc. 6.1 7.9 15.4 14.6 15.0 16.1 17.3
Construction 12.4 13.0 12.3 13.6 1 1.5 12.7 15.7
Chemicals 10.8 12.3 10.9 10.3 11.9 12.7 13.5
Engineering 9.0 10.5 10.7 12.6 18.1 13.8 12.0
Food 13.2 14.8 13.6 11.6 11.6 10.5 11.0
Transport 2.3 3.2 3.0 3.9 2.9 3.9 5.7
Paper 3.3 4.2 4.2 4.5 3.1 4.3 4.7
Furniture 7.2 7.3 6.6 5.3 5.5 4.7 4.3
Others 4.7 5.0 6.9 7.0 7.1 5.6 6.5
Total, Private 68.9 78.2 83.5 83.5 86.7 84.3 90.8
Total, Public . .  . 31.1 21 .8 16.5 16.5 13.3 15.7 9.2
TOTAL, INDUSTRY 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Burrows (1959, p. 179)
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remained fairly constant. The greatest mean annual rate of increase 
(not shown in Table 2.6) was recorded in the clothing/textile industry 
in which the ten-fold increase in employment represented some 22 per 
cent of the total increase in manufacturing employment between 1925 and 
1954.
Changes in the racial composition of employment in manufacturing in 
Greater Durban are shown in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Growth of Manufacturing Employment in Greater Durban,
by Racial Groups, 1924/25 - 1953/1954
YEAR EUROPEANS NATIVES INDIANS COLOUREDS ALL RACES
No. No. No. Index* No. No. Index*
1924/25 ...... 7 848 11 787 5 237 100 723 25 595 100
1929/30 ...... 9 367 11 109 4 681 89 856 26 013 102
1934/35 ...... 10 634 10 887 5 647 108 978 28 146 110
1939/40 ...... 13 565 17 528 8 450 161 1 531 41 074 161
1944/45 ...... 15 251 28 878 1 1 549 221 2 195 57 873 226
1949/50 ...... 21 096 41 062 13 711 262 3 019 78 888 308
1953/54 ...... 23 737 47 709 16 827 321 3 912 92 185 360
*Index 1925 = 100
Source: Adapted from Burrows (1959, p. 151).
The total labour force employed in manufacturing industry increased 
over the period. 1925-1954 by some 66 000 workers, with White workers 
increasing by 16 000, Africans by 36 000, Indians by nearly 12 000 and 
Coloureds by 3 000. Although Indian employment in manufacturing 
expanded noticeably this was by no means a uniform expansion, and 
especially in the years 1924-30 the table shows an absolute decline. 
And they experienced a slight decline relative to Coloured and African 
employment in manufacturing over this period. The proportion of Indian 
women in manufacturing employment in Natal was small, being 3% in 1936 
and no more than 4% in 1946 (Burrows 1959, p. 133.)
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An analysis of the distribution of workers by type of industry for 
1953/54 (Table 2.8) reveals the heavy concentrations of Indians in the 
clothing industry (in which they outnumber other groups) and 
significant numbers in the engineering (metal), food, paper and 
furniture industries. This sectoral concentration of Indian workers in 
1953/54 was virtually the same throughout the 1930's and 1940's (Katzen 
1961, Appendices).
Table 2.8: Distribution of Workers by Class of Industry According to Race,
Greater Durban, 1953/54
CLASS EUROPEANS NATIVES INDIANS COLOUREDS ALL RACES
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Clothing, etc. 1 627 7 5 473 12 6 759 40 2 129 54 15 988 17
Construction 3 330 14 10 369 22 609 4 197 5 14 505 16
Chemicals 4 297 18 7 354 15 673 4 137 4 12 461 14
Engineering 3 277 14 5 907 12 1 306 8 526 13 11 016 12
Food 1 760 7 5 917 12 2 387 14 103 3 10 167 11
Transport 1 785 8 2 624 6 335 2 538 14 5 282 6
Paper 1 530 6 1 452 3 1 320 8 45 1 4 347 5
Furniture 821 4 1 567 3 1 485 9 72 2 3 945 4
Others 1 388 6 2 556 5 1 861 11 146 4 5 951 6
Total, Private 19 815 83 43 219 91 16 735 99 3 893 100 83 662 91
Total, Public 3 922 17 4 490 9 92 1 19 0 8 523 9
TOTAL 23 737 100 47 709 100 16 827 100 3 912 100 92 185 100
Source: Burrows (1959, p. 183).
A more detailed picture of the changes in and composition of the Indian 
labour force in the major branches of manufacturing between 1917-1946 
is shown in Table 2.9. Although these figures relate to the whole of 
South Africa they nevertheless reflect, with fair accuracy, the pattern 
for Natal and Greater Durban, as between 65-70 per cent of all Indians 
employed in manufacturing over the period were so employed in the 
Greater Durban area.
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Table 2.9: The Composition of the Indian Labour Force in Major
Branches of Manufacturing in South Africa 1917-1946
Class of Industry 1917 1929 1936 1946
I Raw materials 95 226 173 140
II Stone, clay, etc. 447 385 363 743
Ill Wood 581 400 584 809
IV Metals, engineering 645 621 957 1 176
V Food, drink & tobacco 7 884 4 611 4 666 4 778
VI Clothing, textiles, etc. 345 1 180 2 485 4 632
VII Books, printing, etc. 285 344 477 945
VIII Vehicles, etc. 78 108 163 249
IX Shipbuilding 50 44 63 104
X Furniture 313 505 581 1 182
XI Chemicals, etc. 1 214 542 437 758
XII Surgical instruments, etc. — — — 2
XIII Jewellery, etc. 31 3 6 26
XIV Heat, light, & power 102 117 136 260
XV Leather & leatherware 139 306 650 1 863
XVI Building & contracting 86 98 269 107
XVII Miscellaneous 18 38 255 245
Total 12 313 9 528 12 265 17 620
Source: Industrial Censuses, 1917, 1929, 1936, 1946.
The above table indicates that the food industry - mainly workers in 
the sugar mills outside Greater Durban - remained despite a fall in 
numbers the largest employer of Indian workers in South Africa during 
the period. There was a noticeable decline in Indian employment in the 
chemical industry, but a large increase in the clothing and textile 
sector.
In general there appears to have been a substantial increase in Indian 
wage employment in the manufacturing sector especially after the Great 
Depression (9 528 in 1929 as against 17 620 in 1946 for South Africa as
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a whole) with the clothing/textile, metal/engineering, books/printing, 
furniture and leather industries being the main sub-sector sources of 
new employment. Indian employment in manufacturing continued to 
increase between 1946 and 1960 with total employment rising from 17 620 
in 1946 to 22 005 in 1951 and 31 642 in 1960 (Arkin, 1981, p. 299). By 
1960 the major branches of manufacturing in which Indians were employed 
remained the same as those for 1946 - food (6 813), textiles (2 538), 
clothing and footwear (12 244), furniture (1 381) and paper and 
printing (2 267). Clothing and footwear had, by 1960, replaced 'food' 
as the leading sector of 'Indian' manufacturing employment. That 
Indians were mainly wage earners is confirmed by Table 2.10 which shows 
that 96,0 per cent of Indians engaged in the manufacturing industry in 
greater Durban in 1952/3 were wage-earners, as against 1,8 percent who 
were working proprietors and 2,2 per cent in managerial positions.
Table 2.10: Grades of Employment of Workers in Manufacturing 
Industries in Greater Durban, 1952/53
RACIAL WORKING MANAGERS, WAGE TOTAL
GROUP PROPRIETORS CLERICAL EARNERS WORKERS
No. % NO. % No. % No. %
Europeans 393 1,7 7 244 31,2 15 563 67,1 23 200 100,0
Natives 1 0,0 230 0,5 46 436 99,5 46 667 100,0
Indians 292 1,8 354 2,2 15 517 96,0 16 163 100,0
Coloureds 3 0,1 11 0,3 3 651 99,6 3 665 100,0
All Races 689 0,8 7 839 8,7 81 ,167 90,5 89 ,695 100,0
Source: Adapted from Burrows (1959, p. 188).
The question of the size of firms is also of some importance. It is 
evident that over this period there was a steadily increasing 
concentration of manufacturing employment in a small number of larger 
firms in this region so that by 1952/3 only 14 per cent of all firms 
employed over 100 workers each and yet employed 73 per cent of the 
manufacturing labour force; and 30 firms (2,2 per cent of the total)
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accounted for a third of all the workers, with an average of over a 
thousand workers per establishment (see Table 2.11) below.
Table 2.11: Number and Size of Manufacturing Industries in Greater 
Durban, 1952/53
SIZE OF ESTABLISH 
MENT (WORKERS)
ESTABLISHMENTS WORKERS EMPLOYED AVERAGE
SIZENo. % Cu. % NO. % Cu. %
1 000 and over 9 0,7 0,7 15 249 17,0 17,0 1 694
501 - 1 000 21 1,5 2,2 14 991 16,7 33,7 714
401 - 500 10 0,7 2,9 4 634 5,2 38,9 463
301 - 400 18 1,3 4,2 6 850 7,6 46,5 381
201 - 300 39 2,9 7,1 9 708 10,8 57,3 249
101 - 200 93 6,9 14,0 14 200 15,8 73,1 153
51 - 100 138 10,2 24,2 9 624 10,7 83,8 70
21 - 50 243 17,9 42,1 8 070 9,0 92,8 33
11 - 20 225 16,6 58,7 3 351 3,7 96,5 15
5 - 10 320 23,6 82,2 2 301 2,6 99,2 7
Under 5 242 17,8 100,0 717 0,8 100,0 3
TOTAL 1 358 100,0 - 89 695 100,0 - 66
Source: Burrows, (1959, p. 187).
The larger establishments were to be found in the public sector, 
(Burrows 1959, p.188) chemicals, food, clothing and construction, with the 
smallest average sizes in transport, furniture and metal/engineering. 
However, these were early days in the path to concentration, 
rationalisation'and monopolies. And many of the industries in which Indian 
workers were being organised, especially in the 1930's and 1940's, were 
still characterised by a preponderance of small firms each with a small 
labour force - a factor which militated against working class organisation 
and cohesiveness. For private industries in the Durban-Pinetown region the 
average size of firms was 36 in 1929/30, 40 in 1939/40 and 57 in 1949/50 
(Katzen, 1961, p. 17).
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The structural change in the South African economy after the First 
World War, which was marked by the rapid growth of the manufacturing 
sector (vis a vis agriculture and mining), created the basis for an 
increase in the employment of factory or production workers. Given this 
shift it was, however, as Arkin points out (1981, p.185), a change in 
the labour process (i.e. in the techniques of manufacturing production) 
which formed one of the chief reasons for Indians increasingly entering 
industrial employment during the period 1911-1946. There was over this 
period a tendency towards the splitting up of more complex operations, 
requiring highly skilled manpower, into a number of relatively simple 
tasks undertaken by semi-skilled operatives. Jon Lewis (1982, p. 94/5) 
also makes the point that by the mid-twenties the traditional division 
of labour in manufacturing between skilled and unskilled workers had 
broken down especially in the consumer product industries, where labour 
processes began to be re-organized on the basis of semi-skilled 
operative labour. Industries such as the manufacture of footwear and 
clothing especially were built on the foundation of semi-skilled 
operators who were efficient in a single task only. And it was as 
semi-skilled operators in the rapidly expanding secondary industry 
sector that large numbers of Indians found employment.
Data on the skill composition of Indian workers in the 1930's and 
1940's may be gathered from the results of investigations undertaken by 
the Wage Board in respect of various industries in which wage 
determinations were made during the period 1937-1948."^ The 
findings were that Indian workers were evenly distributed between the 
three skill groups - 32,5 per cent skilled, 31,7 per cent semi-skilled 
and 35,8 per cent unskilled - as compared to Coloureds (55,3 per cent 
unskilled), Africans (83,5 per cent unskilled) and Whites (2,1 per cent 
unskilled). However, it may be justifiably claimed that not all of the 
classes regarded by the Wage Board as skilled are in fact skilled. 
Their classification of skilled workers included waiters, cooks, 
weavers, bakers, hairdressers, motor vehicle drivers, mechanics, 
blockmen, clerks and slaughtermen who should more accurately be 
classified as semi-skilled. If we downgrade at least some of these 
classes into the semi-skilled category, and some they regarded as 
semi-skilled (such as bakers and confectioners assistants, liftmen.
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pages and valets) into the low skill group, a more accurate picture of 
the skilled composition of Indian workers in this period emerges - one 
in which the overwhelming majority were either semi-skilled or 
unskilled.
It was from these ranks of mainly semi-skilled, unskilled and newly 
proletarianized workers that the new industrial unions emerged in the 
1930's and 1940's. With no 'formal' skills or craft traditions these 
workers more easily "embraced the logic of open industrial unionism" 
(Lewis, 1982, p. 16).
The major structural changes which emerged and began to interact with 
one another in the early decades of this century, and their
implications for Indian workers and trades unionism may now be 
summarised. They were:
1. a shift in emphasis toward industrialization especially consumer 
goods industries, in the post 1918 South African economy and a 
relative decline in the importance of agriculture and mining;
2. a decline in Indian employment in agriculture, especially those 
under contract employment as fieldworkers in the sugar estates;
3. a decline in Indian employment in the collieries of Natal;
4. a decline (albeit uneven) in the employment of Indian workers in 
the public services sector;
5. an increasing movement of Indian workers into the industrial 
economy of- the Greater Durban region and especially into such 
sub-sectors as food, clothing, textiles, metal, furniture and 
paper particularly after the Great Depression;
6. a gradual tendency towards an increasing concentration of 
employment in a few large companies, though this was less apparent 
in the 1930's and 1940's, and
7. the increasing use of semi-skilled operatives in place of skilled 
craftsmen in industry.
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By the mid-thirties onwards, therefore, more and more Indians were 
being propelled into urban wage labour in secondary industry. As Swan 
comments "particularly during and after the Great Depression the 
descendants of the indentured immigrant community were powerless to 
prevent their being pushed out of the countryside into urban wage 
labour with increasing rapidity" (1984, p. 258). Not all, however, 
were successful in finding urban wage employment for the increasing 
dependence upon wage labour meant, as Smith comments (1950, p. 79), "an 
increasing subjection to the economic contingencies such as involuntary 
unemployment [which] have come to characterize the individualistic 
capitalist organizations of society". Thus to the structural changes 
of a mainly sectoral nature just summarized, one needs to add two 
further conditions that are important in understanding and explaining 
the emergence of a trades union movement in Durban. These relate to 
unemployment and low pay, as our inquiry has revealed that low pay and 
the constant threat of unemployement (over this period) were 
significant factors which, by contributing to the general instability 
of the lives of these workers, stimulated the formation of unions as 
defensive organs of this emerging working class.
2.6 Unemployment and Low Wages (1930-1950)
Information on Indian unemployment in Natal in the 1930's and 1940's is 
sketchy to say the least. Burrows reports (1952, p. 25) that there 
were 2 456 Indians unemployed for at least part of 1936 (an 
unemployment rate of 3,6 per cent as against 3,1 per cent for Whites 
and 3,8 per cent for Coloureds). This unusually low rate does not tie 
in well with evidence from other sources and, since it relates to one 
year only, it is, by itself, an inadequate indicator of unemployment 
over the period of the study.
Unemployment statistics by race and region, especially prior to 1946/7 
are for various reasons33 also far from reliable. Nevertheless 
applications by Whites for employment through Government labour 
exchanges between 1930-1940 (Table 2.12) are much higher than Burrows' 
figure of 3,1 per cent suggests. Although those applications include 
monthly re-registrations and apply for the whole year, they nonetheless 
indicate that the problem of White unemployment was much more severe 
than 3,1 per cent.
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Table 2.12: Application by Whites for Employment through Government
Labour Exchanges. South Africa 1930-1940 (as at 30 Sept)
Year No. of Applications % of EA White 
Population
1930 81 042 12,4
1931 120 021 17,9
1932 174 442 25,5
1933 187 924 27,0
1934 149 516 21,0
1935 119 218 16,4
1936 95 888 12,9
1937 96 784 12,8
1938 79 985 10,4
1939 82 200 10,5
1940 78 325 9,8
Source: Official Yearbooks of the Union of South Africa 1930-1941
S.A. Statistics (various issues).
Bell (1984, p. 2).
There is no reason to believe that the relative magnitude of the 
problem was any less severe for Indians, especially in view of the 
civilized labour policy which encouraged the employment of Whites in 
government and parastatal institutions. Applications for employment 
through government exchanges for 'Coloureds and Asiatics' in the Durban 
area are intermittently available for the years 1940-50, and are 
presented in Table 2.13 below:
TABLE 2.13 ; APPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT THROUGH GOVERNMENT EXCHANGES
COLOUREDS AND ASIATICS - DURBAN 1940-1950
Year No. Year No.
1940 2 389 1946 5 614
1941 3 122 1947 17 192
1942 N/A 1948 41 928
1943 N/A 1949 31 928
1944 3 188 1950 40 591
1945 4 913
Source; Official Yearbooks of the Union of South Africa. 
Various Issues.
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Two qualifications need to be made in interpreting these figures:
1. the number of applications includes monthly re-registrations and 
applies to a whole year rather than to a particular date. These 
numbers thus exceed the number who were actually unemployed at any 
time during each year; and
2. the numbers include 'Coloured' applications. However for Durban 
with its relatively small Coloured population, it can be assumed 
that the majority of these applications were lodged by Indians.
Neither of these qualifications affect the conclusion that despite the 
increased pace of economic activity during the war years thousands of 
Indians were unemployed and therefore sought employment via the 
government labour exchanges. The table reveals that applications for 
employment escalated sharply in the years following World War II, as 
registration became compulsory in 1947 under the Unemployment Insurance 
Act of 1946 (as amended). This clearly indicates that the figures for 
the years prior to compulsory registration understate the extent of 
unemployment measured in this way. In other words the applications for 
employment would have been much higher had registration been compulsory 
for those years too.
That Indian unemployment was indeed a serious problem from at least 
1925, when Indian employment in manufacturing in Greater Durban 
actually fell from 5 237 to 4 681 (see Table 2.7), when urbanization 
grew rapidly and when agricultural employment fell, is borne out by 
other studies and reports of that period.
In her draft report on Indian unemployment to the Indo-European joint 
Council Mrs Mabel Palmer admitted that it was impossible to give 
figures showing the unemployment rate among Indians.
[There is] no [unemployment] insurance (save in printing 
trades), no labour bureaux, no poor laws, no juvenile 
affairs board; we can get neither absolute nor relative 
figures covering [the] whole ground for [the] amount of 
unemployment among Indians in Durban but have no 
hesitation in regarding it as severe.
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Following a mass meeting of unemployed Indians held under the auspices 
of the Natal Indian Congress on Sunday Sept 30, 1931, an unofficial
labour bureau was opened.2  ^ Within days 2 000 Indians 'registered' 
as unemployed, the largest number being waiters, urban labourers, 
furniture makers and factory hands. The full list of unemployed 
Indians registered (by occupation) was: tinsmiths 99; vanmen 6;
clerks 92; factory hands 144; barbers 66; bakers and confectioners 
11; laundrymen 61; motor drivers 71; furniture makers 165; shop 
assistants 44; butchers 7; printers 39; painters 59; labourers 214; 
tailors 12; waiters 401; jewellers 5; shoemakers 6; policemen 3; 
bricklayers and carpenters 26; teachers 16.2®
The annual reports of the Protector of Indian Immigrants22 provide 
further evidence of the seriousness of the unemployment problem. In 
1932 he reported that "owing to bad times many Indians have been thrown 
out of employment and the number of unemployed is becoming very large". 
And in 1936: "There are still a great number of Indians out of
employment especially in and around Durban; 129 are employed on the
Municipal Relief Works". In 1941 he noted that:
the number of unemployed amongst the Indian population is 
large and there are many cases of destitution amongst them ... 
the question of unemployment for the young men leaving 
schools and Sastri College is becoming a big problem ...
Joshi (1942, p. 186) reports job losses among Indian workers for the 
early 1930's of 700 in the collieries, 542 in the railways, 32 in the
police service, 200 in the laundry trade, 100 in printing and 300 in
the furniture industry.
The poverty and destitution following in the wake of this unemployment 
of the 1930's and 1940's is reflected in Cell's findings (1955, p. 40) 
that 70 per cent of Durban Indians lived below the poverty line in 1944 
compared with 5 per cent of the Whites, 38 per cent of the Coloureds 
and 25 per cent of Africans.
Contributing to this poverty and destitution were problems arising from 
low waqes. In 1941 the Department of Labour (UG 45, 1941) reported that 
of the highly industrialised centres, Durban was the lowest wage
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area. As will become clear, the wages of many Indian industrial and 
commercial workers in Greater Durban were extremely low, so much so 
that the issue of low wages remained (throughout the period covered in 
the study) among the major priorities of the emerging Indian trades 
unions. Thus in addressing the annual conference of the South African 
Trades and Labour Council (Ambag, April 1945), a Durban trade unionist, 
Mr E. Shanley, commented that there was no improvement in the wages of 
unskilled workers in Durban (measured in real terms) between 1938-1945, 
and added that the trades union movement had to consider seriously the 
question of raising the wages of low paid workers. Mr Shanley's 
statistics reveal that their average monthly wage was £4.6s 8d in 1938 
and £4.3s in 1945. Research conducted by the Inter-racial Study Group 
came to the conclusion that the 'bare minimum' income for an Indian 
family of five (in 1938) was £5 per month and the 'minimum of comfort' 
income for this category was £15 per month. According to this 
study, 40% of Indian families in Durban were living below the minimum 
figures. Even allowing for three earners per family, the total family 
income (on average over this period) was lower than the 'minimum of 
comfort level'. The repeated demands of trades unions for wage board 
investigations into the wages and working conditions of lower paid 
(unskilled) workers led to some improvement in wage rates for specific 
industries. Table 2.14 indicates some of these improvements in the 
basic monthly wages of unskilled municipal employees (nearly all
Table 2.14: Basic Wages of Durban Municipal Employees
1938 - 1945 (per month)
Prior to Jan. 1938 £2.0.1. plus rations and quarters
From Jan. 1938 . £2.3.11
From Oct. 1940
(Wage Det. No. 72) £3.18.0 £1.1.8 deducted for board & lodging
From Aug. 1942 £5.11.4 " " " " " "
From Dec. 1945
(Wage Det. No. 130) £6.4.7 £1.6.0 " "
Source: Dimes Memoranda (revised) dated 7/4/48.
TUCSA Papers AH 646. Da. 5. Wits University.
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Indians) in Durban between 1938 and 1945. Two of these improvements 
followed wage board investigations.
Burrows (1952, pp. 17-18) has shown (see Table 2.15) that the average 
annual wages in the more important sectors of increasing Indian 
employment rose steadily between 1929/37 and 1951. However although 
such a marked rising trend is evident from his figures certain problems 
arise in their interpretation:
1. they do not relate to the wages of Indian workers only;
2. it is not clear whether they refer to real or money wages and, if 
the latter, they would in the main reflect no more than the 
prevailing rate of inflation.
3. they cover all levels of skills - skilled, semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers;
4. and as Burrows himself points out (1952, p. 22) "sometimes these 
higher rates are more on paper than in practice, since it is not 
unknown for Indians to be dismissed when high wage rates become 
applicable to them”.
TABLE 2.15: AVERAGE ANNUAL WAGES IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES
WITH A RELATIVELY LARGE INDIAN LABOUR FORCE
Industry 1929/37 1946 1951
Wood £45 £1 12 £150
Metal £68 £145 £175
Textiles/Clothing £74 £1 48 £1 82
Printing £110 £187 £250
Vehicles £71 £161 £190
Furniture £136 £235 £250
Leather £75 £193 £250
Source: Burrows (1952, pp. 17-18).
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For all these reasons it seems likely that Burrows' figures over= 
estimate the wages of Indian workers who were concentrated mainly in 
unskilled and semi-skilled occupations during this period. That the 
wages of unskilled workers were very much lower than Burrows' figures 
is evident from Table 2.16 which shows the weekly minimum wages of 
unskilled workers in selected industries in Durban as at 30 June 
19442 . The average annual wage derived from these figures is no 
more than c£72 which, even allowing for the insignificant two-year time 
difference, is about half of Burrows' average figure for 1946. The 
average gross annual wage of the mainly unskilled Indian workers in 
municipal employment in December 1945, as determined by the Wage Board 
Determination No. 130 (see Table 2.14), is +£74 which supports the 
figure given in Table 2.16(below).
These wage rates were clearly inadequate as an investigation into the 
health and housing conditions of workers in the furniture and garment 
industries in Durban in 1943 by a group of doctors and trades union 
officials reveals. The report (Daily News, 4.9.43) reflects a 
deplorable state of affairs among the lower paid groups in these 
industries, which were major employers of Indian labour. Many of these 
workers, the report indicates, were necessities of life which are necessary for 
health and resistance to disease" (ibid). And referring specifically to 
Indians, Swan comments
that hemmed in by the civilised labour policy and 
by grossly inadequate educational facilities [see 
Appendix C.3] the majority of the Indian workforce 
remained unskilled labourers at the lowest levels 
of th§ wage spectrum (1982, p.9).
TABLE 2.16: Weekly Minimum Wages - Unskilled Workers in Selected
Industries: Durban June 1944
Industry Wage Industry Wage
Bag-making £1.5.0 Mineral Water (WB) £1.2.0
Baking £1.4.0 Motor Engineering £1.3.0
Brush & Broom (WB) £1.2.0 Paint & Polish (WB) £1.3.0
Building (WB) £1.8.11 Printing £1.17.3
Chemical (WB) £1.4.0 Rubber manufacturing £1.10.0
Clothing £1.4.0 Soap & Candle (CB) £1.10.0
Commercial & Sugar Industry (WB) £1.7.8
distributive (WB) £1.10.0 Sweet manir=
Furniture £1.10.0 facturing (WB) £1.8.6
Laundries (WB) £1.7.6 Tea, Coffee,
Leather £1.12.6 Chicory (WB) £1.4.0
Liquor & Catering £1 .5.5 Tobacco (WB) £1.4.0
WB = Wage Board determination 
WM = War Measure regulation 
CB = Conciliation Board
Source: Department of Labour Circular (adapted)
SAIRR papers: AD 843. B.95(6) Wits University.
These extremely inadequate wage rates, applicable to unskilled workers, 
were an important factor contributing to the growth of trades unions in 
Natal from about the mid-1930's. Thus in reviewing the origin and 
development of the Tin Workers' Union the editors of the 25th Souvenir 
Brochure of the Union comment (1962, p.1)
the wages and conditions of work were regulated by the employers 
with the workers having no say in the matter whatsoever. The 
workers employed at the Durban Falkirk Industries struck for 
better wages in 1937. They stood solidly together and they were 
an inspiration to all workers who were toiling under severe 
hardships.
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[And] inspired by the struggle of the Durban Falkirk 
workers, leading workers in the tin industry came 
together and decided to form a union ... The union 
wasted no time in the general mobilization of the 
workers for the fight for increased wages and improved 
conditions of work.
From both the records of unions meetings and oral evidence it is clear 
that the issue of wage increases dominated union discussions and 
debates through the decades of the 1940's and 1950's. As our analysis 
of worker action will show, many of the strikes which occurred in this 
period arose out of conflicts over wage issues.
2.7 SUMMARY
Changes in the structure of the South African economy in the years 
following World War X, and which manifested themselves principally in a 
shift towards industrialization, began to have their most decisive 
impact on the economy of Natal especially after the Great Depression. 
The Indian population of the province, originally introduced into its 
economy as sugar field workers in 1860, found themselves having to 
adapt rapidly to the changes. There followed in the inter-war period a 
rapid urbanization of Indians as (for reasons outlined earlier) Indian 
employment in agriculture declined markedly. After 1935 Indian 
employment in secondary industries such as food, clothing, textiles, 
metal and furniture as well as in commercial and some service sectors 
increased, although wage rates applicable to the mainly semi- and 
unskilled jobs in the sectors were low and unemployment remained a 
serious problem even during the years of the war.
These changes had important implications for the emergent Indian 
working class and for the formation and development of their labour 
organisations in the Durban industrial core. For industrialisation, 
urbanisation, skill-acquisition and the general instability of economic 
and social conditions, led directly to the formation by this emerging 
Indian working class of defensive organisations which would express
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directly the demands and even the aspirations - however tentative - of 
this class. These formal expressions were concomitant with developments 
taking place nationally.
For the country as a whole the war years (1939-1945) witnessed a 
tremendous spurt in trades union organisation and activity. Union 
membership rose from 264 000 in 1939 to 410 000 in 1945, with the 
number of registered unions rising from 139 to 203. Both organised and 
unorganised workers struck work on the docks, railways, coal mines, 
sugar estates, municipal services, dairies, laundries and factories 
(Simons and Simons, 1983, pp. 554-5). And further, 304 strikes 
involving 58 000 Africans, Coloureds and Indians and 6 000 Whites were 
reported in the years 1939-45 compared to 197 strikes in the preceding 
14 years.
These nationwide trends are discernible in Indian labour organisations 
and worker action in and around Durban in this period, as numerous 
unions were formed, defunct unions revived and workers struck work in 
various industries - the most important being in the iron and steel 
(1937), rubber (1942/3) and laundry industries (1945/6). These 
developments and the formation and organisational structure of such 
unions and worker action, form the subject of the following two 
chapters.
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CHAPTER THREE
UNIONS, GROWTH AMD STRUCTURE
3.1 Introduction
The expansion of industrial employment and the stimulus provided by the 
Second World War, coupled with other forces already analysed in Chapter 
Two, led to an upsurge in trades union organisation in the years after 
the Great Depression. The way in which these forces operated to 
encourage trade union growth in Durban/Natal is evident from Table 3.1 
which shows the number of unions (with Indian members) registered or 
established in each year in the period 1930-1950. Whereas no new unions 
were registered/established in the years 1931- 1933, at least 43 
unions with Indian membership were registered/ established between 
1934-45, seven in 1941 alone. ^ There was also a sudden decline in the 
number of new unions registered/ established after 1945.^
Table 3.1 : Number of Unions (with Indian Members) Established/
Registered Per Year Between 1930-1950. Durban/Natal
Year No. (Per Year) Year No. (Per Year)
1930 1 1941 7
1931 - 1942 4
1932 - 1943 4
1933 - 1944 4
1934 3 1945 4
1935 3 1946 -
1936 1 1947 1
1937 5 1948 2
1938 5 1949 -
1939 2 1950 -
1940 1
Source: Derived from Table 3.2 below and therefore includes only those 
unions whose dates of establishment/registration are known. Where both 
the dates of establishment and registration are known and differ the 
date of establishment has been used in the compilation of this table.
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3.2 Schedule of Trades Unions with Indian Members (1930-1950)
A more complete schedule of trades unions in Natal with Indian 
membership is presented in Table 3.2. This schedule includes those 
unions known to have been established/registered or which were in 
existence (having been formed earlier) for some time in the period 
1930-1950. The unions are listed chronologically according to the dates 
of establishment/registration. Where possible the schedule also shows:
(i) The names of the unions.
(ii) What type of unions they were, e.g. industrial or craft,
(iii) Dates of establishment/registration.
(iv) Dates of de-registration, dissolution or when the union 
went defunct.
(v) Membership figures by 'race'.
3.3. Size Distribution of Unions (Indian Members,1943)
Table 3.3 provides some indication of the Indian membership of the 
trades unions operative in Durban in this period. These figures have 
been derived from a schedule of trades unions (with Indian membership) 
in Durban supplied to Parliament by the Minister of Labour in February 
1943. Therefore this Table (3.3) does not include all the unions listed 
in Table 3.2 but only those in existence in February 1943. This 
schedule supplied by the Minister of Labour is in any event the most 
uniform and complete source from which Indian membership figures are 
available. The table, which has been re-arranged in descending order of 
size, at the same time serves as a summarised version of the data 
presented in Table 3.2.
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TABLE 3.2 tuxes unae m tram, wnn deem* MMESggp1
(includes all those trades unims known to have been established car registered or in existence far sane time in the period 1930-1950)
NO. w m , cf imcK TYPE
m m  of
ESIAELISIM2C
DftTE OF 
RHHS3SMT03
m m  m ssznm y  
OR ES332SISEERED white INDIAN G3U33RED m i d ®  m
1. WfflONAL ONION OF LE20HERI03CE3S
(a) a parallel union for Africans was established in 1946
(b) membership fig u re s  fa r Durban only
I 1924 16/3/1925 409(1943)
278(1948)
1017(1943)
2214(1948)
99(1943)
114(1948)
(p) 40(1943) 
738(1948)
2. RMHTUH2 WDKCERS INDUSTRIAL UNION I 1926 16/3/1926 268(1940)
53(1943)
99(1948)
470(1940)
340(1943)
869(1948)
110(1940)
21(1943)
14(1948)
(p) 108(1940)
645(1943)
694(1948)
3. DURBAN m ) DISTRICT TCm JX* WORKERS INICN
(a) part of the Natal Stokers Congress
(b) later becanes the Tcbacoo Workers Union
C1928 30/4/1929
4. DURBAN AND DISTRICT BAKEFS UNION 
(a) part of the Natal Workers Congress
1928
5. DURBAN AND DISTRICT UNION CF U & M m
AMD ZR f O M C  EMTJDS3S
(a) part of the Natal Workers Congress
I 1928 31/12/1934 deregistered
1936
6. m m ij liquor p m  c&tekiio traces employees uni®
(a) part of the Natal Workers Cmgress
(b) originally fanned with cnly Indian msrbers hit later merged 
with a "white union"* the Durban Hotel Brplqyees Unim (1919) 
to farm one unim far the whole trade.
I 24/6/1928 300(1940) 
392(1940) 
547(1948)
1026(1940)
2115(1943)
2600(1948)
24(1940)
35(1943)
89(1948)
(P)
800(1948)
7. DURBAN T U m r o S  AM) TRUNK fflKERS UNION 
(a) part of the Natal Workers Congress
c 1928 12/8/1929 deregistered
12/3/1934
8. S3JIH AFRICAN OT03RAPHICAL UNION
(a) incorporates Indian Printers Unim in 1929* although famed in 1889
(b) 1943 m±er^np figures fee: Durban mly
I (1EB9) Indian 
nerbership 
from 1929
15/10/1924
(Durban
branch)
582(1943)
1754(1948)
489(1943) 
12(1948)2
12(1943)
9. DUraAN AND DISTRICT G ^ N T  VOEKER5 IKTCN
(a) later bacones Garment Workers Industrial Union (Natal)
I 1930
10- TEXTILE WORKERS IMDUSIRIAL UNION (NATAL)
(a) beoares a toanch of the Textile Workers Industrial Unim in 
Soith Africa in 1936
I 18/9/1934 deregistered
3/1936
11. SffSSNT K®KEfS HCOSTKIBL UNICN (NJOISL)
(a) 1943 nenfcership figures far Durban cnly
I 1934 31/12/1934 556(1940)
340(1943)
272(1948)
711(1940)
952(1943)
1687(1948)
559(1940)
648(1943)
31(1948)
(p) 237(1940) 
213(1948)
12. DURBAN IMPROVEMENT VDRCER3 UNION 31/12/1934
13. TEXTILE W3FKEFS INDUSTRIAL UNION CF SOUTH AFRICA (NATAL STANCH)
(a) registration scope becomes nationwide in 1936 - farmed as 
Transvaal Branch in 1935
(b) absorbs TWIU of Durban msribership
I 1935
(Tvl)
284(1940)
108(1943)
80(1948)
293(1940)
535(1943)
700(1948)
7(1943)
8(1948)
(p) 168(1940)
304(1943)
112(1948)
14. DURBAN INDIAN MJNICTPAL EMPLOYEES SOCIETY eM 4/1935 11/6/1936 1600(1940)
2450(1943)
2334(1948)
15. NATAL HAIRDRESSERS EMPLOYEES INDUSTRIAL UNION
(a) We cannot to .certain that this unim had Indian marbership
1935
16. SOUTH AFRICAN RAILWAYS AND HARBOURS INDIAN EMPLOYEES UNION I 9/1936 26/4/37 ^registered
23/3/45
450(1943)
17. OiEMICRL KDFKERS INDUSTRIAL INICN
(a) It appears that the Durban branch was only established in 1942, 
although it was established cn a rational scale in 1937.
I C1937 139(1943)
220(1948)
(p) 700(1943) 
1200(1948)
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NO. NAME CF INICN TYPE
rwrR a? 
ESBUBLISMNT
DATE OF d w t ! dissolved
Cft LtvKFTtlH'l'KKfrT) D m .
fEJHiRSHIP
(XL0QBBD AFRICAN TOTAL
18. NATAL IRCN AND STEEL WOFKERS INDUSTRIAL UNICN I 6/4/1937 +300(1937)
100(1943)
+100(1937)
647(1943)
19. SCXJIH AFRICAN TTNWORKEFS UNICN 1937 (National) 
1939 (Durban?) 350(1940)550(1943)
500(1948)
50(1940)
75(1948)
(p)50(1940)
65(1943)
300(1948)
20. NATICNAL UNICN CF CFERATIVE BISCUIT INKERS AMD FACXERS
(a) The 241 Indian marbers in 1948 were all eiplcyed in m e  factory. I 19/5/37 90(1943) 10(1943)
241(1918)
21. RXE AND m i WORKERS INDUSTRIAL INICN 6/12/1937 200(1943)
400(1918)
90(1943)
22. NATAL RISER VCKKERS HCUSTRIAL LNICN I 1938 effectively 
defunct c1943
340(1940)
155(1943)
145(1940)
160(1913)
25(1940)
310(1943)
23. EXJSAN INDIAN BOTCHERS EMPLOYEES INICN C1938 effectively 
defunct by 1948
32(1943) 32(1943)
24. NATICNAL MELLDC VEFKEIS INDUSTRIAL INICN 
(a) 1943 msifcership figures far Durban only.
I 18/6/1938 15(1943)
24(1948)
56(1943)
37(1943)
25. SOOTH AFRICAN ELECTRICAL WORKERS ASSOdATICN C C1938 300(1948) 4(1948)
26. NATAL 9JG5\R INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNICN
(a) See Agricultural Workers Federation, formerly Natal Sugar Field 
Workers Unim, that organised sugar-field workers.
I
15/10/1938
(Ringrose)
1939
(Smith p.511)
2000(1940)
3072(1943)
2742(1948)
(p)990(1943)
1520(1948)
27. TGBAOCD WDRCEHS UNICN
(a) Predeoessar af Durian and District Tobacco Workers Union.
(b) Later incorporated as Durban branch of the National Unim of 
CLc^nstte and Tcbacco Workers.
12/1939 8/1940 (Dorian) 160(1943) 1(1943)
28. M3IDR DBUSIOT IMEIDYHS INICN c 1939 872(1948) 24(1948) 70(1948)
29. INDIAN DISTRIBUTIVE AND CLERICAL EMPLOYEES INICN 3/1940 effectively 
defunct c1948
50(1940)
162(1943)
30. SWEET VDRKEF5 INICN
(a) Discrepancy in date of establishment. Ringrcse gives it as 
registered in 1939. However the Guardian of 14/8/41 states 
it was fanned cnly in May/June 1941.
1939 (Ringrose) 
1941 (Guardian)
60(1943)
180(1948)
(p)82(1943)
70(1948
31. BGK VOTERS UNICN
(a) Later becomes Natal Bex, Brocrre and Brush Workers Unim.
I 4/1941 24/7/1942 114(1943) 90(1943)
32. SOAP AND ONDLE WORKERS INICN 4/9/41 (Durban) effectively 
defunct c1948
46(1943) 257(1943) 18(1943) 321(1943)
33. LAUNDRY, CLEANED AND DYEEG EMPLOYEES UNICN 
(a) Beccsnes Natal Ixanch of the National Unim of Laundry, 
Cleaning and Eyeing Workers in 1945.
I 28/11/41 694(1943) 5(1943) 43(1943)
34. NATAL BOX, EROCM AND BRISK WORKERS UNICN 4/1941 ( 200 (1948) )(a) Incorporates Box Workers Unim.
35. NATAL TEACHERS UNICN
(a) Becomes incorporated into Natal Indian Teachers Society
1941 20/1/41 de-registered
26/2/45
450(1943)
36. TEA, COFFEE AND CHICORY WORKERS UNICN
(a) Incorporated into the National Unim of Tfea and Coffee 
workers in 1948.
16/9/1941 de-registered
4/1948
171(1943)
200(1943)
1(1943) 30(1943)
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ESTABLISHMENT
OKIE CF 
REGISTRATION
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OR l S1TCW*] ) w h e
MEMBERSHIP 
INDIAN COLOURED AFKLCRN TOffiL
37. TWINE BND BAG WOFKEFS UNICN I 23/1/42 de-registered
26/2/45 —
340(1943) 225(1943)
38. PETHXEtM, LUBKICATnG OILS AND INSECTICIDES EMPLOYEES UNICN 25/7/1942 effectively 
defunct c1948
112(1943) 1(1943) 400(1943)
39. 1CN-EXJRQPEAN MINEWORKERS UNICN I 16/8/1942 effectively 
defunct c1948
40. NATAL NON-EURCEEAN MINEHCfPKEFS UNICN I 4/6/1942 de-registered 
June 1947
41. DURBAN NDN^URCPEAN BUS EMPLOYEES UNICN I 3/1943 effectively 
defunct c1948
256(1943)
20(1948)
42. SHIP AND BOAT WORKERS UNICN C1943 effectively 
defunct c1948
43. PAINT, POLISH AND VARNISH WORKERS UNICN I 20/11/1943 98(1943) 120(1943)
44. NATIONAL BAKDC INDUSTRIAL LNICN
(a) Formerly Natal Bakers and Ocnfecticners Enplcyees Society that 
went defunct in 1938 and before this was known as Durban Baking 
Employees Society (1927).
(b) It cannot be established if these early unions had '’ncn-white" 
maters.
1943: Moves 
to form a 
national inicn 
initiated in 
1941
6/1943 95(1948) 260(1948)
45. SCUIH AFRICAN RAILWAYS AND HARBOURS NON-EUROPEAN VOTERS UNICN 
(a) This union had African, Indian and Coloured matters in Natal, and 
was supposed to be affiliated to a "national union".
Ringrcee claims that it was a union of "Natives" employed by the 
SAR£H adidnistraticn.
24/6/1944
46. MINERAL WATER WORKERS INDUSTRIAL UNICN I 3/9/1944 120(1948)
47. WOO! WORKERS UNICN (NKEAL) C 12/4/1944 70(1948) 102(1948)
48. BRICK, TELE AID ALLIED VDFKERS UNICN I 3/3/1944 
(Djrban) 
1945 (Ptnb)
150(1943) (p) 500(1943)
49. NATAL FCCD AND CAININO WOFKERS UNICN 17/3/1945
50. NATIONAL NON-EUROPEAN IRCN, STEEL AND METAL WORKERS UNICN 
(a) Incorporated as Branch 5 of the Amalgamated Engineering Union 
in May 1947
I 7/1945 defunct
5/1947
51. NATIONAL UNICN CF lAUNUERENO, CLEANUP AND DYEIN3 WORKERS I 5/1945 Natal Branch 
effectively 
defunct c1946
1(1948) 129(1948) 21(1948)
52. NPOTCNAL LNICN CF CTMMERCIAL TRAVELLERS 
(a) Formerly SA Camercdal Travellers Unicn
c 19/1/1945 220(1948) 2(1948)
53. AMALGAMATED ENGINEERirG UNICN
(a) Incorporates National nan-Eurepean Iron and Steel and Metal 
Workers Unicn in 1947 - from vhich year the unicn lad Indian 
members.
I 1918
Indian member­
ship from 1947
2582(1948)
including
Coloureds
464(1948)
54. NATIONAL UNICN CF TEA AND COFFEE WORKERS 
(a) See Tea, Coffee and Chicory Workers Union
I 1948
55. FERTILIZER INDUSTRY EMPLOYEES UNICN I 31/8/1948 80(1948) 40(1948)
56. NCN-EUROPEAN BUS WORKERS UNICN Dates unknown
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EfflE CF DATE CF DKIE EHS3X,VED gm r o g m )
to. NAME CF UNICN TYPE ES3AELXSWEOT RBSISERATICN OR r»Jw»igr??i>.'K^D white INDIAN AFRICAN TOTAL
57. NATAL INDIAN TEACHERS 9XXFTY 
(a) See also Natal Teachers Union
Dates unknown
58. NATAL CHEMICAL AND ALLIED WORKERS UNICN Dates unknown
59. NATAL BISCUIT WORKERS UNICN Dates unknown 398(1943) 55(1943)
60. NATAL PLYWOOD WORKERS UNION Dates unknown 65(1943) 65(1943)
61; NATAL DAIRY WORKERS UNICN Dates unknown
62. HtN MOULDERS SOCIETY C Dates unknown 250(1948) 36(1948)
63. FOCD, CANNEM3 AMO ALLIED WORKERS UNICN Dates unknown 282(1943) 251(1943)
64. DUNDEE GLASS WORKERS INDUSTRIAL UNICN
(a)This union was separated along racial lines: Writes cnly; and the 
other far Indians, Coloureds and Africans.
Dates unknown 26(1948) 500(1948)
65. BUTLDIN3 AND ALLIED WORKERS UNICN C Dates unknown 1310(1948) 306(1948) 350(1948)
(a) Established in 1916 - but with Durban matters fran sane time in 
the 1940's.
(b) A branch was established in Pietenraritzburg with an all race 
m=trtership of 300.______________________________________
66. BUHDUC W03TR3 IMXSTRIAL UNICN
(a) Cnly teanch No.7 was open to ski lied Indian carpenters, masons 
and plasterers.
C Date unknown
67. BREMSFtf WESKERS UNICN Dates unknown
68. A3ULCULTURAL WORKERS EEDERATICN
(a) Formerly Natal Sugarfield Workers Unicn
(b) See also Natal Su^r Infestry Eirplcyees Union
Dates unknown 2865(1946) (p)2273(1946)
KEY: I = IrKi^ strial______________
G = General
C = Craft _______
E/M = Employment fcy tlm icdpali'ty 
P = Parallel
SOURCES: Ringrose (1948,1951);
Schefele of (Indian) trafe unions 
in Durban, Parliamentary Archives;
Srri-th (1945); Karis & Carter Collection; 
Indian Cpinicn; Leader; Guardian.
NOTES
1. The unions included in this register are those known to have been established car registered cs: were in existence far sane time in the period 1930-1950. Those miens forced in the pre-1930 
period,, tut as far as can be ascertained were not in existence car functioning in the years between 1930-1950 are listed in Appendix C. Tie only unions included are those which had Indian members, 
no natter hew small their nutters nay have been in relation to the total rrentership. These unions are listed according to their dates of establishment (car registration where the (fetes of 
establishment are not known.) These unions far which we have not beat able to determine dates of establishment car registration appear at the end c£ the list - from No.56 cowards.
2. The sharp decline in the muter cf Indian neuters of the SA1U resulted from the strategy of SOTJ, which was dominated by Stilled workers, to incorporate Indian billed printers and in this way to 
maintain their barc^ining position. This meant that entry into the SAIU was controlled by skilled white workers. Tan Rutherford, the general secretary of SAW, 'boasted twenty-five years after 
Indians were a&nitted to the union that one. could now "count the nutter of skilled Indian printers in Natal cn the fingers of your cne hand. They have been almost eliminated. That happened because 
we took than into the unicn"'. (Gimwala 1974, p.392)
3. There sears to be a suggestion in the 25 Anniversary Brochure of the SA Tinworkers Unicn that this union was involved in the Ealkizk dispute cf 1937 bbreen the Ehlkirk Iren and Steel Co. and 
the Natal Iron and Steel Workers Unicxi. The implication is that the dispute led to the formation cf the SATMJ. This suggests that either a new unicn was farmed fer Tin workers apart fran the 
NISWU or that the NISWU, for reasons unknown to the researchers, later becarre incorporated into the EATWU. However, fran Smith's (1945) study it appears that the two unions actually oo-existd in 
1940.
(Smith 1945, p.510/512). In any event it appears that the NISWU ceased to exist iy 1948.
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Table 3.3 ; Indian Membership of Trades Unions in Durban (1943) 
(In Descending order of Size)
Number of Indian
Unions with More than 1 000 Indian Members Members
1. Natal Sugar Industry Employees Union 3 072
2. Durban Indian Municipal Employees Society 2 450
3. Natal Liquor & Catering Trades Employees Union 2 115
4. National Union of Leather Workers (Durban) 1 017
Unions with Between 500 - 1 000 Indian Members
1. Garment Workers Industrial Union (Durban) 952
2. Durban Laundry Cleaning & Dyeing Employees Union 694
3. South African Tin Workers Union 550
4. Textile Workers Industrial Union of S.A. (Durban) 535
Unions with Between 250 - 500 Indian Members
1. South African Typographical Union 489
2. S.A. Railways S Harbours Indian Employees Union 450
3. Natal Teachers Union 450
4. Natal Biscuit Workers Union 398
5. Furniture Workers Industrial Union 340
6. Twine and Bag Workers Union 340
7. Food, Canning and Allied Workers Union 282
8. Soap and Candle Workers Union 257
9. Durban Non-European Bus Employees Union 256
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Table 3.3 continued
Unions with Between 100 - 250 Indian Members
Number of Indian 
members
1. Rope and Matting Workers Union 200
2. Natal Bakers & Confectioners Employees Union 182
3. Tea, Coffee & Chicory Employees Union 170
4. Indian Distributive & Clerical Workers Union 162
5. Natal Rubber Workers Industrial Union 160
6. Tobacco Workers Union 160
7. Brick & Tile Workers Union 150
8. Chemical Workers Industrial Union 139
9. Box Workers Union 114
10. Petroleum, Lubricating Oils & Insecticides
Employees Union 112
11. Natal Iron and Steel Workers Union 100
Unions with Less than 100 Members
1. Paint, Polish & Varnish Workers Union 98
2. Natal Plywood Workers Union 65
3. Sweet Workers Union (Durban) 60
4. National Union of Milling Workers (Durban) 56
5. Durban Indian Butchers Employees Union 32
6. National Union of Operative Biscuit Makers
and Bakers 10
Total Indian Membership (1943) 16 617
3.4 Sectoral Distribution of Unions (Indian Members 1943)
The major employers of Indian labour by sector/industry in the 1940's 
were 'Food, beverages and Tobacco'; 'Clothing and Textiles'; 'Leather 
and Leatherware'; 'Furniture'; 'Metal and Engineering' and 'Paper and 
Printing'. Outside these sectors in manufacturing industry, 
significant numbers were employed by the Durban Municipality, in 
'Commerce and Catering' and in the sugar estates. This sectoral 
concentration of Indian workers is reflected in the number and size of 
trades unions that Indian workers joined or formed in this period, 
which is presented below in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4 : Sectoral Distribution of Trades Unions with Indian
Membership. Durban, February 1943
Sector Unions
1. Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco
Natal Sugar Industry Employees Union 
Tea, Coffee and Chicory Employees Union
Total : 4 422 Sweet Workers Union 
Tobacco Workers Union 
Durban Indian Butchers Employees Union 
Natal Biscuit Workers Union 
Natal Bakers and Confectioners Employees 
Union
Food, Canning and allied Workers Union 
National Union of Milling Workers 
National Union of Operative Biscuit 
Makers & Bakers
2. Clothing & Textiles 
Total : 1 487
Garment Workers Industrial Union 
Textile Workers Industrial Union
3. Leather and National Union of Leather Workers
Leatherware
Total : 1 017
4. Metal & Engineering Natal Iron and Steel Workers Industrial
Total : 650 Union
South African Tin Workers Union
5. Furniture & Wood Furniture Workers Industrial Union
Total : 519 Natal Plywood Workers Union 
Box Workers Union
6. Paper & Printing 
Total : 489
South African Typographical Union
7. Chemicals Chemical Workers Industrial Union
Total : 349 Petroleum, Lubricating Oils & 
Insecticides Employees Union 
Paint, Polish and Varnish Workers Union
8. Transport 
Total : 256
Durban Non-European Bus Employees Union
9. Construction Brick and Tile Workers Union
Total : 150
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10. Services Durban Indian Municipal Employees Society
Total : 4 044 Laundry, Cleaning & Dyeing Employees Union
South African Railways and Harbours Indian 
Employees Union 
National Teachers Union
11. Commerce & Catering 
Total s 2 277
Natal Liquor & Catering Trades Employees Union 
Indian Distributive & Clerical Workers Union
12. Others
Total ! 957
Twine & Bag Workers Union 
Ropes S Matting Workers Union 
Natal Rubber Workers Industrial Union 
Soap and Candle Workers Union
(GRAND TOTAL : 16 617)
It is evident from Tables 3.3 and 3.4 that there were more and 
relatively larger unions in the 'Food' and 'Services' sectors and in 
'Clothing and Textiles' and that in more strategic industries such as 
'Metal and Engineering' and 'Rubber', unions were both fewer and less 
well represented in terms of the degree of unionisation. Thus, for 
example, in the 'Metal and Engineering' industry in Durban, not only 
was the average number of workers per establishment small (Burrows, 
1959, pp. 187/188) but of the total of 2 312 Black workers only hh 400 
were unionised (i.e. 17,3%) in the year 1937.3 By 1948 only 1 339 of 
the 6 523 Black workers were unionised in this sector in Durban 
(20,5%).4
3.5 Constitutional Structures and the Potential for Worker Democracy 
3.5.1 Introduction
Brief descriptive accounts of some of the unions which Indian workers 
formed or joined in this period may be found in the works of Smith 
(1945), Burrows (1952), Moodley (1960/61) and Ringrose (1948,1951). 
Rather than concentrating on such a descriptive account which would, in 
any event, amount to no more than a repetition of the data already
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presented here in tabular form, the remainder of this chapter tries to 
assess the structure of trades unions and the potential for broad-based 
worker control, democracy and action. The data presented thus far 
serves only to locate the growth of (Indian) unions within a framework 
of historical forces - in particular in an analysis of the level and 
form of economic activity out of which unions came to take root. This 
framework, though important, is in itself inadequate from the point of 
view of any assessment of the structural character and efficiency of 
these unions, consideration of which is of fundamental importance in 
the evaluation of their proper historical role. The value of the 
approach which follows is that it raises the level of analysis and 
inquiry beyond what is trite in much of current (even so-called 
radical) historiography on Indian workers. For, as yet, no proper 
attention has been paid to the question of the structure of the unions 
which Indian workers joined or formed in this period, and the potential 
these structures held for greater participation of workers in the 
decisions being taken and the directions being pursued.
In general, the argument developed here attempts to make the point that 
many of the unions in Durban in this period did not have constitutional 
structures which allowed, let alone facilitated, genuine democratic 
practices leading to the attainment of longer-term union goals. The 
analysis, however, is not principally/exclusively concerned with 
whether unions acted constitutionally or not, but with the consequences 
for independent working class development, action and strategy of less 
than democratic internal structures in the unions of this period. 
These consequences will become clear from our analysis of worker action 
(Chapter 4) and our examination of the nature of the relationship 
between unions and political organisations. (Chapters 4 and 5). At 
the same time the failure to establish the basis for greater worker 
participation in union affairs and to develop a shop-floor leadership 
at this early and crucial stage of unionisation in Durban is, in our 
view, an important - though by no means the only - component of any 
explanation as to why many of these unions collapsed (became defunct) 
and why and how some of the other unions were able to survive.
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We will now analyse the overall structure of these unions as contained 
within the constitutions, and the potential which this held for 
advancing or hindering the democratic participation of rank and file 
members in ,the affairs of the union. The important issue is the 
relative control, power and influence which the various levels of 
leadership and rank and file members had over the decisions taken. We 
will do this by:
«*
1. a close analysis of a model constitution, issued by the Department 
of Labour to those unions who wished to register;
2. an analysis of certain important clauses in the constitution of 
eight unions; and
3. information gained from interviews with Mr B Peters, Mr RD Naidu and 
Mr SP Pillay.5
3.5.2 The Model Constitution
The 'model' constitution which the Department of Labour presented to 
unions to follow as a guide, contained the following clauses: the name 
of the union; its aims and objects; the members in terms of industry, 
trade; undertaking or occupation; the entrance fees and subscription to 
be paid, including exemptions; the types of meetings to be held; the 
power, duties and function of the executive committee; the officials of 
the union; the finances and control over finances; representation on 
industrial councils and conciliation boards; how ballots were to be 
held as well as 'clauses relating to fines; discipline; resignations; 
winding up the union; amendments and general (see Appendix E for a copy 
of a model constitution).
At first glance this model constitution seems to contain all the rele­
vant clauses for setting up a democratic trade union. It is, however, 
not our aim to comment on the soundness of this constitution in terms 
of the principles of constitutional law. Rather, we wish to analyse:
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1. the structure of the unions as it appears from the 
constitution; and;
2. the limits on and possibilities for promoting democracy and 
informed rank and file participation and control.
There are at least four clauses in the 'model' constitution which give 
us a clearer understanding of the structure of the union envisaged, and 
the kind of democracy it promoted. These clauses are:
1. meetings;
2. composition and power of the executive committee;
3. the officers of the union; and
4. representation on Industrial Councils and Conciliation 
boards.
There appear to have been four types of meetings held (clauses 5.1;
5.3; 5.7). These are:
1. general meetings;
2. special general meetings;
3. annual general meetings; (AGMs)
4. executive committee meetings;
For all these meetings, notices of the intention to hold the meetings 
had to be given. It was left to the union to specify the period of 
notice.
Motions at meetings had to be submitted, in writing or otherwise, and 
seconded. Voting was by show of hands, "unless otherwise provided" in 
the constitution, which meant a ballot had to be taken. There was also 
a time limit on how long a member could speak. The quorums for all 
meetings was also to be decided upon by the union (clauses 5.4 and 
5.5).
The officials of the union consisted of the Chairman (President); Vice- 
Chairman (Vice-President); the Secretary (General) and all other 
persons elected by an annual general meeting. If necessary an acting 
chairman could be chosen by the executive committee.
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According to this ’model' constitution the "affairs of the union, 
between general meetings, shall be vested in the executive committee 
consisting of the chairman, the vice-chairman and other members of the 
union who shall be elected at the annual general meeting ..." (clause 
6. 1).
This clause did provide for rank and file representation on the 
executive committee on the basis of factory elections, or branch 
level, or any kind of constituency as decided by the union at its 
general meetings. However, the clause could be manipulated (within the 
terms of the constitution) to under- represent, misrepresent or even 
bureaucratically represent its members at the level of crucial (and not 
so crucial) day to day affairs of the union. Depending on how often 
general meetings (or special general meetings), were held, the executive 
committee appears to be the most powerful decision making body in the 
constitution, more especially if general meetings were held less than 
once a month. In the absence of strong rank and file representation on 
the executive committee, for instance, the clause could well have 
allowed for the following: if an immediate decision had to be taken on 
the acceptance or rejection of a wage increase proposed by management 
which did not meet the initial demands of the union, it is possible 
that the executive committee could take a decision without reference to 
its members (such as calling a general meeting) as the constitution 
clearly allows for this. There would be no pressure, constitutional or 
otherwise, to determine the reaction of rank and file members to 
managements' proposal. It would, of course, be different if (i) the 
rank and file members were adequately represented on the executive 
committee or had access to the relevant information concerning the 
negotiations; ahd (ii) these representatives had to report back to 
their constituents. None of those conditions existed in the model 
constitution.
In one aspect, however, the executive committee had little or no power 
to intervene in decision making. This was in negotiations and formal 
agreements reached at industrial council or conciliation boards (clause 
9). The "general meeting" of the union appointed
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representatives to the industrial council/conciliation boards, and 
could formally remove such representatives. However, the action of 
constitutionally removing such representatives appears to be limited by 
or contradictory to clause 9.5. This clause reads:
Representatives shall have full power to enter 
into agreements on behalf of the union, and such 
agreements shall not be .subject to ratification 
by the Executive Committee or a general meeting.
This clause clearly restricted the right of rank and file members to 
recall these representatives or influence the terms of such an 
agreement, before it becomes legally binding. Of course representatives 
who concluded agreements contrary to the wishes of the executive 
committee and the general membership could be dismissed. However, if 
such a representative were dismissed after such an agreement was 
concluded, it could make little legal difference to the contracting 
parties: the union and employers, and in any event there were always
possible obstacles to removal.
It is, in any event, difficult to know how the rank and file members 
would be kept informed of developments in industrial council or 
conciliation board negotiations in order to instruct their 
representation, or even to dismiss them for either not carrying out 
their mandate, or for inadequately representing their interests in 
negotiations. There were no formally constituted structures which 
ensure accountability to the union's membership. This is not to deny 
that the issue may have arisen at general meetings, or even at 
executive committee meetings, but there seems little in the 
constitution which would resolve such a problem.
Structures which would enable rank and file control of their 
representatives were also missing in the model constitution. This was a 
fundamental flaw, and was repeated in all union constitutions based on 
the 'model' supplied by the Department of Labour.
The model constitution did, however, provide for ad hoc measures to be 
taken. Clause 5.6 reads:
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All matters on which the constitution is silent 
shall be decided on motion by a majority vote 
of the members present at a meeting.
Given that this clause could be interpreted very broadly to suit 
whatever purpose, it could well have been used to exert some form of 
control on wayward union officials and representatives. However, this 
would have necessitated acting on an ad hoc basis, rather than in 
accordance with principles which promote worker democracy in trade 
unions. This is clearly lacking in the 'model' constitution: the
principles of building democracy from below, of rank and file 
participation in union affairs, and the concept of worker control were 
clearly not considered. What is unfortunate, however, is that not many 
unions in this period (in Natal) perceived the serious shortcomings of 
such a constitution and followed the implicit assumptions contained 
within it. R.D. Naidu said of the National Baking Industry Employees' 
Union's constitution, and of all unions' constitutions of the period:
•.. constitutions [were] drawn to the model supplied 
by the Department of Labour. All unions had the same 
constitution. Only the composition and number of 
executive members were filled in.6
Mr B Peters, a former Secretary of the Durban Indian Municipal 
Employees' Union, confirmed that a 'model' constitution was received 
from the Department of Labour, in which the union was simply required 
to fill in the details of number of members, executive committee etc.
Mr SP Pillay, Secretary of the Laundry Workers union also confirmed 
this rather startling fact. Mr Pillay pointed out that despite the fact 
the Labour MP, a Mr AT Wanless, drew up the constitution of the laundry 
union, it was based on the 'model' supplied by the Department of 
Labour. In reply to the question "Was there anything in the model 
constitution that you wanted to change?" Mr Pillay said:
No. Final constitutions were very similar to the model 
constitution. All constitutions must be in compliance with 
the Industrial Conciliation act. Most of the unions had a 
very similar constitution.^
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The structure of any union as contained in the 'model' constitution 
could be diagrammised as follows:
j EX COM
t
ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING
I
GENERAL MEMBERSHIP
EX COM - Executive Committee 
IC - Industrial Councils 
CB - Conciliation Board
The 'model' constitution is conspicuously silent on the shop-floor 
representation to management, branch or local meetings, and educational 
programmes. Yet all of these are essential to creating the conditions 
and structures for greater democratic participation by the rank and 
file in the union.
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Many other aspects of the 'model' constitution reflect similar 
problems, but our analysis so far reveals the main points which need to 
be made, and it is in the light of these points that a number of 
specific constitutions are examined.
1. National Union of Cigarette and Tobacco Workers
2. Tea, Coffee and Chicory Industry Employees' Union
3. Natal Sugar Field Workers' Union
4. South African Railway and Harbour Indian Employees' Union
5. Twine and Bag Workers' Union
6. Garment Workers' Union8
7. Match Workers' Industrial Union (Natal)
8. Furniture Workers' Industrial Union (Natal).
All these unions existed in the period under discussion (see Table 
3.2) and r,._ny of their constitutions were similar to each other, 
differing only in style and form. There were a number of structural 
differences. For example, the Match Workers' Industrial Union and the 
Furniture Workers' Industrial Union organised by JC Bolton had a much 
more sophisticated constitution: the language used and the structure 
it described were way above those contained in the Department of 
Labour's 'model' constitution. In contrast, the constitutions of the 
Twine and Bag Workers' Union; the South African Railway and Harbour 
Indian Employees' Union and the Natal Sugar Field Workers' Union 
slavishly followed the 'model' constitution. The Twine and Bag Workers' 
Union- included, verbatim, the clause dealing with Industrial Council 
representatives which is quoted above p.64).
3.5.3 Shop Stewards and Shop Committees
Of the eight unions listed above, only three had provision for shop 
stewards. These were the Garment Workers' Union, the Match Workers' 
Industrial Union and the Furniture Workers' Industrial Union. The 
former union had Solly Sachs as its secretary, while the latter two
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were for some time under the secretaryship of JC Bolton. The other 
unions made no provision for shop stewards or factory (shop-steward) 
committees.
The fact that some unions had shop stewards and shop steward committes 
does not necessarily imp 1y that these unions' structures were more 
amenable to 'better' democratic practise, or that such shop stewards 
represented workers' interests at leadership levels within the union, 
and in negotiations with management. The role of the shop steward in 
all these unions was limited to collecting dues/subscriptions and 
enrolling new members. For example the Match Workers' Industrial 
Union's constitution had a clause on shop stewards which reads:
The shop steward shall request all members to produce 
their contribution cards for inspection, and if a new 
starter is not a member, he shall request him to make 
the necessary application .... The shop steward shall 
collect subscriptions from all members in his 
establishment and enter same into a book that is 
provided for the purpose by the 'Executive Council'.
(Clause 10.8)
The Match Workers' Industrial Union and the Furniture Workers' 
Industrial Union did provide for the shop steward and 'shop committee' 
to engage in attempting to resolve disputes on the factory floor. 
However it is not clear, from the paragraph that outlines the shop 
stewards’ negotiating role, what precisely this entailed. The relevant 
paragraph reads:
The shop steward shall immediately summon the secretary 
or any organising secretary when the shop committee has 
failed to settle any dispute in the establishment, and 
under no circumstances shall the shop steward negotiate 
or interview employers with the shop committee.
(Clause 10.8)
In each of the clauses quoted above, the last three lines are 
ambiguous. But even if one were disposed to a charitable
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interpretation of these clauses, it is clear that either the shop 
steward, or shop committee, or both were powerless in the circumstances 
referred to. There is only a vague suggestion that the shop steward 
is more than a mere money collector. The role of negotiator is 
completely obscured by four paragraphs (30 lines) outlining in detail 
the procedure to be followed in recruiting new members, collecting 
their dues, handing over the money to the secretary or treasurer, and 
on how to deal with members in arrears. This corroborates the view 
expressed by HG Ringrose:
In South Africa .... their [i.e. shop stewards] functions 
do not normally extend beyond the collection of subscrip= 
tions, but in some of the unions which are constituted on 
British lines, shop stewards are required to submit 
periodical reports to the local branch office". (1951, pp.72/73)
Ray Alexander (1944), in a pamphlet entitled Trade Unions and You 
issued by the Communist Party in the mid-1940's, argued that the shop 
steward should be considered "the backbone of any union" (p. 10). It
would be pertinent to discuss the views expressed in the pamphlet on 
the role of shop stewards, as it was circulated among trade unionists 
who were members of the Communist Party, of which there were many in 
Natal including PM Harry; G Ponen; B Peters, RD Naidu and C Amra. In 
the pamphlet Alexander gives much greater emphasis to the role of the 
shop steward as a leader in the department of a factory. She describes 
the qualities of leadership as follows:
One of his main duties is to see that his department is 
fully organised, and that all members are in good 
standing, that is, their subscriptions are paid up to 
date. He has to convince non-union workers that it is in 
their interests, as well as the interests of all workers, 
that they should become members. As a fully conscious 
trade unionist he must also explain union policy to all 
members and workers and develop their understanding of 
both the economic and political aims of the union. He is 
therefore, an educator, as well as a collector of dues. 
(Alexander, 1944, p.10)
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These views are explained further in the attributes which Alexander 
considers important in making a good shop steward:
1. knowledge of the constitution, industrial council 
agreements and wage determination;
2. knowledge of the safety rules of the Factories Act;
3. keeping written records of members and non-members;
4. keeping a written record of grievances;
5. seeing to it that workers attended meetings;
6. seeing to it that the department is clean;9 and
7. ensuring that the employer keeps to the terms of an
agreement.
It is clear that Alexander's description of a good shop steward does 
not seem to amount to much more than a glorified union clerk in the 
factory. As a result, two major issues appear not to have been
considered important.
1. It is not clear in what way the shop steward was to be
involved in the settlement of disputes, and
2. despite her seriatem exposition of the attributes referred to, 
it is still not clear what role the shop steward plays beyond 
that of "educator", which amounts only to the recruiting of 
new members and the collection of dues.
Alexander does add to her ideas by saying that a shop steward must 
ensure that workers attend union meetings. From this it is not certain 
whether or not the shop steward needed to report back to members in a 
factory (or department of a factory) as to what transpired at the 
meeting since all members should have been at the meeting. This, 
however, was not always entirely possible since the South African 
transport system was most unsatisfactory, pass laws were highly
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restrictive and the police force over-zealous. ^  These problems 
would have made it difficult to ensure that workers were always fully 
informed and adequately consulted on all decisions that affected them. 
Our point is that Alexander's contentions that in a well-run and 
democratic union, members are fully informed, can only have real 
meaning and be guaranteed if the shop steward is constitutionally 
empowered and practically acts as an elected representative of a 
specified constituency on the factory floor, and is fully integrated 
into the structure of the union, rather than in some vague role of 
"educator" and "collector" of dues. In both her analysis and in the 
constitutions of the Match Workers' Industrial Union and the Furniture 
Workers' Industrial Union the opposite was in fact the case.
The actual practices of trades unions and shop stewards confirm such a 
conclusion. SP Pillay stated that the duties of the shop steward were 
to recruit members, collect subscriptions and attend to worker 
grievances.
As a result of organisational conditions and prevailing attitudes 
towards shop stewards within the unions, workers were understandably 
not always supportive of either shop stewards or union leaders. SP 
Pillay comments:
In those days when a shop steward took up a complaint 
with the employer he was fired and you had no redress.
(If) you go to the Labour Department ... it was a long 
procedure, and they would say it was within the 
employers' rights. The only alternative was a threat of 
a strike. Often this did not work out. We did not have 
the support of the Labour Department. And the pressure 
from the working class wasn't so powerful. They took it 
easy. When they saw a White man they were afraid. From 
the sugar industry as indentured labour - this was 
something new.^'
Quite clearly the unions in Natal in the 1930's and 1940's frequently 
failed to incorporate shop stewards into the structure of the union in
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any meaningful sense, and failed, equally, to establish links between 
factory floor and the various union committees in concrete ways. 
Consequently, a broad based, diffused leadership structure extending 
from the shop floor into the union, responding to worker interests and 
with a refined sense of accountability to its full membership was, in 
most cases, entirely absent.
3.5.4 Meetings
The raison d'etre of any union is not simply its opposition to capital 
and securing, through its daily operations, whatever material benefits 
it can for members. A union also exists in order to advance and fulfil 
its long-term objects and to this end the way in which it conducts its 
daily struggle is of considerable importance. One of the most important 
aspects of the daily struggle of organised labour lies in the meetings 
union members have (as laid down in the constitution) in pursuance of 
its aims and objectives. It was at the various committee meetings that 
decisions on policy, principles, strategy and tactics were taken. The 
frequency with which various kinds of meetings were held, the 
composition of such meetings and how decisions were taken were 
therefore critically important to the way unions functioned in terms of 
promoting or limiting democracy. This will be more clearly illustrated 
in the following chapters, when we analyse the actual practice of trade 
unions in this period, but an introduction to patterns and structures 
of meetings will be useful at this stage.
All the unions under consideration had annual general meetings. Apart 
from reporting back on the union's year of activity, and its financial 
standing, an important aspect of the AGM was the election of an 
executive. In all the unions mentioned above the executive committee 
was in charge of the management of the union, either between AGM's or 
branch and/or quarterly general meetings. This pattern reflected the 
structure of the 'model' constitution. The composition of executive 
committees varied, however: the Natal Sugar Field Workers' Union, The 
Tea, Coffee and Chicory Industry Employees' Union and the Twine and Bag 
Workers' Union had executives made up of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman and
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nine other members. The South African Railway and Harbour Indian 
Employees' Union executive had a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen, an 
Organising Secretary, Secretary, Treasurer and fifteen other 
representatives. The Executive of the Match Workers' Industrial Union 
and the Furniture Workers' Industrial Union consisted of a President, 
Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, 2 Trustees, and 3 other members, 
while the executive of the Garment Workers Union had a General 
Secretary, President, Vice- President and 20 other members. All these 
persons were elected, in all but one of the unions, at the AGM. The 
exception was the National Union of Cigarette and Tobacco Workers which 
elected its President, Vice-President and National Treasurer from among 
its National Executive Committee (NEC). This was exceptional, not only 
because it was different, but also because the NEC consisted of branch 
representatives elected on the basis of "one representative and/or 
alternate for every two hundred and fifty (250) members or part 
thereof". (Clause 7.1, NUCTW, papers AH 1328)
Those unions which folowed the Department of Labour's constitution only 
had general, special general, annual general and executive committee 
meetings. The unions which had such meetings were the Twine and Bag 
Workers' Union, the Tea, Coffee and Chicory Industry Employees' Union 
and the South African Railways and Harbour Indian Employees' Union. 
General meetings were held at least once every two months for the Twine 
and Bag Workers' Union, and Tea, Coffee and Chicory Industry Employees' 
Union. For the South African Railway and Harbour Indian Employees' 
Union, general meetings were held at least once every four months.
Notices and agendas for such meetings of the latter three unions were 
to be given in writing to members not less than 3 days before the dates 
of such meetings. When special general meetings took place, written 
notices of a shorter duration could be given. There is, of course, 
nothing unconstitutional about such procedures. However, the brief 
period of notice is indicative of a less than serious attitude to the 
availability of time to prepare for such meetings, particularly as it 
was only at these meetings that the rank and file could participate in 
the union affairs. With such short notice, meetings were open to 
manipulation, especially when there existed a clause which allowed the 
chairman to decree that all motions be "reduced to writing and shall be
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delivered to the presiding officer to be read to the meeting." (e.g. 
Clause 11.4 NUCTW, Papers AH 1328) In the exceptional case of the 
South African Railway and Harbour Indian Employees' Union, it was 
compulsory to submit handwritten motions. In view of the facts that 
rank and file union members worked during the day, that they had to 
arrange their domestic affairs to fit in a general meeting (most often 
over a weekend), that transportation had to be arranged to and from 
meetings, and that members had to ponder over the 'business to be 
transacted' at the meeting, it was unlikely that such a union could 
ever achieve in practice a well-informed democratic involvement of 
members. It was, of course, much easier for an executive committee 
composed of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman and nine other members of the 
union to draw up motions, resolutions, etc, in advance of general 
meetings since they met at least once a month.
The problem of organising a well-informed democratic union was further 
complicated by the fact that many union members, being recently 
proletarianized, were illiterate, or semi-literate. This, as has 
already been shown with regard to shop steward structures, was not a 
problem to be solved bureaucratically. The creation of constitutional 
structures which could confront the problem of unionism in the 
interests of its members specifically, and of the working class in 
general, is a fundamental consideration which appears to have been 
lacking in all the unions in question.
This is not to say that all the union secretaries, in their positions 
of leadership, simply took it upon themselves to make arbitrary or 
individual decisions on a day to day basis, or to leave it to the union 
executive committee to take decisions on issues as they arose. Many 
tried to do a more responsible job. For example, Mr B Peters has 
explained how it was possible to keep the members of the Durban Indian 
Municipal Employees' Society informed:
Members of DIMES (were] kept informed of matters via the 
DIMES Bulletin. This included the work of the 
Executive. Other matters relating to workers [were] 
taken from the Guardian. DIMES Bulletin [was] issued
quarterly and distributed by committee members [shop 
1 ?stewards] .
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Mr Peters has further pointed out that memos and proposals were also 
printed in the DIMES Bulletin "so that all workers were informed of the 
proposals. Meetings were held in Magazine Barracks in Somtseu Road". 
The publication of such a 'Bulletin' testifies to the hard work and 
unselfish devotion to the tasks at hand, particularly for those who 
believed in creating an informed membership. The dedication shown by 
such union secretaries as Billy Peters, G Ponen, SP Pillay, RD Naidu, 
PM Harry and others cannot be denied. . However, disseminating such 
information as was printed in union newspapers or pamphlets was really 
only a starting point. It left unhandled the problem of members' 
illiteracy and the question of how the information was critically 
absorbed, discussed, and used within the structures of the union. Yet 
these were the issues which were of vital importance.^
Our argument thus far suggests that despite the dedication, hard work 
and long hours put in by the leadership of the unions during this 
period, the lack of adequate constitutional structures may have 
militated against promoting the constitutionally declared aim and 
objectives of these unions - objectives which are intrinsic to trades 
unions as organisations designed to promote the interests of workers. 
In so arguing, we have no intention of undermining the importance of 
union newspapers, news letters or pamphlets, or indeed the union 
leadership. They were (and are) invaluable in guiding and informing 
the membership. But it is only when shop floor representatives or 
organised rank and file workers in trades unions are integrated into 
every level of the deliberative and decision making process of the 
union, which must include a system of accountability, that it could 
become possible (although not predictable) to generate higher levels of 
consciousness, activity and democratic practice.
Yet further evidence based on meeting structures suggests that 
accountability did not really exist in many cases. The Natal Sugar 
Field Workers' Union had, for instance, no provision in their 
constitution for a general meeting on a bi-monthly or monthly basis. 
All decisions were taken by the executive committee and only once a 
year at the AGM were the rank and file members allowed to decide on a 
new executive consisting of the chairman, vice-chairman and nine other
members of the union. Decisions made during the year were not subject 
to ratification. The relevant clause read:
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The management of the affairs of the union shall, 
between conferences [its AGM], be vested with an 
Executive Committee consisting of the Chairman, 
Vice-Chairman and nine other members of the union,
[who shall] on nomination duly seconded and voted 
upon by show of hands, hold office until the next 
annual conference of the union and be eligible for 
re-election, on termination of their period of office.
(Clause 6.1)
It is interesting to note that the annual conference of the Natal Sugar 
Field Workers' Union was not open to all its members, but to
....  delegates from all Estates, elected on a basis
of one delegate for every twenty five members or 
part thereof ... (Clause 5.1)
Thus we find that as a result of their constitutions, the structures of 
the Twine and Bag Workers' Union; the Tea, Coffee and Chicory Industry 
Employees' Union and the South African Railway and Harbour Employees' 
Union, were those intended by the drafters of the 'model' constitution 
provided by the Department of Labour. The Natal Sugar Field Workers' 
Union would also appear to have modelled itself on the Department of 
Labour constitution, but chose to excise the clause on general meetings 
in its own constitution. Whether or not this streamlining of the 
'model' constitution actually facilitated matters in organising 
agricultural workers has yet to be ascertained. What is clear,
however, is that it certainly concentrated all decision-making power 
and authority, without need for accountability or report-back to its 
members, in one committee of the union.
Thus in the unions discussed here,^ there seemed, at best, to be 
an ambiguous connection between general meetings and executive 
meetings. At worst, no structural connection existed at all. AGM's 
seemed to be primarily for the election of new executives, and served 
no broader communicative or accounting responsibility at all.
In the constitutions of the Match Workers' and the Furniture Workers' 
Industrial Unions, the types of meetings held were similar to the ones
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outlined in the 'model1 constitution: general meetings were to be held 
once every three months, with allowance for special general meetings; 
an annual general meeting and an executive council (committee) meeting 
were to be held once a fortnight, and allowance was made for special 
executive council (committee) meetings.
In the case of the National Union of Cigarette and Tobacco Workers 
(NUCTW) the following committees, each with its own meetings, were 
constitutionally established: Branch Annual General Meetings; Branch 
General Meetings; Branch Executive Committee meetings; National 
Executive Committee meetings, and a national Annual General Meeting.
The Branch General meeting (BGM) took place once every six months; 
Branch Executive Committee meetings (BEC) twice a month and the 
National Executive Committee Meeting (NEC) twice a year. In this 
constitution the branches were given power similar to the NEC. Being a 
national industrial union it had to cater for its members over a much 
wider geographical area than any of the above mentioned unions. 
Despite this, and the fact that it did not have shop stewards, the 
union seemed to have a structure which was more responsive than other 
similar structures to issues workers faced on the shop floor. The 
Branch Executive Committee constituted an executive comprising the 
chairman, vice-chairman and not less than five (5) other members 
provided that each factory in the area of the branch had at least one 
representative on the BEC. The number of representatives per factory 
for the BEC was decided at a BGM and each factory was then allowed to 
vote by ballot for such representatives. The BEC then elected from 
among itself representatives to the NEC on the basis of "one 
representative and/or alternative for every two hundred and fifty (250) 
members or part thereof." (Clause 7.1)
Although the National Union of Cigarette and Tobacco Workers appears 
from the structure contained in its constitution to formally 
incorporate its rank and file representatives into the general running 
of the affairs of the Union to a much greater extent than any of the 
others, it would be a mistake to conclude that such democratic 
principles ensure survival. For in a report prepared in 1951 by
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Anna Scheepers for the NEC of the National Union of Cigarette and 
Tobacco Workers (NUCTW), she comments generally on the Durban branches 
of a number of unions,
From recent discussions X have had with trade union leaders 
I had come to the conclusion that there is a great need for 
organisation in general in the Durban area. There are 
branches there of a number of trade unions which have almost 
become defunct, and others not functioning at all.
One of these union branches was that of the National Union of Cigarette 
and Tobacco Workers. She wrote specifically of it as follows:
The NEC was not satisfied with the lack of organisation in 
Durban and also the NEC did not receive the information 
required from this branch in terms of the constitution.^
Effectively the union had little presence in Durban. Thus, while a 
union's constitution may appear to have had the potential to be 
responsive to its members on the factory floor, the mere existence of 
democratic constitutional structures is not a sufficient condition 
guaranteeing the survival or success of the union as an organisational 
form. But the point we are making is that without the necessary and 
desirable constitutional structures it would have been very difficult 
for rank and file members to begin to assert themselves in the affairs 
of the union.
3.5.5 Affiliation to Political Organisations
We now turn our attention to the issue of union affiliation to 
political organisations. We might point out here that formal 
affiliation to any political party was and is illegal in terms of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act. However, as certain political 
organisations were not formally constituted parties, it would seem 
legally feasible for trades unions to affiliate or at least to support 
such organisations.
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However, none of the constitutions of the unions mentioned above, 
except for that of the Transvaal based Garment Workers' Union, had 
a clause explicitly outlining the conditions for affiliation to 
political organisations. There were clauses providing for 
representation on industrial councils and conciliation boards, and for 
affiliation to other trades union organisations. In addition, nearly 
all the unions had provision for some kind of co-operation or 
assistance to be rendered to other trades unions, or to sections of the 
working class provided such assistance was deemed to be in the 
interests of the working class movement as a whole. Such sentiments of 
working class solidarity were usually found in the clause "aims and 
objectives". For example one of the aims and objectives of the Tea, 
Coffee and Chicory Industry Employees' Union was:
To co-operate with and assist other trade or industrial 
organisations or any section of workers in the general 
interests of the working class movement. (Clause 3.f)
Other unions had similar clauses. To give effect to such aims and 
objectives meant that a decision had to be taken at a formally 
constituted meeting of the union. However, as there was no specific 
clause relating to the issue of affiliation to a political 
organisation, it would appear that such a decision would have to be 
made at a general meeting in terms of the following type of clause:
All matters on which this constitution is silent shall 
be decided on a motion by a majority of those present at 
a general meeting. (Clause 6 (f) - Tea, Coffee and 
Chicory Employees' Union)
Similar clauses are to be found in the constitutions of the Twine and 
Bag Workers' Union (Clause 6.f), the South African Railway and Harbour 
Indian Employees' Union (Clause 5.6), the Furniture Workers' Industrial 
Union (Natal) (Clause 18), Match Workers' Industrial Union (Natal) 
(Clause 18). In the case of the Natal Sugar Field Workers' Union,the
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Executive Committee had the power "to do such other things as, in the 
opinion of the Executive Committee, appear to be in the interests of 
the Union." (Clause 6.j) The National Union of Cigarette and Tobacco 
Workers were able at both branch level and NEC level "to do such other 
things as in the opinion of the NEC/BEC may appear to be in the 
interest of the Union." (Clause 8.1 and Clause 12.2e) In all of the 
above cases such actions or "things" which are supposed to be in the 
interests of the unions were subject to the provisions of the 
constitutions and to the broad direction of the general meetings of 
those unions. The very vagueness of these provisions appear to allow 
Executive Committees to appropriate decision-making on this issue. 
Except in the cases of the National Union of Cigarette and Tobacco 
Workers, the Executive Committees of those unions were less than 
representative of the rank and file members and could quite easily 
decide on, say, affiliation to a political organisation, without 
contravening any of the rules of the constitution. Because the 
commitment to reporting back to workers and the procedures for doing so 
were either weakly defined or non-existent, it seems that workers' 
feelings on issues which arose outside the confines of the constitution 
did not carry considerable weight in the deliberations of executive 
committees. Such decisions could even be presented as fait accompli at 
general meetings.
3.5.6 Calling Strikes
Under the Industrial Conciliation Act only registered unions could go 
on a legal strike - and this only after following lengthy procedures 
designed to resolve any grievances by negotiation. There was therefore 
no automatic right which workers had to go on strike in this period. 
However, going on strike always pre-supposed a minimum of worker 
solidarity and organisation and a belief in the efficacy of such 
collective action. The constitutions of unions do provide some 
indication of the extent of such organisation and the importance unions 
attach to this form of worker action as a means for resolving 
grievances. The eight constitutions we examined divide into two dear 
categories of procedure or decision-making in regard to strike action. 
The constitutions of three of these unions laid down that a ballot had
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to be held and also provided for strike pay and registers. The unions 
in this category were: the Furniture Workers' Industrial Union (Natal), 
the Match Workers' Industrial Union (Natal), and the National Union of 
Cigarette and Tobacco Workers. In the constitutions of the remaining 
unions no procedures for calling strikes are laid down and no 
provisions were made for strike funds. These unions were: the Twine 
and Bag Workers' Union, the South African Railway and Harbour Indian 
Employees' Union, the Tea, Coffee and Chicory Industry Employees' 
Union, the Natal Sugar Field Workers' Union and the Garment Workers' 
Union (Transvaal).
This does not necessarily imply that these latter unions (which did not 
have clauses relating to strike action) did not in practice discuss 
such procedure and strategy with the rank and file membership. 
However, given the importance of the strike weapon, the failure to 
include such clauses in the constitutions may be indicative of a less 
than clear view on the importance of the democratic involvement of rank 
and file workers in all issues relating to strikes. The absence of 
such clauses also allows room for the leadership of such unions to 
appropriate decisions on this crucial issue without adequately 
involving and informing rank and file members.
3.5.7 Commentary and Assessment
We have, up to this point, analysed various aspects of the 
constitutions of some of the unions which existed in the period 
1930-1950. In so doing, we covered, inter alia, shop floor structures 
(e.g. shop stewards and shop steward committees), meetings, decision 
making, industrial council representation, affiliation to political 
organisations, and the calling of strikes. We have not touched on 
issues such as financial control and workers' education. (All union 
constitutions examined are silent on the issue of worker education, 
with the exception of the South African Railway and Harbour Indian 
Employees' Union, which had a clause stating that it was an objective 
"to encourage and work for the education of all members and their 
dependents.")
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Nonetheless, we feel that our analysis more than adequately depicts the 
structures of the unions of this period and the potential for and/or 
limitations on democratic involvement of the rank and file which these 
structures generated.
The argument presented in this chapter concerning the potential for 
worker democracy, as it existed in the constitutions of the unions of 
the period, may be dismissed as being either an unwarranted criticism 
made with the benefit of hindsight or a bourgeois pre-occupation with 
'constitutionalism', with the correct form of rules, regulations and 
procedures. We do not believe such dismissals or criticisms to be of 
any value. It is not simply our critique here that because of their 
structural limitations, these unions were unable to offer, foster and 
develop democratic and informed practices in the rank and file. It is 
not, in other words, simply our contention that union leaders should 
have extended the capacity for self-education and encouraged worker 
participation in the affairs and actions of the unions. It would 
indeed be mere hindsight to make such an injunction or judgement.
Instead, we perceive much wider and more pervasive difficulties arising 
from the limitations pointed to. And these relate principally to the 
way in which the absence of clear democratic procedures militated 
against the independent class organisation and activity of this nascent 
working class movement and often subsumed its very capacity to act 
under organisational and political precepts generally unrepresentative 
of the objective demands of this class. These difficulties will become 
clearer as we look at the activities of this movement (Chapter 4) and 
its relationship to the political organisations of the time. (Chapters 
4 and 5)
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CHAPTER FOUR
WORKER ACTION IN DURBAN: 1930-1950
4.1 Introduction
From c1934, after the collapse of the Industrial and Commercial 
Workers' Union (ICU) and the virtual demise of the Natal Workers' 
Congress (NWC), many new trades unions were formed in Durban by Black 
workers (mainly African and Indian) either along racially divided or 
non-racial lines. Thus a new phase in union organising began after the 
Great Depression, and it was Durban rather than any other industrial 
area of South Africa that was the main centre of strike activity.^ 
Hemson points out (1979, pp. 302/3) that the leading force in the 
strike wave was the dock workers. However, there were many other 
instances of worker action in this period. A schedule of strikes 
involving Black workers in Natal is given in Table 4.1 below.^
The major points emerging from this schedule may be summarised as 
follows. There was a total of (at least) 85 strikes involving (at 
least) 15 984 Black workers. Seventeen strikes, more than in any other
*3single year in this period, occurred in 1942. strike activity was 
also high in the years 1937, 1938 and 1939 in the aftermath of the 
formation of new trades unions by semi-skilled and unskilled Black 
workers. Of the total of 85 strikes in the period 1930-1950,4 46 
occurred between 1937 and the end of 1942, when War Measure 145 was 
enacted prohibiting strikes by Africans and providing for compulsory 
arbitration at the discretion of the Minister of Labour. The greatest 
number of strikes occurred in the food, beverages and tobacco sector 
(20); services, including the railways, docks and municipalities (9); 
mining (12); metal and engineering (6); and clothing and textiles (5). 
Other strikes occurred in the rubber, leather and footwear; chemical; 
furniture; paper; building and agricultural sectors (sugar field 
workers). These strikes ranged in duration from a few hours, in the
yqgE R ?cncw  in  mm* 1930-1950
(S trik e  A ction  by B lack Workera)
T A B L E  4 . 1
EKEE BBIH1 AFRICAN OTfXJRgj SHTTC TOOT, AcnnyissuE tNEK INWIMD DEEBTKf & FACTORY DDRATEN conn® BEmnoB
17/8/31 STRIKE: OBJECTION TO m S l 
REDUCTION
DUNDEE GOAL MINE 24 HRS SETTLEMENT RINGRQSE, p.58;
NATAL JERCUKY 18/3/31; 
UNICN YEAR BOCK: 1931
2/4/32 788 788 STRIKE: mXJCTIOI IN VBGES DURBAN DUCKS STRIKERS DISMISSED 71® REPLACED RINGROSE, p.58; HEMSCN (1979)
>3/7/32 70 70 STRIKE SUGAR INDUSTRY, 
ZHLUIAND MUX
3 nus RDGROSE, p.58;
UNICN YEARBOCK 1932/33
-/9/34 282 5 287 STRIKE: CBTEnTIQI TO V®GE
heimctich
NEWCASH£ COAL MINE 287 m a  
DAYS
RINGRQSE, p.58;
1/2/35 * * ft ft 264 STRIKE: i.KETOCTICN IN PUCE 
WORK RATOS
ii. ND MID MDENING EKEAK
iii. VICTIMIZKriCN
TEXTILE 7.15AM- 
10.30AM 
(SAME DAY)
EBNJGEMENT AGREED TO THE FCRWTICN CF A 
OOMtrrTEE TO REPRESENT WOHLERS.
RM3CS3, p.61;
NATAL MERCURf 2/2/35
-/5/35 630 630 SYMPMHY STRIKE TOR ODEN 
MEMBERS IN THE TRANSVAAL WED 
STRUCK FOR PAYMENT CN JUBILEE DAY
TECnUS WC&KE2S 
IMXJSTRIAL UNICN
TffXTTTE EACIQRY 1 DAY WORKERS REIURNED TO VDRK PENDING 
LEVEHEMENIS CN THE REEF.
KDGROSE, p.61;
NATAL MERCURf 14/5/35
-/12/35 ft a ft 61 161 STRIKE: HTUMPIS B5T EMPLOYER TO 
EH IOKER WGES THAN HE OTJIHM3 
INDUSTRY VETS CE3EMn®HaB
GARMENT WURKhliS 
INDUSTRIAL INICN
aOmiNS INDUSTRY: 
ASCOT AND YORKSHIRE
aonnrc; factory
6 DAYS RINGRQSE STATES THAT THE STRIKE WAS 
S S m E D  BUT THE (GWEU) 25TH ANNIVERSARY 
Hmi]RE STATES THAT THE STRIKE WAS LOST 
AFTER BEING SABOTAGED BY S3® \OKERS.
RINGROSE, p.61;
(5JIU 2E4H 7NNIVERSARY 
BHoaura;
-/11/35 * a ft * 51 STRIKE SUGAR INDUSTRY: 
INAMDA MUX
1 DAY RDCsoa,- p.62
2/12/35 500 500 STRIKE: AFRICAN WOTKERS ISEUSED 
TO WORK HEAUSE THEY HAD CMY 2 
MEALS A EAY WHILE HTTTE WCSKERS 
WERE PROVIDED WITH 3
CDAL MINING 1 DRY CHIEF WdSIRKE, NATIVE COML3SICNER 
SAP JS® REPRESENTATIVES IRCM NATIVE 
AFEAIRS DEPARTMENT TERSUADED MLNE3S 
TO RETORI TO WORK.
KOnGhQsb, p.62;
NATAL MERCURY 4/12/35
-/1/36 * * ft 60 163 STRIKE LEATHER WDIKERS 
UNICN
ECOIVEAR;
PIETEFMAKTI2BUTG
3 DAYS RDGFCa, p.62;
4/7/36 96 96 SIRIKE SUGAR INDUSTRY; 
ZmHAND SUGAR MULL
I DAY RM3CSE, p.62;
-/2/37 * ft ft ? STRIKE CVER Wffi DEMANDS LED BY 
SKHI2D WORKERS CF THE AEU
AMALGAMATE!) HC. 
UNION (REP. WHME 
COLOURED & 
SKTIIJD WORKERS)
FALKIRK IRCN & STEEL 
CD. JACOBS, DURBAN
RESOLVED TO THE SATISFACTION CF SCHIfD 
WDFKERS CNLY.
TO2SA PATHS 
JH 646 DC 8.30
3/5/37 * ft +400 VICTTMIZKnCN CF MEMBERS CF THE 
NISWU LED TO VmC-T>RUL£ THEN 
LOCK-OUT
NATAL IRCN AND 
STEEL WORKERS 
UNICN
FALKEFK IRON & STEEL 
CD. JACOBS, DURBAN
ND RESQLUnCN CF CENTRAL ISSUES. SEE CHAPTER 4.2 CF 
THIS CHAPTER FDR 
rffTTATTS
25/5/37 45 45 STRIKE OJER DEMANDS FCR HIGHER 
WAGES
ECK-MAKING FACTORY, 
JACOBS, DURBAN
10 REIUMED TO WOHC CN THE SAEE DAY; 
13 CN THE fttlOWDC TRY H® THE REST 
WEFE PAID CSF.
NATAL MERCURf 26/5/37; 
RINGROSE, p.64;
12/8/37 650 650 TOST LABOUR RATES REDUCED ERCM 
3/6 TD 3 SHTTXiTNGS PER DAY, AMD 
WORKERS REFUSED TO WORK INTEL 
WAGES WERE INCREASED TO THE RATES 
PAID TO STEVEDORING COMPANY 
EMPLOYEES, IE. 4 gmXTNGS
DURBAN DOCKS 2 VEEEKS TOGT WORKERS FESUMED WORK AT THE 
OLD RATES CF PAY.
RINGROSE p.64; - 
NATAL MERCURf 13/B/37; 
26/8/37
-/S/37 ft ft ft 31 STRIKE SUGAR INDUSTRY; 
MUX AT HICM0
2 DAYS RETURNED TO WORK, RECEIVING WAGES 
IN FULL
KENGfOEE, p.64;
INICN YEARBOCK, NO. 19, 
p.273
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DATE INDIAN AFKKSN CCUCDFST) WTECE TOTAL rannq/issnE cnxck imised & FNOKM Z DdRRTICN otnctJE
-/S/37 * * * 420 STRIKE MIRDC INDUSTRY; 
UTRECHT
I DAY RDOBSE, p.64; UtHCN 
YEARBOOK M0.19, p.273
28/8/07 400 400 STRIKE: INCREASE IN WAGES STEVEDORING, FBYDCN 
VHAIF, DURBAN
3 DAYS RETURNED TO W M  PENDING AN INVESTIGAT­
ION INTO) THE DEMANDS, BUT 2 DAYS LATER 
THE STRIKE BROKE CUT AGAIN.
RIN3RQSE, p.64? NA3HL 
FERCURY 30/8/37 & 
31/8/37; UNION 
YEARBOOK ND. 19 p.273
6/8/37 50 400 450 STRIKE CVER DEMANDS FOR:
1. HIGHER WSGES
2. WEEKLY PAY
3. CASH VALUE CF FOOD RATIONS
CHEMICAL, EXPLOSIVE
F2CTOKY,
IMBOGINIWINI
1 EftY bsloyers restEED to maxtraNOE psanae
EOT AGREED TO CCNSHSR THE OTHER ISSJES.
KESOOSE, jp.64/65; 
NATAL MERCURY 8/9/37
25/8/37 * * * 186 STRIKE FTSHING, EUTOAN 16 DAYS RDCFCSE p.65; (MON 
YEARBOOK NO. 19, p.273
-/9/37 * * A 13 STRIKE SOAP FACTORY, 
DURBAN
KIN3BSE; p.65;
14/12/37 300 300 STRIKE: RMUR IHAT LEW CCMOCND 
MANAGER WAS STARTING
COAL MINING, 
DANHAUSER
1 DRY KIM3C6E, p.65?
NATAL MERCURY 15/12/37
10/1/38 637 637 STRIKE COAL MINING 1 KJUR R1N2R06E, p.72; NATAL 
MERCURY 10/1/38 S 
11/1/38
2/5/38 125 125 STRIKE GOAL MINE 1 DAY RTN3Bffi, p.72
-/1/38 98 98 STRIKE ENGJNkEKQG:
GENERAL EN3INEERIN3 
FACIOKf, DURBAN
S DMT KDBCffi, p.72
-/2/38 4 4 STRIKE MOTOR:
MOTOR REPAIR SXP
4 AFRICHE FINED EUR STRIKDC. KEN3B6E, p.72
25/7/38 * * 45 105 STRIKE: CBJtL-TICN ID EMPLOYMENT 
CF NDN-UNICN WORKER
FURLETURE: 
FUKGTURE FACTORY, 
DURBAN
20 MINUTES NNKKICN EMPLOYEE DISMISSED. KIN3CSE, p.72
4/3/39 400 400 STRIKE:
1. HOURS IDO ICNG
2. EOCD WAS POCR
CT5AL MINING, NEAR 
NEWCASTLE
>j DRY WCRCERS ASSEMBIID N  FTT HERD. HRIF 
FETUHTED TO WORK RFIER TALKLN3 WTIH 
SAP. OTHERS HETURffiD TO WOfK WHEN TWO 
FUYRL AIRECFCE RIRCRRFT FLEW CWEEHEAD - 
"ON A PRBCTICE FLTCHT". WOHLERS M3RRIE 
OILAPSED. WORKERS WORKED OVERTIME TO 
MAKE UP FCR IOST MAN HOURS.
KTN3SDSE, jp.72/73; 
NATAL EERCURY 6/3/39
12/6/39 350 350 STRIKE COAL MINING, 
NEAR VRYHEUD
1 DRY ONE SCBINDI Turn CHARHD WEE INCTi'ItG 
A STRIKE, RIB SEMHKID TO 3 UNDE 
IMPRISONMENT.
KDdtSE, p.73
26/5/39 750 750 STRIKE: INCREASE IN W££S CF 
6d. PER DAY
TIMBER YAH), 
DURBAN
1 DAY EMPLOYER CLAIMED STRIKE VAS THE W34C CF 
KTETAICSS. STKIKIEG WORKERS DISMISSED. 
W5NY TRIER FETUBSIED TO ffi IB-HIRED.
RDEBDSE, p.73;
NATAL MERCURY 27/5/39; 
(NEON YEARBOOK (1940)
indicates a total
NUMBER CF'600 BTKiKIIC 
woracERS.
9/6/39 35 35 STRIKE VffiTER AUIH3RTTY, 
HENLEY DAM, NEAR 
FOEIEFMARnraJFG
1 CAY KffGRDSE, p.73
23/8/39 11 11 STRIKE SEE INDUSTRY, 
DURBAN
1 m u GRIEVANCES WTDLLN 24 HUES. KIN3R0SE, p.73
11/10/39 * + * 612 STRIKE VHAUNG, DURBAN >5 DRY KTNSRDSE, p.75
DATE INDIAN AFRICAN mi CORED VHTIE TOTAL actionA ssue UNICN INVOLVED INDUSTRY & FACTORY DURATION CUiaCME REFERENCE
-/2/40 16 16 STRIKE TOBACCO, CIGAR 
FACTORY, DURBAN
1 DAY KINGRDSE, p.75
-/10/41 33 33 STRIKE: VICTIMIZKnCN CF UNICN 
MEMBER
TOBACCO WORKERS 
UNICN
TOBACCO, IMPERIAL 
CIGAR MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, DURBAN
1 DAY WORKERS REBURIED TO WORK PENDING 
CCNCILIAnCN BY DURBAN LOCAL QOMUTTEE 
CF THE SATICo
R3NGRDSE, po76; 
GUARDIAN 23/10/41
-/B/41 1500 1500 STRIKE: DEMAND FOR INCREASE IN 
WAGES FKM 4s ID 8s A DAY
HARBCUR, DURBAN 3 DAYS IMTKIVED INCREASE DEMANDED. AISD CRDSB 
1000 SARffl W3SCEFS TO BE "IDLE".
KDGF06E,'pp.75/76; 
NATAL MERCURY 19/8/41; 
AISO HEAKW (THESIS)
1941 * * * * STRIKE MULING IMXETKY KIMGRCSE,p.76
1941 * * 250 STRIKE: VFGE DEMANDS, REDCQOTITCN 
CF UNICN, REEDGNITICN CF MAY DAY 
AS A HXJDAY
TEA, COFFEE AND
chicory workers
UNION (DURBAN)
TEA, COFFEE,
chicdky u k s t k
(roOD, BEVERAGES)
H®IAN CFINICN 26/9/41
1941 * * * * SIKDCE COAL MINING KDGROSE, p.76
1941 * * * STRIKE BUILDING INDUSTRY KIH3CH:, p.76
1942 * * * STRIKE RARER BQAFD INDUSIEY WORKERS DEMANDS ACCEDED TO. HEMSCN, p.336; 
KDGRQSE (1951, p.30)
1942 * ? * STRIKE TOBACCO WORKERS 
UNICN
CIGAR, TCBACCD 
INDUSTRY
NtXHW PAPERS AH 1328
1942 * * SIKEKE DURBAN DOCKS 7 DAYS RDER06E, (1951, p.30)
8/12/42 147 +290 +437 STRIKE: IMPOSTETCN CF A CEMPANY 
UNICN AT DUNICP RUBBER COMPANY
NATAL RJEBER 
WORKERS
INDUSTRIAL DNICN
FUEEER INDUSTRY, 
(DUNLCP PTY. HDD.)
+90 DAYS AIL STRIKING MINERS DISMISSED. SEE SECTION 4.3 CF 
THIS CHAPTER FOR
IW P A T T f l
8/42 - 
9/42
* x5 * x5 5 STRIKES OVER WAGE DEMANDS SU3AR INDUSTRY RM3CSE, (1951, p.30)
1942 * *  * * STRIKE: WGE. DEMANDS BRICK A S D  THE, 
DURBAN
RBGR0SE (1951, p.30)
1942 * * * STRIKE: WAGE DEMANDS LAUNDRY, DURBAN RBGROSE (1951, p.30)
1942 * * * STRIKE: WMF DEMANDS QUAKRYIN3, DURBAN KQGHDSE (1951, p.30)
1942 * * * STRIKE: WAGE DEMANDS SHEET METAL, DURBAN RDGROSE (1951, p.30)
1942 * * * STRIKE: WAGE DEMANDS TEXTILES, DURBAN WORKERS’ DEMANDS ACCEDED TO. R3N3RDSE (1951, p.30); HEM9DN p.336
1942 * * * STRIKE: WMF DEMANDS BUILDING INDUSTRY, PIETEPMARTIZBURG
RIN3RDSE (1951, p.30)
1942 * * * STRIKE: WAGE DEMANDS EOCD AND CANNING, 
ESCOUFT
RDEEOSE (1951, p.30)
1/5/44 * * 227 STRIKE BRICK & THE FACTORY
1 DAY CFETCXAL YEAR BOCK CF THE UNICN: 1945
29/3/44 * * 64 STRIKE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY OFFICIAL YEAR BOCK CF THE UNION: 1945
1/11/44 * ★ 202 STRIKE WHALING INDUSTRY OEFIOAL YEAR BOCK CF THE lOTCN: 1945
-/7/44 * * * DISPUTE OVER BONUS AND
amrciCNS cf work
NATAL SUGAR FIELD 
EMPLOYEES UNICN
SUGAR INDUSTRY, 
NATAL ESTATES LTD.
1 DAY WORKERS RETURNED AFTER NEGOTIATIONS 
VHTH AUIHDRITTES.
GUARDI® 27/7/44
1945 STRIKE NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY RETORTED TO WQFK AFTER EE3N3 CAUTIONED KDGRGSE p.81 EY MA3ISTRAIE.
8 7
DATE INDIAN AFRICAN COLOURED WHITE TOTAL ianCH/ISSUE UNION INVOLVED INDUSTRY & FACTORY DURATION CUICCX-E REFERENCE
11/12/45 * * 700 STRIKE: WAGE DEMANDS, WORKING GCNDITICNS NATIONAL UNION OF LAUNDERING, CLEANING 
. & DYEING EMPLOYEES
LAUNDRY INDUSTRY, 
DURBAN + 3 UNDE WORKERS DISMISSED SEE SECTION 4.4 CF THIS CHAPTER.
~/10/46 400 400 STRIKE METAL FIRM, 
NEWCASTLE (AFRICAN 
METAL CORPORATION)
FTNGRCSE, p.81;
NATAL MEROJFY 16/10/46
-/11/47 * * 252 STRIKE: PROTEST AGAINST 
POLICE BRUTALITY
SJGAR ESTATES, 
DAFNELL
RETURNED TO WORK AFTER COMPANY ®VE 
AN UNDERTAKING THAT PCUCE WOULD NOT 
AGAIN BE CALLED IN.
TOCSA PAPERS AH 646 
Da.4.4
30/4/47 * * 54 STRIKE DAIRY COMPANY, 
DURBAN
UNION YEAR BOCK: 1948
8/B/47 * * 124 STRIKE QUARRYING, DURBAN 0NICN YEAR BOCK: 1948
22/11/47 ★ * 175 STRIKE DAIRY COMPANY, 
DURBAN
ONION YEAR BOCK: 1948
14/1/47 * * 65 STRIKE SU3BR MEUSTRY UNION YEAR BOCK: 1948
6/1/47 * * 151 STRIKE POWER STATION, 
CDTRMSQ
UNION YEAR BOCK: 1948
21/8/47 * * 142 STRIKE MILK PRODUCTS 
FACTORY, ESOOUKF
UNION YEAR BOCK: 1948
13/10/47 ★ * 81 STRIKE BUHDDE INXEIHY, 
IADYMHH
INLCN YEAR BOCK: 1948
12/3/48 * * 74 STRIKE FCCD PRCCUCTS 
FACTORY, ESCCUFT
UNION YEAR BOCK: 1949
24/9/48 * * 15 STRIKE TRANSPORT,
IADXEMTIH
0NICN YEAR BOCK: 1949
1948 ★ * 16 STRIKE DAIRY COMPANY UNION YEAR BOCK: 1949
1948 * 60 60 STRIKE: WORKING 
CDNDITTCNS
SUGAR INDUSTRY, 
ILLCMD MILLS
KHEK5SE, p.81; NATAL 
MERCURY 29/1/48:8/4/48
3/3/50 * * 448 STRIKE COITCN SPINNING, 
LADYEMTIH
‘s nay 0NICN YEAR BOCK: 1950
9/1/50 * * 160 STRIKE COAL MINING, 
VFYHETD
2 DAYS UNICN YEAR BOCK; 1950
4/1/50 * * 33 STRIKE COAL MINING, 
VKYHELD
1 DAY 1MICNI YEAR BOCK: 1950
8/5/50 * * 111 STRIKE TOBACCO WORKERS 
UNION
TCBAOCD INDUSTRY, 
3 FACTORIES
+3 WEEKS TUCSA PAPERS-AH 646 
DC 8.49
26/6/50 300 300 PROTEST DAY CALLED 
BY CPSA
DURBAN INDIAN 
MNICIPAL 
EMPLOYEES SOCIETY
MUNICIPALITY,
DURBAN
TUCSA PAPERS AH 646
28/11/50 572 572 STRIKE: WAGE DISRJTE DURBAN DOCKS(SAR&H) UNION YEAR BOCK: 1950
1950 * * ? STRIKE SU3AR INDUSTRY 
(MTTir.TNS)
TTCHMAfN (1983, p.81)
>2/8/50 * * 223 STRIKE LEATHER INDUSIRY, 
DURBAN
EKKN YEAR BOCK: 1950
>1/9/50 * * 14 STRIKE ENGINEERING,
RTNETOWN
JMEDDYEES PAID CSF AND N3T KE-EN3SQD UNION YEAR BOCK: 1950
1/10/50 * * 53 STRIKE MINERAL WATER, DURBAN
UNION YEAR BOCK: 1950
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case of the textile workers strike of 1 February 1935, to about 3 
months in the case of the laundry workers strike in 1945/46. As far as 
is ascertainable and verifiable, only eleven unions were involved in 
the strikes which occurred. However, where a specific trade union is 
known to have been established in a particular industry in which a 
strike occurred, that union may well have been involved in that action. 
Thus, for example, many of the strikes in the sugar mills after 1938 
are likely to have involved the Natal Sugar Industry Employees' 
Onion.®
Although these strikes were not organised as part of a coherent trades 
union or union federation strategy, they did serve to broaden the base 
for the economic demands of semi-skilled and unskilled Black workers. 
At the same time, they also raised a whole new set of issues in terms 
of the organization of these unions and their strategies, and in terms 
of the relationship between the workers' movement and the political 
organizations of the time. More specifically, the strikes over this 
period raised the following issues apart from the immediate shop-floor 
problems which may have led to the strikes, such as wage demands, 
dismissals and union recognition:
1. the basis for and future of non-racial unionism;
2. the reaction of crafts unions such as the Amalgamated Engineering 
Union (AEU) to the movement towards industrial unionism;
3. the formation of parallel unions;
4. the reaction of capital and the state to this new wave of trades 
unions and worker action;
5. the role of the South African Trades and Labour Council (SATLC) and 
in particular the reaction of the Durban local committee of the 
SATLC to the new industrial unions;
6. the role of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), the Natal 
Indian Congress (NIC), the Natal Indian Association (NIA) and the 
various factions within these organizations in support of worker 
action, and the implications of such support or intervention for 
working class struggles.
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These issues are most clearly illustrated in the three most significant 
strikes which occurred over this period and which involved Indian 
workers, viz, the Falkirk strike of 1937, the Dunlop strike of 1942/3 
and the laundry strike of 1945/6. These strikes will now be analysed 
in the light of the issues listed above. The most important points 
emerging from this analysis are summarised at the end of the chapter. 
Because most of these issues were first raised in the Falkirk dispute, 
this strike will be analysed first and in the greatest detail.
4.2 The Falkirk Strike (1937)
On 3 May 1937, + 400 Indian and African workers at the Durban Falkirk 
Co. Ltd in the Jacobs industrial area went on strike in support of 
what they called the victimization by retrenchment of 16 members of 
their union - the unregistered Natal Iron and Steel Workers Union 
(NISWU).® xhe formation of the union was precipitated by an earlier 
strike over wages that was led by skilled workers, but which involved 
all the company's employees. This took place in February 1937, and was 
resolved to the satisfaction only of the White and Coloured workers who 
were members of the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU).7 This union 
had used the numerical weight of the non-organized Indian and African 
workers in support of their demands for wage increases, but then cast 
them aside once they had struck a deal for themselves with management. 
Faced with this situation, the unskilled Indian and African workers 
went about trying to form a trade union and as a result the NISWU was 
formed. In their memorandum on the strike this new union stated:
At about the month of February 1937 a strike led by the 
skilled workers took place. The skilled workers gained 
their demand while unskilled workers gained no material 
advantage from the strike. This caused the unskilled 
workers to talk about forming a trade union. A union, 
as above named (NISWU) was formed and the decisions were 
contained in the "Mercury" issue of 6/4/37 as press 
news®
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This public statement, however, served to warn management of the 
formation of the unregistered and as yet unrecognised 'non-racial' 
union. In their memo the NISWU stated that members of the union saw 
the works manager talking to a foreman with the newspaper cutting in 
his hand. Consequently, and without formal warning, management 
retrenched 16 members of this union on the 22 April 1937. Workers 
considered this victimization, as there already existed a "usual 
practice of short-time". This victimization was not without prior 
management provocation. On 10 and 12 April, separate instructions were 
issued to various departments to the effect that workers would in 
future only be allowed to visit the cloakroom during tea-breaks. 
Furthermore, workers alleged that they were prevented from making 
purchases at a nearby shop during these tea-breaks. This arbitrary 
prohibition on the use of toilet facilities during working hours, and 
the ban on the purchasing of food from a shop caused resentment and 
hostility to build up against management. However, the workers did not 
immediately go on a wildcat strike in the face of this unwarranted 
provocation by management. The union wrote to management on two 
occasions in an attempt to arrange a meeting to discuss the 
retrenchment/victimization. Management disregarded the letters.
On the 3 May 1937, the strike began and received widespread publicity 
in the newspapers. An inspector for the Industrial Council of the 
metal industry, Mr EA Colenso, tried to persuade workers to return to 
work and continue production. Management's public response to the 
strike took the following form:
1. They refused to recognise the union on the grounds that it did not 
want to join the Industrial Council and had no constitution. They 
also objected to the fact that workers had struck work rather than 
negotiated. The Natal Mercury quoted Mr M Barker, the managing 
director, as saying:
The Indian and Native employees had had the opportunity 
of joining the National Industrial Council ... They 
refused, have no constitution and cannot be recognised by 
us. They demand that we recognise it, and resort to the 
old method of striking instead of collective 
bargaining.®
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2. They rejected the claim of victimization, stating that the employees 
were "redundant and we have dismissed them. They are daily paid 
men".10
3. They called in the police, claiming that "some strikers threatened 
to 'beat up' any Natives or Indians who attempted to start 
work".11
Management's response does not seem to accord with the actual 
developments at the factory in the weeks preceeding the dismissals or 
with what took place after the dismissals. In their statement, 
management failed to mention that the union had twice requested a 
meeting to discuss and resolve the so-called retrenchments. According 
to the union, it was this attitude to a reasonable request that set off 
the strike action. There is no evidence that management responded to 
these points made by the union. The company's statement that the union 
did not want to join the industrial council appears to be incredibly 
(and conveniently) misinformed, as it was well known that African 
workers, not being defined as "employees" in terms of the IC Act, were 
excluded from representation on industrial councils. Thus management’s 
response can only be interpreted as a well orchestrated attempt to 
smash and/or discredit this non-racial union. Furthermore, the 
industrial council itself was dominated by national and local unions 
representing the interests of skilled rather than semi-skilled or 
unskilled workers. Thus the NISWU argued in a press statement:
Hitherto the non-European workers have not been
consulted in regard to any agreement in the industry, 
and they are compelled to organise in their own 
interests. We deny that we have the option of joining a 
union to which the European employees of the firm 
belong. The Indian and Native employees are
semi-skilled or unskilled. They are compelled to 
organise in their own interests, to have a future say as 
to the wages and conditions in which they have to 
work.
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The secretary of the Industrial Council, Mr AH Scott-Taylor, charged 
that the NISWU was trying to take advantage of the Industrial Council 
agreement which had lapsed on the 26 April 1937. He said that the 
Council was legally still in existence, implying that the NISWU was 
either contravening the law by being involved in an illegal 
dispute/strike, or that it was too immature to understand the 
intricacies of industrial relations. His comments clearly deflect from 
the central issues of wage discrimination, victimization and the right 
of a union to organize. He acknowledged that the NISWU had applied to 
be party to the agreement, but stated that their application was still 
being considered by the Secretary of Labour.
It appears that an agreement was reached and signed between management 
and the union the following day - the 5 May 1937. Before the agreement 
was reached, workers were addressed by representatives of the Native 
Commissioner, the manager of the Municipal Native Affairs Department, 
the Department of Labour and the Industrial Council.13 The terms of 
the agreement were14
That the employees resume work at 1.30pm on condition that:
i. The management agree to receive a deputation of 
employees of the company and discuss the dismissal of 
15 Asiatics and one Native employee, and that they 
agree to the employees1 representatives adding to their 
number an official or member of a registered trade 
union.
ii. There shall be no victimization.
iii. The management will pay the employees in full for May 3 
and 4 provided that those employees who were not at 
work on April 30 and did not report for work at 1.30pm 
on May 4 shall not be entitled to pay.
Management, however, also slipped into this agreement an insidious 
clause which was extremely damaging to the public image and 
credibility of the union. It read as follows:
The management agrees to this because it believes that 
the general body of workers have been led into taking an 
action which they would not have taken had they understood 
the proper course for them to pursue.
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The union objected strongly to this clause on the grounds that it 
exposed the leaders of the union to a charge of misleading the workers. 
However, and surprisingly, the leaders of the union accepted this 
clause after receiving verbal assurance from management that they 
(management) would not interpret the clause in that way. No date was 
set for the meeting between the union and management in terms of Clause 
1 of the agreement. The failure to include such a clause could be 
counted as a tactical mistake on the part of the union and in view of 
developments over the following few weeks it was to prove a costly 
error. However, on 11 May, a meeting was held to discuss the issue of 
the dismissed men. No agreement was reached and a further meeting was 
scheduled. It cannot be ascertained whether management were employing 
stalling tactics, but it is clear that they were adopting a 'hard-line* 
approach in discussions.
Sometime between 11 May and 24 May, the secretary of the Union, 
Mr HA Naidoo, was dismissed and on the 21 May, 26 others, including the 
chairman of the union, were put on short-time.15 Management 
claimed that this was done because business was slack and that, in 
fact, some workers were redundant. The union claimed in its pamphlet 
that the dismissal of the union secretary was deliberate victimization.
... The secretary of the union was dismissed and 26 
others, including the chairman of the union (PM Harry), 
were put on short-time, with the pretence that the 
factory was slack, but in reality to keep the chairman 
isolated from the workers. Thus it will be seen that 
the employees have openly and deliberately violated 
the terms of agreement of the strike [of 5 May 
1937].16
The response of the workers to this act of provocation was to resort to 
what they termed 'sanctions', which amounted to a sort of 
'work-to-rule' campaign. This type of industrial action was agreed at 
a general meeting of all the workers held on 24 May.
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On 25 May workers arrived late for work, ie. at 6.50am instead of 
4.00am, and observed the correct meal hours and breaks in what they 
called the "legal hours of employment in terms of the Factories 
Act".^  Workers took their lunch break at 11.45am and returned to 
work at 12.15pm, whereupon they were asked to leave the factory.
Management put up notices to say the factory was closed and called in 
the police to prevent workers entering the factory. Thus the dispute, 
which originally began in February 1937 as a wage demand by all 
workers, snowballed into one involving issues of wage discrimination, 
victimization, the refusal to recognise a union and finally a lock-out.
It was also alleged in a newspaper report that the management of the 
Falkirk company closed the factory in response to a report that a 
nearby box-making factory's workers went out on strike demanding higher 
wages. The morning newspaper, the Natal Mercury stated that these 
developments (ie. the two industrial disputes within one area) were 
being "regarded seriously and as a threat to the entire industry in 
N a t a l " . O n e  can only surmise that the large number of strikes in 
Natal in 1937 was beginning to cause concern among industrialists. The 
management of the box factory denied that any dispute or strike took 
place.19 However, the strike is documented by other sources, 
including the annual report of the Department of L a b o u r , a n d  it 
would thus appear that the denial was an attempt to hush up the strike, 
especially if it showed that it influenced Falkirk's management to lock 
out its workers.
At this point, outside political leaders began taking an active 
interest and role in the dispute. Mr AX Kajee, secretary of the Natal 
Indian Congress (NIC) telephoned the Agent-General (of India to South 
Africa) to request him to ask Mr JH Hofmeyr, the Minister of Labour, to 
appoint a conciliation board in terms of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act. It must be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that the 
union, its members or any individual connected with the strike gave Mr 
Kajee such a mandate, although significantly the union does not appear
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to have objected to this sort of intervention. Mr Kajee, in a press 
interview, claimed that his actions were motivated "in the interests of 
the dependants of the men who were locked out".21 In any event, Mr 
Kajee's action appears to have fallen totally outside the ambit of any 
possible control that could be exerted by the union or its leaders, and 
this, as we shall attempt to show throughout this chapter, was to have 
serious implications for the unions concerned.
On the second day of the lock-out the 400 workers involved refused to 
turn up for work. Management had by this time taken stock of the 
situation, and perhaps realising that they could be prosecuted for 
illegally locking out workers, claimed in the Natal Mercury of 27 May,
Yesterday morning, when the 400 men failed to appear for 
duty, the factory management deemed this to be a strike.
On Friday all 400 of these employees will be discharged 
and fresh men will be taken on under ordinary factory 
conditions.
Management did, however, indicate that they would be happy to re-engage 
the strikers under the conditions of production which prevailed in the 
factory, which they claimed "differ slightly from those pertaining in 
other factories and are due purely to the exigencies of the work which 
... cannot be operated on a time-basis".22 Management claimed that 
the furnace could not be closed down, otherwise it would be damaged and 
the molten metal would become useless. Clearly management wished to 
imply that workers had neglected their jobs and responsibilities, and 
that this had caused the closure of the whole factory. The allegation 
was rejected by PM Harry:
The allegation that it was due to neglect of work that 
the factory was closed is unfounded. This alleged 
neglect was confined to only one of eight departments of 
the factory yet all eight were closed."22
In a press statement, PM Harry and HA Naidoo stated adamantly that this 
was a lock-out, not a strike and that workers were perfectly happy to 
return to work provided they started work at 6.50pm and not at
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4.00am.24 The union pamphlet expressed their views thus:
The following morning the workers deputation made an 
attempt to meet the employers, but were refused a 
hearing. The management then gave publicity to the 
effect that the workers were dismissed and that they 
were to be paid off on Friday, 28th. New workers would 
be engaged, and if the "strikers" wished to be 
re-employed they could apply for work. It will thus be 
seen that the manager did his utmost to split the ranks 
of the workers but failed, thanks to the militant standn cof workers.
The workers then adopted what they called a "sit-down-outside" policy 
in the hope that some negotiations would be started. Although
dismissed by management on 28 May, workers refused to collect their 
pay, stating that they would return every day to carry on their 
"sit-down-outside" policy. This was a remarkable show of solidarity 
by workers across racial lines. However, Falkirks soon resorted to 
exploiting the 'race factor' in an attempt to divide the workers and 
break worker solidarity. Management stated that employees' pay would 
be credited to their accounts on the wage sheet. There was nothing 
sinister about this of course, except that management sent the African 
workers' registration tickets to the Durban Municipal Native 
Administration Department where workers would have to claim them within 
a week or be liable for arrest and prosecution under municipal by-laws. 
The African 'strikers' were also evicted from their hostel
accommodation. Management claimed that these African workers were 
being housed and fed at the company's expense and since they were 
dismissed they could no longer live there. It is not clear whether in 
fact Falkirks fully subsidized the feeding and accommodation of these 
workers. Whatever the case, these actions, by treating African workers 
differently from Indian workers, clearly had a divisive effect on 
workers' solidarity.
In the meantime, the Department of Labour wrote to the union asking it 
to submit its case to the Industrial Council for the Metal and
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Engineering industry. Faced with such a prospect a meeting of the 
workers held on 31 May passed the following resolution:
This meeting re-affirms its contention that the present 
state of affairs at the Durban Falkirk Iron Co. 
constitutes a lock-out. If, on the other hand, the 
employers hold to the contrary, then the employees 
declare their willingness to resume work and 
that the status quo be maintained until all grievances 
have been suitably disposed of through the mediatory 
channels.
At about this time 'outside' individuals and organisations began to 
play a more prominent role in the dispute. On the 28 May 1937, the 
very day the African workers were evicted, the secretary to the 
Agent-General (of India) in South Africa, a Mr Ridley, held talks with 
the management ostensibly on behalf of the Indian workers in the 
dispute. One can only presume that AI Kajee's earlier call to the 
Agent-General had prompted a visit by the latter's secretary. We have 
not found any evidence to suggest that the workers or union officials 
ever sought this intervention. It would seem highly unlikely that a 
union which had demonstrated such worker unity across racial lines 
would want mediation on behalf of Indian employees only. It would 
appear from the newspaper reports that the Agent-General's Secretary 
did not first visit the workers to ascertain their plight, or to 
determine whether (or how) his intervention could have been of any 
assistance in resolving the dispute.
On Tuesday 1 June workers returned to the factory at 5.00am ready to 
resume work. Management, however, refused to allow them to do so, 
contending that as they had been on strike and dismissed by the company 
they should first sign on as new workers. The workers refused to do 
this, stating that they were locked out, and if they returned to work 
under these circumstances, they would be admitting that they had been 
dismissed. They instead called upon management to reinstate them and 
allow the Industrial Council to decide the issue. Despite this show of 
unity, 12 workers broke ranks and returned to their jobs as new workers 
with fresh contracts. But the resolve of the remainder of workers was
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to come to nought. By that afternoon, management had already signed on 
70 new workers of all 'races’. The managing director, expressing his 
satisfaction at this state of affairs, said:
We could have taken all of them back this morning if 
they had been willing to sign on. As they are not 
offering themselves, we are taking on others.
The employment of scab labour further weakened the bargaining position 
of workers. The following day the managing director again claimed that 
more than 100 workers were taken on and that "by this time next week we 
shall be carrying on as usual".
On the same morning the representatives of the South Africa Indian 
Congress (SAIC) conferred with management and then tried to persuade 
workers to return to work. In a press interview these representatives 
expressed their failure to convince workers to resume work under the 
conditions that management had imposed.
We have tried to persuade the men to return to work but 
they will not give up their principles. There will soon 
be a great deal of misery among them because they are 
without wages. On humanitarian grounds we appeal to the 
management to take on men under the old conditions and 
to allow the Industrial Council to settle the
OQdispute.
While the dispute raged on at the gates of the factory, the union sent 
a telegram on the morning of the 1 June to the secretary of the Trades 
and Labour Council, Johannesburg, requesting assistance. This was the 
first official assistance the union requested, and significantly it was 
from the umbrella body of trades unions in South Africa representing 
the majority of the organised working class. The telegram read:
Iron and steel workers 400 in number locked out by 
Durban Falkirk management Reasons: denying right of
workers to organise trade union STOP Dispute recognised 
by Labour Department and referred to Metal and 
Engineering Industrial Council despite this management
maintains workers dismissed STOP Appeal to you forogassistance report follows Harry
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The actual assistance which the Trades and Labour Council rendered was 
limited to instructing the local committee to render assistance to the 
Falkirk workers. However, the local committee did little or nothing at 
all. The SATLC's action in the dispute will be examined later as it 
occurs in the sequence of events.
On Wednesday, 2 June, the union was dealt another blow by the secretary 
of the Industrial Council, Mr AH Scott-Taylor. It appears that he 
informed the Divisional Inspector of Labour that the council had found 
that management was within its rights in dismissing the employees. The 
significance of this is further emphasised by the fact that the Natal 
Iron and Steel Workers' Union were not informed by the Industrial 
Council, or the Divisional Inspector of Labour, but by Mr AI Kajee and 
Mr Ridley, the secretary to the Agent-General.
The public response of PM Harry (the union's chairman) was that it was 
unfair and a pre-determined decision:
The case of the employees was posted by me on Monday,
May 31, and therefore could not have been before the 
Council on Friday, the 28th, the date on which the 
Council made its decision. It must therefore follow 
that the council prejudged the employees in their 
absence.^®
PM Harry further stated in a letter to the Divisional Inspector of 
Labour that the case of the Falkirk workers had been forwarded to the 
secretary of the Industrial Council and the union's representatives 
would be willing to meet "on any day and place they are advised to 
submit the case of the employees".
While it was quite correct for PM Harry to publicly condemn the stance 
taken by the secretary of the Industrial Council, and defend the right 
of workers to represent themselves at a hearing of the Council, it is 
not clear how or why AI Kajee, the Agent-General and his secretary 
should have been privy to information relating directly to the lives
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of the workers in the dispute. It is not clear (from our research) who 
mandated these eminent figures to act on behalf of the workers and the 
union. Neither were we able to confirm whether or not union officials 
kept the workers informed of these developments and whether workers 
actually agreed to this intervention. This also raises the vitally 
important issue, (assuming that such intervention was sanctioned) of 
the terms of such a mandate. This is vital, for at the meeting of the 
Industrial Council on 5 June 1937, Mr Scott-Taylor reported that AI 
Kajee came as "the official delegate from the Indian Congress", to 
"support" the case of the workers.
At this meeting of the Industrial Council, the union was represented by 
Mr Alec Wanless, MPC - an advisor to the NISWU - and by Mr Ben 
Matthews, a trade unionist. However, the Industrial Counci 1 rejected 
Mr Matthew's credentials because he was not an official of a trade 
union in the engineering industry. The Industrial Council upheld the 
earlier view expressed by its secretary that:
i. The action of management did not constitute a lock-out.
ii. If employees had acted along constitutional lines the trouble would 
not have arisen.
iii. The men were wrong to go on strike again after coming to an 
agreement.
v. There was intimidation to prevent others from working.
With only one person to represent the union's case, the Industrial 
Council came out strongly against the union, further stating that as an 
unregistered union they could not be represented on the Council. 
However, having-already decided on the issue, they called in the NISWU 
deputation not in order to discuss the matter, but to inform them that 
they were in the wrong. This was felt necessary because
... often having arrived at an agreement they again 
went on strike. Having done so, they have broken the 
undertaking that pending an enquiry they would continue 
working. Furthermore, certain people intimidated
workers who were prepared to accept employment with the
31firm: that was a breach of the agreement.
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While it is not clear what brief Mr Kajee held for the NISWU, he 
severely criticized the Industrial Council. He said that there had 
never been any intimidation; that White and Coloured workers did not 
stop work on 25 May; and that the Council's decision of 28 May (and its 
confirmation on 4 June) was done without the workers presenting their 
case. He added that it was misusing the law to say that there was no 
lock-out and that management was right in dismissing the workers. Mr 
Kajee then directly accused the Amalgamated Engineering Union of being 
responsible for the present state of affairs at the Falkirk Iron 
Company, stating that they should not have left any workers 
unorganised.
If there is any blame why these men should have been 
left unorganised, it is on the officials of the unions 
like the Amalgamated Engineering Union.^
In a letter to the SATLC the chairman of the NISWU, PM Harry, was 
scathing about the treatment the union received at the hands of the 
Industrial Council, and he accused the Council of abusing its powers.
The Industrial Council for the Metal and Engineering 
Industry has all along taken an attitude which we feel 
is abusing the powers given to the Council by the 
Government. At the last meeting of the Council the 
workers delegates, amongst whom was Mr AI Kajee 
representing the Natal Indian Congress and Mr AT Wanless 
were treated with the utmost bias and callous disregard, 
which is typical of the Council's attitude towards the 
Indian and Native workers in the industry.^3
The letter also brought to light several other developments. The AEU 
offered to incorporate the new union as a section. This move by the 
AEU was nothing short of cynical. The NISWU attitude to this offer, 
although somewhat ambiguous, was stated in their letter thus:
Of course it must be understood that the workers have no 
opposition to becoming a section of the Amalgamated 
Engineers Union. The AEU has given no consideration, 
whatsoever, in the past to organise their workers, but 
now they have formed their own union the AEU, we 
understand, is prepared to accept them. 34 
added)
(emphasis
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It would seem that the NISWU, in the interests of diplomacy, was 
careful to qualify its anger at the AEU's cynicism. Quite clearly, 
too, the AEU was not going to take on African workers as this would 
have damaged its credibility among its skilled White worker 
constituency, and the benefits it derived from the Industrial Council. 
The tenor of the NISWU letter clearly indicates a rejection of any 
rapprochement between the two unions.
By this time the NIC had become thoroughly embroiled in the dispute. 
This is clear not only from the union's letter to the SATLC, but also 
from the mass meeting held under its auspices on Sunday 6 June 1937. 
In the letter Harry writes:
The workers are still standing out whilst scab labour is 
being recruited .. . Management have done everything 
possible to smash up the union whilst on the other hand 
the workers are standing firm to their principles ... In 
the meantime we are doing everything possible in Durban 
to see that the locked out workers are being fed. We 
are getting considerable assistance from the Natal 
Indian Congress, both material and moral, and also from 
the local factory workers, trade unionists and 
sympathisers.36 (emphasis added)
The mass meeting held under the auspices of the NIC was attended by 
about 1200 people and was extensively reported in the press.36 The 
significance of this meeting arises not so much from the fact that it 
pledged support for the workers but:
i. from the lip-service it paid to the non-racial character of workers' 
solidarity;
ii. from its strident outpourings of bourgeois paternalism for 
workers'grievances couched in terms of an Indian nationalist rhetoric;
iii. from the implications it held for the independence of organized 
trades unionism.
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Three resolutions were passed at the meeting.37 The first called 
on the Minister of Labour to appoint a mediator and the management to 
"restore the status quo” by permitting the workers to resume work in 
the meantime. The second resolution questioned the application of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act in conjunction with the White labour 
policy, particularly since the "Indian community" had accepted the Cape 
Town Agreement of 1927. This application of the country's laws (it 
went on) "retardts] and set[s] back the progress of the Indian working 
class and Indian employers..." It then called on the Minister of 
Labour and Social Welfare to remove "the adverse factors which operate 
against the Indian Community" and recognise "the right of the Indian 
workers and employers to form Trade Unions and employers organisations 
or alternatively to join the existing trade unions or employers 
organisations. .."
The third resolution pledged its support to the employees and
request[ed] the Natal Indian Congress as representing the 
Indian community to continue its efforts to obtain for the 
workers involved in this dispute the necessary redress of 
their grievances by every constitutional means. (emphasis 
added: all references are to NIC resolution)
In the resolutions passed at this meeting no mention is made of the 
NISWU's role in the negotiations and strategies that were being 
discussed. Mention is only made of the "Indian community", the NIC, 
Indian (non-European) workers, the "Falkirk Company" and even "Indian 
employers". In other words it would appear that the issues that 
affected these workers were subsumed under the broad political demands 
of the NIC at that time. (The implications of this divestment of 
control over the conduct of the negotiations will be examined shortly.)
In general, the NIC directed its comments to such issues as the 
flouting of the Cape Town Agreement and the principles of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act and the Wage Act. Mr EM Paruk, chairman of 
the meeting, said as much in his speech. "In this dispute these 
principles [the Cape Town Agreement etc] are at stake and it is 
therefore the community's affair and hence this meeting," adding, 
"There can be no division of opinion of [sic] this question. The 
attack on these men are because they are Indians, because they are 
without political power."38
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This must surely have been received with some surprise by the Falkirk 
workers. Of course, they knew they were without political power, but 
this was surely not the point. For them, the central issue was their 
fight for the recognition of their union and the redress of their 
grievances as workers. They were dismissed because for the first time 
inter-racial co-operation amongst workers threatened (i) the right of 
the employers to manage as they saw fit and (ii) the maintenance of 
high profits through the differential payment of workers along lines of 
race and skill. The NIC leadership in their paternalistic concern for 
the workers deflected the issue to one of "racial bias" as AI Kajee 
claimed, and to a heart-rending plea to provide relief for the 
dependants of the workers. Thus Paruk states:
The daily bread of 1500 to 2000 innocent women and 
children, dependants of these unfortunate men, is 
involved . .. these men and women and their dependants 
are in need of food and steps have been taken to provide 
relief. I appeal to you to stand by your fellow 
countrymen and by our Native friends and extend to themOQyour moral and material support.
AI Kajee struck a more demanding note, alleging racial bias and again 
raising the questionable issue of ethnic nationalism:
This is a turning point. We must demand justice from 
higher powers, not only for these Indians, but for all 
other Indians who are ground down. Let us remember that 
we are Indians first and everything else after.40
Besides defusing the obvious class issue, Kajee's demand for "justice 
from higher powers" was just so much mindless rhetoric. It is 
pointless to meet ministers in an attempt to redress such grievances, 
for without organised power based on the interests of a strong, 
disciplined and well-structured labour movement, all such "demands" 
would come to nothing.
During the week following this mass meeting, a deputation consisting of 
Mr S Nana, secretary of the South African Indian Congress, Dr Y Dadoo,
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Mr MM Moola and Mr GH Kathrada met the Minister of Labour, Mr Hofmeyr. 
Predictably nothing concrete emerged from this meeting, although there 
were reports in the press about the power the Minister had in 
appointing a mediator.
A meeting was also held on 8 June 1937 between the workers and the 
secretary of the Industrial Council, Mr Scott-Taylor. At first, Mr 
Scott-Taylor had wanted to cancel the meeting on the grounds that he 
could not help the workers any longer as the company had taken on 200 
new workers and therefore had nothing to offer. However, the meeting 
did take place and after negotiations with management 50 of the 
dismissed workers were promised work. This offer, according to 
PM Harry, was refused individually and collectively by the workers' 
delegation present at the meeting.
At the same time, two MP's, Mr DC Burnside and Mr JG Derbyshire and 
Senator SS Brisker met with officials of the Industrial Council to try 
to have a mediator appointed. The following day, the board of 
management of the Falkirk company met to discuss the question of 
mediation, but it is not known what was decided at this meeting.
On 10 June, the general secretary of the Trades and Labour Council 
wrote to the Durban Committee of the Trades and Labour Council 
requesting financial assistance to be given to the Natal Iron and Steel 
Workers' Union involved in the Falkirk dispute. The Durban Committee 
secretary, a Mr FW Payn, replied in a three page letter dated 22 June 
1937 that in their view the National Executive Committee's actions 
constituted an
interference in the domestic affairs of one of our 
affiliated unions, and furthermore is an interference in 
the relationship between affiliated unions and their 
employers' associations in this centre.42
With regard to actually helping the workers in the-Falkirk dispute they 
said they recognised "the hardships which these workers are suffering" 
but they thought that the National Executive Committee was
ill-informed. They then outlined exactly what management stated as its 
reasons for dismissing the workers.
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The Durban Committee then added that:
These unfortunate workers are being misled by their 
leaders, their leaders being in the main prominent 
members of the Communist Party... Our delegates do not 
feel inclined to send monies or interfere unless they 
can be thoroughly convinced that this dispute is being 
carried on in proper Trade Union lines.^
We have not been able to corroborate the Durban committee's claim that 
the Communist Party leaders of the NISWU, ie Harry and HA Naidoo 
"misled” the workers in this particular dispute, nor has it been 
possible to establish what, in general, the role and effect of any CP 
intervention was.
The dispute dragged on for another month. On 11 July 1937 a 
'settlement' was finally reached when the company agreed to 're-engage' 
119 of the +400 workers who had gathered daily outside the factory to 
protest against (what was to them) the lock-out, the denial of the 
right to work, to form a union and to bargain on wages and working 
conditions.
In assessing the implications of this dispute one thing becomes clear. 
Although the failure to resolve the dispute to the total satisfaction 
of the workers may be related to the union's tactical mistakes in 
dealing with management, to the employers' refusal to deal with the 
unregistered non-racial NISWU and to the Industrial Council protection 
of the sectional interests of skilled workers, these factors are less 
important than the question of union leadership and their control over 
the conduct of the strike. The very limitations referred to in Chapter 
Three, ie the absence of (i) clear democratic structures in the unions 
of this period and (ii) of a dynamic relationship between the 
membership and their leaders in relation to the specific issues of the 
moment, militated against the internal cohesiveness of the union's 
actions and resulted almost directly in the subordination of its 
actions to those of external agencies such as the NIC.
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We are, of course, not denying that pressure from whatever source in 
support of working class action or the resolution of any specific set 
of worker grievances is important. However the almost total dependence 
on and divestment of control to external (political) bodies, and the 
absence of any meaningful reliance on the organised strength and 
decisions of the rank and file, represents in our view the greatest 
threat to the independence of working class organisations and to their 
development and potential. The entry of political organisations was 
facilitated by the absence of adequate structures and controls and by 
the lack of a clear theoretical perspective on the part of the 
leadership - who appeared happy to entertain outside interference on 
any terms. This allowed for the subordination of worker interests to 
the more diffuse objectives of organisations such as the NIC - 
objectives which were clearly at variance with what ought to have been 
the priorities of this emerging trade union movement.44
4.3 The Dunlop Strike (1942/3)
Towards the end of 1942 a number of serious strikes occurred in the 
Transvaal and in Natal. In Durban strikes involving joint action by 
African and Indian workers occurred in the paper, laundry and textile 
industries.46 In both the paper board-making industry and the 
textile industry such 'inter-racial' co-operation secured victories for 
the workers.46 Following this spate of worker action the 
Government, concerned about the implications of such activity for the 
war effort, proclaimed War Measure 145 of 1942 on 19 December 
19424  ^ which outlawed strikes by African workers, exposed strikers 
to a prohibitive, maximum penalty of a £500 fine or three years 
imprisonment and imposed compulsory arbitration at the discretion of 
the Minister of Labour. Durban employers responded to working class 
action in two ways. In the first instance, they responded by stepping 
up inter-industry and inter-sector co-ordination and co-operation to 
crush strikes (Hemson,1979). Such joint employer co-operation led to 
the formation in 1943 of the Natal Employers' Association. As Hemson 
(p.3 38)comments:
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The Association was to prove essential in co-ordinating 
the policies of employers in different firms and 
industries towards trades unions, and the interests of 
employers and the state in regard to measures to 
suppress strike action and implement effectively urban 
regulations directing the flow of African labour 
supply.
Secondly, they responded by attempting to build 'company unions' with a 
view to undermining the growth and activities of the 'militant' 
non-racial trades unions and in this way maintaining the basis for a 
cheap and quiescent labour force. This latter response is best 
illustrated by the strike at Dunlops (Pty) Ltd which broke out in 
December 1942. The strike, which was triggered off by the dismissal of 
13 members of the non-racial Natal Rubber Workers' Industrial Union, 
was primarily directed at the imposition of a company union at the 
factory. The strike was "decisive in undermining radical leadership in 
registered trade unions and in causing distrust and hostility between 
Indian and African workers" (Hemson, 1979, p.337) and marked a 
watershed in the momentum and direction of working class organisation 
and activity in Durban.
The Natal Rubber Workers' Industrial Union (NRWIU), which was 
registered on 23 December 1938, operated on the basis of what Ginwala 
refers to as a 'gentlemen's agreement' (1974, p.397) with a mixed 
(White, Indian and African) membership. The union began with a 
membership of 450 - mainly composed of employees of Dunlops and, within 
a few months of formation, negotiated an agreement improving wages and 
working conditions.4® Little is known of the activities of the 
union after that agreement. However, it would appear from comments 
made by a delegate to the 13th Annual Conference of the SATLC in 1943 
(when the Dunlop company union was being discussed) that all was not 
well with the union. The delegate (a Mr Evans of Durban) spoke of the 
union being at "sixes and sevens"49 after it had negotiated its 
first agreement. Later he commented that the union "had more 
secretaries since they had been a registered trade union than any trade 
union in the country, but had never had a secretary yet who knew 
everything about the manufacture of rubber" (p.76). Whatever may have 
been the problem, membership of the
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union grew after formation and stood at 625 by the end of 1942 - of 
whom 155 were "European", 160 "Asiatic" and 310 "Natives".50
The problems which led to the December strike began in March/April 1942 
when Dunlop started replacing Indian workers with, primarily, cheaper 
(African) labour.5  ^ The number of Indian workers employed was 
reduced from 282 in March 1942 to 260 in May, and 149 at the 
commencement of the strike on 8 December 1942.52 This trend had 
continued in spite of an arbitration award published in September 
194253 which stipulated that 30 percent of the workers at Dunlop 
would be 'European', 30 percent Indian and 40 percent African. Dunlop 
claimed that Indian workers were laid off in order to re-employ 
'European' employees who had left the company to join the army. The 
company claimed to have given an undertaking to these former employees 
that they would be re-hired on their return.54 However, the NIC 
'investigation' into these events revealed that the majority of the 
'Europeans' taken on at Dunlop had not previously worked there and that 
in any case the majority of replacements were African. These 
allegations made in a letter to Dunlop by the NIC were not challenged 
in the Dunlop reply.55 And a member of the NRWIU was quoted56 
as saying that the real aim of the company was to employ cheaper 
labour.
That cheaper labour is African ... we are not of course 
denying the African workers right to employment, but we 
are denying that the bosses have the right to employ 
anyone at lower wages that they pay the Indian workers
and their right to lay off workers in order to do 
57so.
At the same time as these replacements were being made it was alleged 
that the company began moves to form a rival company union. Mannie 
Peltz, the secretary of the NRWIU informed' the 13th Annual Conference 
of the SATLC that through
victimization, terrorism and by dismissals the firm 
slowly managed to get the signatures of the European 
workers until a proportion - and many of them, if not
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a majority, belonged to our union, to protect 
themselves, joined the company union,3®
the Dunlop Employees' Union. The membership of this union stood at 343 
- all 'European' - by February 1943.®9 Peltz maintained that the 
NRWIU took this matter up with the Department of Labour, stating that 
their union was a registered union catering for all employees and that 
there was no reason or necessity for the formation of another union at 
the factory. He believed that the attempt at forming a company union 
by Dunlop and other factories represented an attack on the "democratic 
trade unions" that were "properly organised and registered".®® 
According to Peltz the Department of Labour replied that they had no 
proof of these developments.
Matters were brought to a head when "13 militant Indian workers"®^ 
with long periods of service were dismissed in December 1942. The 
union asked for the re-instatement of these workers and also for 
facilities similar to those enjoyed by the Dunlop Employees' Union to 
be granted to the NRWIU. When these were not acceded to the Indian and 
African employees of Dunlop - all members of the NRWIU - decided by a 
show of hands to call a strike.®2 RD Naidu, who was a member of 
the strike committee, informs us®3 that some White workers pledged 
their support for the strike but did not come out on strike the next 
day. The decision to strike was taken on the afternoon of 8 December 
1942. That night some of the striking workers picketed the Dunlop 
factory when the night shift went on duty, but the Natal Mercury 
reported that "there were no incidents, no one entering being 
molested".®^ It would appear that non-union African workers 
continued to wor-k and the picketing went on through December and early 
January 1943.
In response to the reports in the Natal Mercury and Daily News of 
9 December 1942 that the strike was called as a result of the dismissal 
of the 13 Indian workers, the NRWIU clarified its strike demands, 
denying that this was the main reason for the strike. The union stated 
that their strike demands to the company were:
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That their trade union which is the sole registered 
trade union for the Natal rubber industry should be 
given the same facilities in the factory as those given 
to the company union known as the Dunlop Employees 
Union. That the dismissed workers be reinstated not 
necessarily in the giant tyre section but in jobs where 
they will not suffer worse conditions or be given lower 
pay. That a retrenchment committee be set up with equal 
representation of employees and employers. That the 
reason for the calling of the strike is the formation of 
the company union.66
Thus it would appear that though the strike may have been triggered off 
by the dismissal of the 13 Indian workers - as the Guardian 
reports66 - the union wanted it to be publicly known that the 
strike was "against yellow unionism which if not nipped in the bud 
would ultimately succeed in destroying workers legitimate 
organisations"6^.
On the 17 December 1942, the 147 Indian workers on strike appeared 
before the chief magistrate of Durban charged with having taken part 
in a strike without having applied for a conciliation board as required 
in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act. The case was adjourned 
until 24 December and then to 4 January 1943 - on which date the 
prosecutor stated that he had been instructed by the Attorney-General 
to apply for a further adjournment on the grounds that:
There had been trouble going on near the Dunlop factory 
and other workers are being molested on their way to 
work. I will ask the court to warn the accused that it 
intends to take action against those who interfere with 
other people, apart from those in the present 
case.66
The case was remanded sine die.
The African workers were brought to court separately from the 
Indian workers on 6 January 1943 and charged under the Urban Areas Act 
with unlawfully absenting themselves from work and breaking their con­
tract, alternatively under the Masters and Servants Act with refusing
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to work. This case was also remanded sine die on the request of the 
prosecutor on the grounds that about 100 African workers could not be 
present that day as they had been arrested the previous night on a 
charge of public violence. The prosecutor informed the court that 
"these men were assembled outside the Dunlop factory where they were 
assaulting and attacking other native employees leaving the 
factory."70 The 104 African workers charged with 'public violence' 
appeared in court on the same day. No evidence was led and the case 
was remanded until 11 January 1943, when 100 of them were found not 
guilty and discharged. Of the others 3 were found guilty7  ^ and 
after unsuccessful appeals against their conviction, were sentenced to 
prison terms ranging from 1 month to 2 months.7^
A separate hearing against Pauline Podbrey, secretary of the Food and 
Canning Workers' Union, on a charge of "incitement to violence" or 
alternatively assault, was also held. It was alleged that Ms Podbrey 
tried to prevent workers going to the Dunlop factory during the strike 
and that she assaulted two Africans and a 'European' . She was 
convicted and fined £20 or six weeks hard labour and in addition was 
sentenced to a month's hard labour, suspended for a year on condition 
that she was not convicted during that time of any offence involving 
violence or a contravention of the Industrial Conciliation Act.7  ^
The sentence effectively gagged Pauline Podbrey who was a member of the 
Dunlop Strike Committee - which also included George Ponen, RD Naidu, 
HA Naidoo, M Peltz, MD Naidoo and others.7“* According to RD Naidu, 
the Communist Party secretariat comprised the strike committee, which 
collected money and food for the striking workers and "saw to it that 
the strike was conducted proper ly".76 Members of the strike 
committee also addressed the workers and organised the distribution of 
pamphlets and other literature in an effort to "boost worker 
morale".76
Meanwhile the struggle against company unionism continued and on Sunday 
17 January 1943, 4000 workers met at the City Hall, Durban in support 
of the strikers and to protest against the introduction of a company 
union at Dunlop. The meeting, which was called by 35 local trades 
unions, endorsed the recommendations of a shop stewards* meeting
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held the day before to mobilize workers in all industries to give their 
fullest moral and financial support to the Dunlop strikers "who are out 
on strike against company unionism and in defence of independent trade 
union organisation and to take other steps that may be essential in 
support of the strikers".^ The meeting was chaired by Alec
Wanless MPC, who attacked company unionism as a "manifestation of 
fascism and a direct threat against the war effort".^8 HA Naidoo, 
secretary of the Natal Sugar Industry Employees Union, declared that 
company unionism was
contrary to the declared aims of the united nations
fighting for freedom of association, to preserve which
the working class has entered the war and is fighting
79with great sacrifice and heroism.
A resolution moved by the trades unionist George Ponen called on the 
Minister of Labour to take immediate steps to settle the dispute "so 
that the workers can retain independence of trade union organisation 
and thereby resume production without further adverse effect upon the 
war effort".8® The meeting also endorsed the decision of the shop 
stewards' meeting that called upon the workers of Durban to levy 
themselves a minimum of 1s per week in the struggle against company 
unions at the Dunlop factory and resolved to set up a council of action 
in each factory that would implement the pledge. The Guardian reported 
(21/1/43) that the secretary of the Railway Workers' Union, Philemon 
Tsele and the organising secretary of the Iron and Steel Workers' Union 
Grenford Mafeka received rousing applause from "African and Indian 
workers alike" when they spoke on the need for unity. The workers were 
also supported by the Kajee-NIC. A representative of the NIC, 
V Lawrence, read a statement by Congress at this meeting in support of 
the strikers. He informed the meeting that Congress was aware that the 
Indian High Commissioner had approached the Minister of Labour to 
intercede to settle the dispute. In the statement81 congress
expressed its "disappointment" that it was not consulted before any
• 82action was taken, as the question had "passed beyond the borders 
of trade union activity and had assumed an Indian national 
aspect".88
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After the strike had been in progress for some time, the NRWIU appealed 
to the local SATLC for assistance.84 The local committee appointed 
a deputation to approach Dunlop's management, and the NEC of the SATLC 
approached the Minister of Labour on the dispute85 - neither 
deputation met with any success. There is little further information 
on the role that the SATLC played in attempting to settle this dispute. 
Mannie Peltz did, however, express the appreciation of the NRWIU to the 
NEC of the SATLC for the assistance it had given, and to a Mr de Vries 
(of the NEC) who had "put himself to considerable trouble" on behalf of 
the striking workers. Peltz's only complaint was that the SATLC report 
on the dispute made no mention of their position on the question of 
company unions. However, at that same conference of the SATLC, Peltz's 
motion that:
the Government be invited to legislate immediately with 
a view to preventing employers from forming what is 
commonly known as company unions which encourages 
workers in their employ to break away from and divide 
the ranks of the properly organised and registered trade 
unions set up to cover the needs of the workers in such 
industry,88
was carried unanimously and indicates total opposition to company 
unions.
However, despite the effort of the local trades unionists, workers, the 
SATLC, the Kajee-NIC and others, the dispute was not settled and the 
strike that began on 8 December failed. Dunlop alleged that "violence 
and intimidation had been used"0 and the striking African and
Indian workers were all dismissed in January 1943. As far as we are 
aware, the cases adjourned sine die against these strikers were never 
brought to court again. The company had, in a sense, pre-empted the 
need for court action, and used the alleged acts of violence (on which 
charges, as we have noted, 100 out of the 104 workers so charged were 
found not guilty) as a pretext for dismissing the striking union 
workers. Immediately thereafter the Minister of Labour, Mr Madeley, 
warned that "in future the government will have no option but to 
prosecute without exception persons who go on strike or incite others 
to strike without affording the Minister of Labour an opportunity to
goexecute his powers".
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Dunlop had, in the meantime, already replaced the striking workers by 
African workers brought in from the Transkei and Pondoland. SP Pillay 
has informed us that as many as 1500 workers from Pondoland were 
brought into Durban in cattle trucks "at the expense of the 
government". out of this number the company was successful in 
training about 500 quickly enough to be able to employ them. RD Naidu 
adds that the White workers at Dunlop assisted in the training of these
qnnew recruits. Thus "while there were 378 African workers employed 
in December 1942, in January 1943, 290 of these workers were dismissed 
(as were 147 Indian workers) and 581 new workers taken on displacing 
Indian and African union members" (Hemson, p.378). Thereafter no 
further Indian workers were employed for many years. Sitas, in a
g  irecent publication on the 1984 Dunlop strike, refers to this 
earlier dispute and writes that:
The fact that there are so few Indian workers there 
[now] was because Dunlop victimized them before and 
after the strike of 1942/3. They were victimized for 
belonging to a union and not Dunlop's in-company union.
It used migrants ... to break the strike. From then on 
it was the law of dismissals and tight factory 
discipline that ruled their [African workers] lives.
Here chiefly [sic] structures were used by Dunlops as 
with Ndunas to control the labour force.
The NRWIU which, as we noted earlier, was heavily concentrated in the 
Dunlop factory was thus effectively decimated and Dunlop were able to 
reassert total control over the workers in its factory.
This concludes our brief outline of the series of events which occurred 
between March 1942 and January 1943 at Dunlop. We now need to examine 
more closely the actions and responses of the workers, the union 
leaders, Dunlop, the SATLC, the government and certain political 
organizations with regard to the dispute; as well as the implications 
of the strike for working class organization and activity in Durban in 
the years that followed.
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The fact that the dispute at Dunlop which began with the dismissal of 
Indian workers and the moves to form a company union, was not resolved 
by exercising, or at least attempting to exercise, the available 
channels of communication, led to severe criticism being directed at 
the secretary of the NRWIU, Mannie Peltz, from various quarters 
including the CP and the SATLC.
The extent of the CP concern over this - based on the possible damage 
the strike could have had on the war effort - may be gauged from the 
fact that the Durban District branch of the Party set up a commission 
of enquiry headed by Billy Peters to investigate the circumstances 
surrounding the strike and the reasons for its call and failure.92 
These developments, including details on the findings of this 
commission are discussed more fully in Chapter 5, where we examine the 
nature of the relationship between the CP and the (Indian) trades 
unions in Durban in the 1940's. It is sufficient to note here that the 
commission was critical of Peltz's hasty action in calling the workers 
out on strike without giving the Minister sufficient time or 
opportunity to look into whether or not a company union was being 
formed at Dunlop, and without notifying either the Party (of which 
Peltz was a member) or the SATLC about these allegations. Billy Peters 
states that the strike failed because of "ineffective leadership; the 
strike could have been successful if only they (the officials)acted 
constitutionally and responsibly".92 According to Peters, workers 
took the decision to strike without having been adequately informed by 
the secretary. about the real state of the negotiations between the 
union and the authorities. Peltz had, however, argued that a company 
union was being established at Dunlop and called for arbitration, and 
added that the Labour Department's reply was that they had no proof of 
such developments. Peltz believed that there was no alternative but to 
take strike action. whether Peltz's statement is a more accurate 
account of what happened and whether the facts about the state of 
negotiations between the union and the Labour Department were 
communicated to workers is impossible to verify. However, the CP
investigation, which characterised Peltz's handling of the dispute as a 
"serious administrative blunder"9  ^ indicates that the Party was 
less than satisfied with his explanation.
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Peltz's actions also came in for criticism from some delegates to the 
April 1943 conference of the SATLC. Here the question of whether the 
developments at Dunlop were referred to the Local Committee or the 
National Executive Committee(NEC) of the SATLC before strike action was 
resorted to was the subject of a heated debate. Mr Downes, a member of 
the NEC, claimed that the local committee had not been informed by the 
union of the developments at Dunlop, adding that had this been done 
"it's quite possible the strike could have been avoided".96 
And the secretary of the SATLC stated that he felt sure that:
Had the NEC been furnished with the fullest particulars 
of the creation of company unions, such as in the case 
of the firm concerned, that employees had been 
intimidated by employers into joining company unions, 
the matter would have been taken up with the
authorities; but as yet they had no specific 
97information.
These allegations and charges were denied by HA Naidoo who claimed that 
the NRWIU had given repeated reports of company unions at the Dunlop 
factory to the local SATLC from as early as six months preceding the 
strike and that the committee had not investigated further.98 
However, in view of the unanimous opposition to company unions 
expressed at this conference, it would appear unusual that the SATLC 
would not have acted had it been informed (as Peltz and Naidoo claimed) 
before strike action was taken - unless of course there was a breakdown 
in communication between the union and the local committee or the local 
committee and the NEC. Whether or not they were informed of these 
developments, it is clear that neither the NEC nor the local committee 
intervened or interceded on behalf of the union until after the strike 
had commenced.
Peltz's action in calling the strike was also heavily criticized by 
another delegate to the SATLC conference. The delegate, Mr Evans, held 
that:
The fault lies at the door of certain officials of the 
union for whom I had great respect if they did their job 
properly. We in Durban, as a trade union movement and
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especially as a local committee have been somewhat 
undermined and our prestige lowered by certain 
individuals who have entered the trade union movement as 
secretaries of the organisation, many of whom have 
sprung up during the night and who, when they called 
workers out on strike have left them in the 
difficulty.
He went on to say that Peltz had not done a good job of work at Dunlop 
and had "accepted too much responsibilty in bringing those Indian and 
African workers out on strike, when they had nothing to bring them out 
on strike on (sic)". Evans, who expressed full support for 
the notion calling on the government to legislate against company 
unions was thus critical only of the way in which developments at 
Dunlop were handled by the officials of the union who he said called 
them out on strike "before first preparing and having settled 
everything as to how they are going to run the strike".
That there was less than a careful evaluation of the implications of 
the strike is also evident from the timing of the strike call. The 
strike was called on 8 December, two weeks before the workers went on 
vacation. The holidays gave Dunlop the time to consider their options 
without losing out on production, and some recruiting of replacements 
from the Transkei occurred during the vacation. RD Naidu, a 
member of the strike committee, maintains that a critical factor in the 
failure of the strike was its timing. "Unfortunately," he recalls, 
"the strike was called in December just before the holidays and this 
enabled management to recruit workers from the Transkei during the 
holiday to replace the striking workers."^®^ All in all the 
timing of the strike could only have been to the advantage of Dunlop.
As far as negotiations are concerned there appear to have been none 
between the union and Dunlop. RD Naidu states that Dunlop refused to 
discuss any aspect of the dispute with the union or any other 
organization. The attitude of the company is evident from its letter 
to the NIC.1®^ In it Dunlop states:
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We have filled all the vacancies caused by those 
employees who illegally broke their contracts. We 
certainly would not consider discharging employees who 
came to work under very difficult circumstances in order 
to re-engage those who have left us ... As we are more 
than fully staffed at present ... we are not likely to 
require additional labour for some time to come ...
Whilst we appreciate your offer of intervention we are 
of the opinion that further discussion would not serve 
any useful purpose.
However, according to RD Naidu, a delegation including church 
representatives (Pastor Rowlands among them) later approached Dunlop in 
an attempt to persuade them to take back the Indian workers "because 
they suffered the most".105 Dunlop replied that the Indian 
workers had been instrumental in calling the strike and agreed to 
re-employ the Indian workers at a rate of only one per year.106
After the strike began, the union appealed to the SATLC for assistance 
in settling the dispute, but the negotiations which the SATLC attempted 
on behalf of the union with the Minister of Labour were to prove 
unfruitful. The Minister had apparently been informed by a member of 
his department, a Mr Freestone, that in his (Freestone’s) opinion, the 
organisation of "European" workers at Dunlop was not a company union, 
although it had been granted "outstanding facilities for organisation 
by the employer".107 The Minster was also presented with 
affidavits from the NRWIU taken by Mr Freestone, setting out the
union's views, but had apparently come to accept Mr Freestone's 
108interpretation. The Dunlop Employees' Union was subsequently
1 09registered as a trade union.
The nature of the response of the Kajee-NIC to the appeal made by the 
NRWIU to it to support the striking workers also deserves comment. 
This response is evident from the letters written by AI Kajee to the 
Minister of Labour and to Dunlop. The NIC letter to the Minister
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reveals that its concern over the dispute arose out of the fact that 
'Indians' were affected and that the strike could jeopardize the war 
effort. Kajee wrote: "The form which the dispute has taken makes the 
matter of serious concern for the whole Indian community of 
Natal."11® He later referred to the principle involved as being 
the "displacement of Indian workers". In its reply to Dunlop, the NIC 
stated that:
It is very vitally concerned in the national and racial 
aspects of employment of Indians in an industry such as 
yours, to the maintenance of which Indians in South 
Africa and India contribute by the use of the materials 
manufactured by you and its distribution by Indian 
traders■111 (emphasis added)
The concern with the effect of the strike on Indian traders certainly 
helps to place their intervention into proper perspective. The entire 
tone of these letters indicates that the NIC had collapsed the central 
principle of independent working class organisation and struggles into 
a purely racial one - a response not inconsistent with that it adopted 
in the 1937 Falkirk dispute. On the question of jeopardizing the war 
effort Kajee wrote: "My congress also feels it desirable to point out 
that for patriotic reasons there should be the speediest possible 
settlement of this dispute."11  ^ Clearly the CPSA was not alone 
in its concern that working class action should not be allowed to 
damage the war effort. In short, although the terms under which the 
NRWIU invited the Kajee-NIC to assist in this dispute are not clear, 
the evidence strongly suggests that the union had little control over 
the nature and form of the NIC's intervention and "support".
What of the implications of the strike? RD Naidu reckons that though 
dismissed, the Indian workers were not disillusioned. Their attitude 
was that they had fought hard but lost. According to Mr Naidu, workers 
gained "very rich experience in what the strike costs", and in the 
final analysis "the main aim was to politicize the workers". If indeed 
this was the intention or the thinking among some of the leaders of the 
strike - RD Naidu among them - it was an extremely costly, and naive 
way of going about such 'politicization'.
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More importantly, however, this view, i.e. the aim of politicising 
workers, coming from a prominent trade unionist who was actively linked 
with both the CPSA and the "radical" wing of the NIA at this time, is 
the clearest evidence on the primacy such leaders attached to the 
political struggles, such as that being waged then between the moderate 
and "radical" factions of the Indian political organisations. It would 
therefore appear that the struggles of workers (as perceived by such 
leaders) were principally linked to the longer term objectives of this 
kind of politicization rather than the advancement of independent 
worker organisations and their capacity to determine their own 
strategies and to make their own decisions (and mistakes) in terms of 
their class interests. We are of course not suggesting that the latter 
approach would have been sufficient to resolve this or any other 
dispute or the more general questions of organisation. However, where 
worker action is viewed as an adjunct to political objectives arising 
outside worker forums or where, as is evident from this dispute, 
extensive reliance is placed on political organisations such as the 
Kajee-NIC, the potential for independent class organisation and action 
is heavily compromised. Our research, including extensive interviews 
with Billy Peters and RD Naidu, who were both closely involved in this 
dispute, has shown that though workers took the decision to strike - a 
decision made, incidentally, without their being aware of all the facts 
- their role thereafter appears to have been totally subordinate. And 
though the CP and the Ka jee-NIC were 'disappointed' at not being 
consulted before strike action was taken - a clear indication of the 
importance they placed on the value of their intervention - they wasted 
no time after being invited to assist by the NRWIU, in dominating the 
events that followed. There is little evidence to suggest that the 
workers retained any control over the nature and form of the 
negotiations or other actions that were made after the strike was 
called.
A further consequence of the strike was its effect on non-racial 
unionism. For the strike led to the collapse of the non-racial NRWIU. 
Hemson suggests that the response of the state and capital to such
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non-racial working class resistance created the conditions that led to 
hostility between Indian and African workers. Having been displaced by 
African workers, Hemson comments (p.339) that: "The tendency among 
Indian workers (thereafter) was towards inward looking trade unions 
keenly aware of the necessity of protecting selected industries for 
Indian employment." And African workers, especially after the downturn 
in economic activity after the war, began to see the "expansion of 
employment and upward mobility in certain industries and occupations 
(e.g. municipal employment and weaving) as being blocked by Indian 
workers" (Hemson, p.340).
These tendencies were complemented and reinforced by the increasing 
attention that even the "radical" Indian trade union leadership began 
to show to the political struggles being waged by the Indian political 
organizations following the "Pegging Act" of 1943, and the 
preoccupation of the CPSA with ensuring that working class action did 
not disrupt the war efforts. These issues will be dealt with in 
greater detail in Chapter 5 of this report.
4.4 The Laundry Workers Strike (1945/6)
On Wednesday the 12 December 1945, between 600 and 700 Indian and 
African workers employed in laundry establishments in Durban struck 
work in support of a demand for higher wages and improved working 
conditions.^ ^  Wages paid to Black workers in the laundry
industry at that time ranged from 27s 6d to 40s a week. ^ ^  The 
total number of workers in the laundry industry was between 1000 and 
1100, the majority of whom were B l a c k s . M o s t  of the Indian 
workers in the industry were members of the Durban branch of the 
National Union of Laundering, Cleaning and Dyeing Workers.^® 
The Durban branch of the union overwhelmingly comprised Indian members. 
A schedule compiled by the Minister of Labour in 1943 shows that there 
were 694 Indian, 5 Coloured and 43 African workers in the Durban branch
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of the Union at that time. 3^
The Laundry Union had started negotiations with laundry employers 
eighteen months before the strike. However, the employers had rejected 
the demands put forward by the Laundry Union at a conciliation board 
held in November 1945. the Laundry Union had called for an increase of 
5s per week, a 44 hour week of 5 days, 'and increase in night-shift 
work, the closed shop principle, 3 weeks annual leave, a paid holiday 
on the 1 May and a sick benefit fund with contributions from both 
employees and employers.^®
Following the breakdown of the conciliation board negotiations, a
decision was taken by the laundry workers, at a general meeting of the
Laundering, Cleaning and Dyeing Workers' Union, to engage in strike 
119action. However, it would appear that the date on which the
strike would take place was to be decided by the "Emergency Committee" 
of the union.120 The "Emergency Committee" had the duty of 
preparing the union for the strike. Besides levying the workers, it is 
not clear what the Emergency Committee did. The strike began at the 
Natal Steam Laundry and spread to the other laundries. In addition to 
voicing the demands put forward at the conciliation board in November, 
the union called for its recognition by employers and demanded that 
workers who participated in the strike should not be
victimized. A number of laundry premises were picketed by the
strikers, who carried large banners and wore lapel badges with the word 
"striker". A few incidents of violence between picketers and
scab labour were reported.123 At those laundry firms that were
picketed, the police intervened to allow "scab labour" to
enter.124 Early in January 1946, the Laundry Workers' Union held 
a mass meeting in Red Square, which was reportedly attended by over
3000 workers and 40 members of the South African Police and Borough 
125Police. The secretary of the Durban branch of the Laundry
Union, Mr L Ramsunder, accused the Department of Justice of siding with 
employers and attempting to suppress the strike by using batons on the 
strikers and threatening to arrest them.126 A number of
picketers, including Betty du Toit, National Secretary of the 
Laundering, Cleaning and Dyeing Workers' Union, were arrested.”^22
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Thirteen African workers who were also picketing were arrested under 
the Masters and Servants Act.128 In addition, Alec Wanless, MP, 
Betty du Toit and L Ramsunder were charged under the Riotous Assemblies 
Act. However, although Betty du Toit had been arrested, held in prison 
overnight and finally released on £10 bail, the magistrate dismissed 
the case against them as "trivial".129
Mr Bolton, chairman of the Durban Local Committee of theu SATLC, and 
Betty du Toit met the chairman and vice-chairman of the Natal Employers 
Association around mid-January, in an attempt to negotiate a settlement 
in the laundry dispute. Mr Bolton asked the employers to agree to an 
all-round 5s increase, leaving the demands for a closed shop, stop 
order. May Day, sick benefit fund and the reinstatement of all strikers 
to be settled by arbitration.^38 However, the employers rejected 
these demands and submitted a counter-proposal, offering a 2s6d 
increase to grades 1,2,3,4 and 5 employees, whose wages ranged from 
27s6d to 37s6d, and the return of qualified employees to work with no 
increase. No wage increases were offered for charge hands, checkers, 
cleaners, clerical employees, drivers, dyers, depot assistants, 
dispatch clerks or foremen. With regard to the demand for "no 
victimisation of strikers" the employers stated that they were prepared 
to re-employ only those strikers for whom there were 
vacancies.^3  ^ By the end of December already most laundries had 
begun to take on unemployed Africans in the place of the
1 onstrikers. According to Mr RD Naidu, some employers resorted 
to the hiring of gangsters to attack the strikers and break the 
pickets.133
The strike committee called a general meeting to discuss the employers' 
counter-proposals. The chairman of the strike committee, Mr J Naicker, 
asked the workers to "carefully consider the matter" before voting. 
The workers unanimously voted for the complete rejection of the 
employers’ proposals.^3^ During the course of the strike the 
strike committee collected funds and food parcels for the 
workers.13;> (Before the strike was called £300 had been 
collected from the workers in levies by the Emergency Committee of the
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union.)136 The union carried out street collections and provided 
film shows and other forms of entertainment, to raise funds to support 
the strikers and their families.137 The Laundry Union also set 
up a People's Laundry - which operated on a co-operative basis - with 
the help of alec Wanless and Sydney Smith, a city councillor.138 
Because the People's Laundry was not registered it could not charge a 
fee for the work done but had to rely on donations from the 
public.138 Workers in the People's Laundry received only half a 
crown per week, and as a result many of them faced starvation and had 
to leave to look for work elsewhere.140 Nevertheless, by the 
time the strike was called to a halt there were still some 250 workers 
employed in the People's Laundry.141 A number of unions 
contributed to the strike fund either through the SATLC or directly. 
Several unions gave loans to the Laundry Union. Donations and loans 
were also received from a number of individuals, some of whom were 
union officials and members of the Communist Party.142 RD Naidu, 
who was in charge of collecting donations in the form of food and 
groceries, acknowledged that AI Kajee supplied groceries.143
Several unions expressed alarm at, and condemned, the action of the 
laundry employers in hiring "scab" labour. The Transvaal branches of 
the National Union of Laundering, Cleaning and Dyeing Workers' sent a 
telegram to the Prime Minister, General Smuts, calling on him to take 
action against the laundry firms in order to stop the employment of 
"scab” labour.144 Telegrams were also sent by Alec Wanless to 
the Ministers of Justice, Labour and Native Affairs, urging "those 
concerned" to refrain from recruiting "scab" labour and "interfering” 
in the dispute.145 The Department of Labour in Durban was taken 
to task by the Amalgamated Engineering Union for failing to bring 
pressure on the laundry owners to persuade them to negotiate with the 
union. The Minister of Labour was also criticised for failing to 
appoint an arbitrator under War Measure No.145.146 The failure 
on the part of the Minister of Labour to appoint an arbitrator was 
brought up in Parliament by Alec Wanless. The Minister of labour, when 
asked why it had not been possible for him to accede to a request by 
the Laundry Workers' Union to appoint an arbitrator to settle the 
dispute, had replied that it was the policy of the government not to
126
exercise the powers vested in the Minister in terms of the War 
Emergency Regulations. alec Wanless pointed out that during the 
miners' strike (two months later) the Minister had in fact made use of 
the emergency regulations and appointed an arbitrator.147 
Clearly, the role of the Department of Labour in the laundry workers' 
strike was not a neutral one.
After three months the strike organisers called the strike to a halt. 
According to Mr SP Pillay, only a small number of former employees were 
reinstated by the firms, and these were mainly the older workers. The 
majority of laundries had taken on African labour in place of the 
strikers.148Thus the strike ended in defeat for the laundry 
workers. Several criticisms have been levelled against the way in 
which the strike was organised. Clearly, the strike was ill-timed. The 
union leaders claimed that the strike was planned for December because
14Qthis was the busiest time of the year for the laundries. 
However, with the downturn in economic activity after the war, 
unemployment was high in Durban. An editorial in Indian Views argued 
that:
The laundry strike has taught a bitter lesson to Trade 
Union secretaries. In the strike the potential danger of 
scabs from amongst African workers was completely lost 
sight of. These secretaries are apt to forget that in 
the unskilled field the Indian worker is not 
indispensable ... Thousands of Africans are walking the 
streets in search of employment.188
The strikers were at the mercy of "scab" labour which was employed by
the laundries with the collaboration of the police.181
According to SP Pillay, the timing of the strike was decided by union 
officials at the Natal Steam Laundry, rather than by the entire union 
membership: "Just out of the blue one factory was pulled out on 
strike. Natal steam Laundry, and then all the others had to 
follow." Thus, although the workers had voted in favour of 
strike action, it would appear that they were not consulted in the 
setting of the date of the strike, as the Emergency Committee - which
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was to decide on a date for the strike - was pre-empted by officials of 
the union at the Natal Steam Laundry. Consequently, the strike took 
place in a manner which was fragmented by the lack of any effective 
democracy in the setting of the date for its commencement.
At the 16th annual conference of the SATLC, Mr Bolton attacked the 
leaders of the Laundry Workers' Union' and described the strike as 
"wrong* and "criminal". Bolton argued that the strike should not have 
been called because finances were not available and the union was 
divided. He accused the trade union leaders of "handling and working 
the strike on political lines", instead of "on trade union 
principles".153 Mr George Ponen, who was also a member of the 
strike committee, replied to Bolton's attack, pointing out that the 
Durban Local Committee of the SATLC was present at the Conciliation 
Board when the employers rejected the workers' demands. In addition, 
Ponen argued, the Local Committee was present when the workers decided 
that they would have to take strike action, and had pledged to give its 
support.154 Although the trade union leaders were at times 
undemocratic and short-sighted in the running of the strike, as will be 
shown later, Bolton's attack is inexplicable, since, as Ponen pointed 
out, he raised no objections before the strike took place or at the 
early stages of the strike. This incidence illustrates the lack of 
unity within the SATLC and its failure to operate as a cohesive 
coordinating body.
The strike organisers were also criticised for making random agreements 
with employers. An article in Indian Opinion ran thus:
There has been some sort of an agreement with the Durban 
laundries which is now working with all the workers who 
were employed by them when the strike was declared. It 
would appear that a closed shop was agreed to and an 
increase on the wages of less than the demands made 
originally by the workers. In this case it would appear 
that the leaders of the strikers agreed to a lesser 
amount than their demands without consulting the general 
body of strikers who were employed in different 
places.155
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This criticism is supported by RD Naidu, who was a member of the strike 
committee. He states: "We started making agreements at random. We 
didn't collectively see the employers association."166 On the 
second day of the strike already union officials had reached an 
agreement with the Durban Laundries Limited, which had contracts for 
Addington Hospital and Springfield Military Hospital, whereby workers 
in that company would continue to work.1 However, the workers 
dealt only with laundry from the hospitals, and refused to do "ordinary 
washing". Separate agreements were also reached with the 
Umgeni Laundry and the Sixty Minute Dry Cleaners.1 Not only 
were these actions undemocratic, in that the general body of workers 
was not consulted, but the effect was to weaken the position of the 
workers. Employers were able to offer lower increases than those 
demanded by the workers. The majority of laundry workers 
however, found themselves jobless, their positions having been taken by 
unemployed Africans.
The laundry workers strike was the last major strike by Indian workers 
in the 1940's. It is important to ascertain the effect of this strike 
on the workers themselves. RD Naidu has described the workers as 
looking "like the lost legion" when the strike was called to an 
end.161 The Durban branch of the National Union of Laundering, 
Cleaning and Dyeing Workers collapsed. According to SP Pillay, many 
workers were disillusioned after the strike and were reluctant to join 
trades unions.'62 Indian workers in the laundry industry were 
without a union after the collapse of the strike, until 1949, when a 
new organisation was formed. SP Pillay argues that the leaders of the 
Laundry Workers' Union made use of the "strike weapon" too hastily, the 
union was still in its infancy and there were "other 
alternatives". 162
Although individual members of the NIC and the Durban branch of the 
Communist Party were involved in the conducting of the laundry workers 
strike, it is not clear from the evidence available, what role these 
political organisations played in the dispute. Jimmy Bolton suggested 
that the laundry workers strike was handled along “political 
lines",164 but there is no evidence to support his claim.
129
Although it may have been the case that political organisations were 
less involved in the laundry strike than in the Falkirk and Dunlop 
disputes, this does not necessarily imply that the laundry workers 
themselves were involved in a more democratic manner in the crucial 
decisions that were taken. This is evident from the following:
i. Although in principle workers had taken the decision to go on 
strike, the general body of workers was not party to the decision of 
when the strike would actually take place;
ii. The decision by the strike committee to make random agreements with 
individual laundry employers appears to have been taken without prior 
consultation with the general body of workers, which weakened the 
union's bargaining position.
In the final analysis, however, our critique here is not simply that 
these issues were not democratically decided - the events speak for 
themselves - but that this was possible because the particular 
historical form of unionism at this time appears to have been 
constrained by the limitations of its own structural features. Whether 
or not the constitution of, say, the Laundry Union was more democratic 
does not affect this critique. In fact, had the constitution of this 
union been more democratic, some of the actions of the leadership would 
- by being in breach of these constitutional requirements - be open to 
even greater criticisms than that we have raised here.
4.5 Commentary and Assessment
It has been argued that the origins of non-racial industrial unionism 
must be sought in the context of the growth of secondary industry in 
South Africa in the period 1925-1930 (Jon Lewis, 1978, p.126) During 
this period new unions based on industrial lines were formed, and 
"despite the backwardness of white workers, there is evidence of 
genuine inter-racial solidarity". (Lewis, 1978, p.138) These new 
unions, Lewis argues, were responsible for the revival of the 
"technique of industrial militancy which had laid dormant since 1922". 
(p.138) However, as already pointed out in Chapter 1 of this study.
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this new movement died out during the depression years. Nevertheless, 
the movement's impact, particularly its policy of non-racial trades 
unionism, was continued in some form with the formation of the Trades 
and Labour Council.
The impact of the "new unionism* is best demonstrated 
at the Cape conference held jointly by the Cape 
Federation of labour unions and SATLC in 1930, which 
resulted in the formation of the Trades and Labour 
Council, specifically on a non-racial basis. The new 
unions were beginning to change the balance of forces 
within the labour movement. (Lewis, p.139)
These changes established the basis and potential for inter-racial 
class activity in the post-depression economy of South Africa. This 
section attests to assess this new militant unionism in Natal in this 
post-depression period.
In the first strike analysed in this chapter, the Falkirk dispute, we 
find that an all-grades strike initiated and led by skilled White and 
Coloured workers raised the possibility of an inter-racial class 
alliance in opposition to capital on the shop floor. However, the 
skilled White and Coloured workers accepted wage increases for 
themselves to the exclusion of the unskilled and semi-skilled workers, 
after the intervention of their union, the AEU. The mainly Indian and 
African semi-skilled workers were in this way denied the potential 
benefits of a militant all-grades strategy on the shop floor. However, 
the lesson was not lost on these Indian and African workers. They 
realized that union organization was necessary to fight for higher 
wages and better working conditions, and if it was to succeed it had to 
be based on non-racialism and industrial lines. The formation in 1937 
of the Natal Iron and Steel workers Union (NISWU) based on these 
principles of non-racialism and industrial unionism was the first of 
many more such unions to be formed just before or during the war years, 
e.g. the Natal Rubber Workers' Industrial Union (1938) and the Laundry, 
Cleaning and Dyeing Employees' Union (1941).
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The response of the employees, the state and the political 
organisations to this rise of non-racial industrial unionism is 
revealed by the strategy they each employed in the three strikes 
analysed above, ie, the Falkirk strike of 1937, the Dunlop strike of 
1942/3 and the Laundry strike of 1945/6. In the case of the Falkirk 
dispute the NISWU was not formally recognised and management skilfully 
played on the divisions between skilled and unskilled workers, between 
those migrant workers living in compounds and the more permanent urban 
(Indian) workers. The employers also used scab labour to break the 
solidarity of workers. In the Falkirk dispute the Department of Labour 
and other agencies of the state, (including local government) 
constantly attempted to persuade workers to return to work on 
management's terms.
In the case of the Dunlop dispute two new weapons in the employers1 
union-bashing armoury were introduced. Firstly, apart from the 
familiar tactic of recruiting scab labour and the deliberate policy of 
not recognising (or negotiating with the NRWIU), an in-company union 
was established with the consent of the state, despite the fact that a 
union already existed for all employees of the rubber industry in 
Natal. Secondly, this new militancy among workers across racial lines 
precipitated the formation of an industry-wide employers organisation 
as a counter measure to industry-wide trade unionism. (Of course it is 
debatable whether the NRWIU could ever have achieved industry-wide 
representation in Natal.) This dispute occurred during the height of 
the war and the Communist Party - the "political party of the working 
class" - seemed to be concerned with the war effort in general. The 
commission of enquiry set up by its Durban Committee was more concerned 
with why a strike was called by the leadership rather than with the 
demands and grievances of workers at the Dunlop factory.
The employers' response to the laundry strike - a strike involving all 
laundry workers in Durban - was a refusal to negotiate with the union. 
The erqployers closed ranks and refused to entertain any kind of deal 
while at the same time employing scab labour on a large scale to
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destroy the months' long solidarity of laundry workers. The state 
response was to refuse to appoint an arbitrator to resolve the dispute.
In all three disputes the presence of the police at the factory gates 
made it virtually impossible for any kind of moral persuasion or 
pressure to be brought to bear on scab labourers. In instances where 
picket action was attempted such as in the Dunlop strike the police in 
concert with employers acted swiftly to charge and convict "offenders" 
under one or other law.
We have already described, for each of the disputes analysed, the role 
played by political organizations such as the NIC and the CPSA. In the 
long run they appear to have done less for the workers and their 
struggle on the shop floor than their noble proclamations of intent 
made at mass meetings. The NIC under the leadership of AI Kajee in both 
the Falkirk and Dunlop disputes continued to highlight sectional and 
racial divisions among the striking workers by concentrating on the 
Indian workers as part of that elusive category "the Indian community". 
However, even when the progressive wing of the NIC took over in 1945 
this did not herald any renewed interest in the concrete shop floor 
grievances of workers - as their deafening silence in the laundry 
strike that was called a few months after their take-over attests to. 
Rather the view was expressed that Indian workers had to be seen in the 
context of the political struggles that Indians as a "community" faced. 
Thus political issues dominated the lives of even committed trade 
unionists serving on the NIC/ASC/NB at the expense of worker 
organisation and support for strikes arising out of grievances on the 
shop-floor. The principle of non-racialism was relegated to rhetorical 
speeches at mass meetings, and industrial unionism sank into sectional 
differences. The CPSA did not actually support racial unionism but 
since the late 1920's and early 1930's, its policy was not against 
setting up separate - in some cases parallel - unions for African 
workers. As Jon Lewis commenting on the formation of the FNETU in 1928 
points out: "The formation of an independent black trade union 
movement16  ^ marks a break with the CP's earlier stress on non- 
racial working class organisation." (1978, p. 134) However, whatever
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the long-term implications of this break in policy the CPSA tended to 
follow the dictates of Stalinist policy and strategy rather than being 
guided by the material circumstances of the working class in South 
Africa. Thus after initially being against the allied war effort 
denouncng it an "imperialist war" it changed its policy and strategy 
after the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, in such a way as to 
actually hold back workers from going on strikes which might harm war 
production. This is particularly clear in its response to the Dunlop 
dispute.166
A further issue that arises out of this period of working class 
activity is the role of the Trades and Labour Council. The Natal, Iron 
and Steel Workers Union and the Natal Rubber Workers' Industrial Union 
were not affiliated to the SATLC and thus were not members of the 
Durban Committee of the TLC. Thus although the NISWIU appealed on 
numerous occasions for assistance from the local committee, such 
assistance could not be effectively co-ordinated as these unions were 
not formally or structurally integrated into the SATLC structures. In 
the case of the Dunlop strike, for example, the question as to whether 
or not the local committee had been informed about the establishment of 
a company union at Dunlop before the strike was called became the 
subject of heated debate at the annual (1943) conference of the TLC - 
with the NRWIU secretary claiming that though they were not affiliated 
to the TLC, the Durban committee had been informed and the SATLC 
claiming that they (the SATLC) would have made representations on 
behalf of the NRWIU in an attempt to settle the dispute, even though 
the NRWIU was not an affiliate. Such conflicts and disagreements could 
have been averted had the SATLC been the kind of union federation that 
had effective structures to co-ordinate its responses to the problems 
of individual unions. Had such structures existed it might also have 
encouraged non-affiliates to join. RD Naidu describes the TLC as a 
"national forum that did very little else", and which "paid lip 
service"lu? to the striking Dunlop workers. And Billy Peters 
comments that: "There was a feeling among some non-white trade unions 
not to have anything to do with the SATLC - they felt that no good 
purpose would be served," adding that, "The SATLC was dominated by
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craft anions that wanted to protect the interests of White 
workers."1®8 This brings us to a second issue in connection with 
the role of the TLC, for in addition to the structural incongruities 
within the TLC, the ability of this body to act unambiguously in 
support of non-racial unionism was affected by serious differences 
within its affiliated membership. Although formally espousing the 
notion of non-racialism, this policy was never clear in its exposition. 
In practice it never led to the formation of all-grades industrial 
unionism as a solution to the changing conditions of industrialisation 
in South Africa. The TLC was dominated by skilled workers who sought to 
protect their narrow interests through craft rather than industrial 
unions. The question of non-racialism and industrial unionism was never 
really settled in the 25 year history of the TLC. The tensions within 
the TLC eventually led to a major split in 1949/50 and to its eventual 
collapse in 1954.
The organisational implications of these muddled policies and 
strategies are clear: the workers and union leaders who worked 
untiringly to maintain unions as a form of resistance to capital, 
invariably came off second best. Thus, for example, none of the three 
unions involved in the strikes analysed above survived very long after 
the strikes were lost. The NISWU did not survive into the late 1940's. 
There is even the suggestion that it succumbed to temptations of 
bureaucracy by splitting its members into a parallel union for Africans 
and another for Indians with the latter registering under the 
Industrial Conciliation Act.' in the case of the NRWIU, its 
strength was heavily concentrated in one factory - Dunlop. As a result, 
it was virtually and effectively destroyed after the 1942/43 strike. 
There is no mention of it by 1948.170 The laundry union also 
collapsed after the 1945/46 strike and was only revived in 1949. 
Between 1946-1949 there was no union for the laundry workers of Natal.
A further issue that arises out of this analysis is the question of 
whether these new unions had the resources and organisational basis to 
undertake strike action. This applies particularly to the Dunlop and 
Laundry strikes where the strike was precipitated and called by the
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leadership of the anion and not with the considered consent of the 
workers. As we have seen in the case of the Dunlop strikes, it appears 
that workers were misinformed (or at least ill-informed) about the 
state of negotiations when they decided to take strike action. We have 
noted in some detail the criticism levelled at the secretary of the 
NRWIU over these issues in the 1943 TLC conference. A strike at the 
beginning of the Christmas vacation also raises questions about the 
strategic timing of such strikes. This applies in particular to the 
Dunlop strike.
This particular strategy of going on leadership inspired strikes 
appears to fall in line with a peculiar view that strike action by 
itself would raise the level of worker militancy and encourage the 
growth of unionism. However, it does not necessarily follow that 
strike action leads to militancy or to the growth of unionism. The 
evidence of unionism in Natal in this period actually points to the 
opposite effect. Badly organised unions and ill-prepared strikes - for 
whatever reason - have a damaging effect on the morale of workers, as 
RD Naidu's comment on the laundry workers looking like the "lost 
legion" amply illustrates.^7  ^ The laundry workers, after the 
failure of the 1945/46 strike, showed great resistance to
re-organising a laundry union - a fact that SP Pillay has attested 
17?to. 4 In organisational terms, such action led to the stifling 
of worker initiative within trades union structures and quickly created 
the conditions for entrenching bureaucracy in such unions.
Contrary to the promise that non-racial industrial unionism held, 
various factors militated against the development of an independent 
non-racial trade union movement in this period, for example, the 
actions of some of its leaders; the intervention by political 
organisations; the unresolved conflicts within the SATLC and the strong 
resistance by capital and the state to the new unionism, created 
conditions almost impossible for the newly unionised Indian and African 
workers to overcome. Most importantly however, the organisational 
structure and capacity of these unions left little possibility for the 
rank and file to assert themselves. When the rank and file were called 
upon to take action they most often did so with the kind of solidarity
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and heroism befitting the comradeship developed on the factory floor. 
However, the lack of proper union structures and of worker democracy 
and of a disciplined regional and national co-ordinating union 
federation allowed for easy access and interference by political 
organisations. All of which is not to say that the existence of 
democratic structures in the organisations of the working class will 
magically resolve questions about its long term development and 
historical role. A whole range of conjunctural factors, such as those 
that we have already mentioned - the power of the state and of capital, 
the lack of adequate resources and communication channels, unfavourable 
economic conditions and even perhaps divisions within the working class 
are relevant and are likely to affect the limits to which independent 
working class organisations and action may proceed - whether or not 
democratic structures exist. But it is our point that a fundamental 
consideration in the advancement of an independent working class is the 
presence of those generalized internal structures that would begin to 
enhance and support its own organizing capacity and the development of 
its own class based politics.
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CHAPTER FIVE
INDIAN TRADES UNIONS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 
IN NATAL (1930-1950)
5.1 Introduction
It is not the objective of this chapter to analyse the origins, 
development and strategies of the many Indian political organizations 
which may be traced back to the Indian Committee (1890) and the Natal 
Indian Congress (1894). An existing body of literature deals with this 
subject more than adequately^. Our primary task is to analyse the 
nature of the relationship between political organizations, such as the 
NIC and the CPSA, and the Indian trades unions which existed in Natal 
in the 1930's and 1940's. In Chapter 4 we have dealt extensively with 
the nature and effect of the intervention of Indian political 
organizations such as the NIC on the development of worker 
organizations in Durban in the 1930's and 1940's, as this emerges from 
the actions workers engaged in. Hence the major thrust of this chapter 
will be to examine the influence of workers and trades unions on the 
ideology of Indian political organisations, especially in the light of 
existing views on the nature and form of this influence. In addition 
we will examine other aspects of the relationship between political 
organizations - in particular the CPSA and the NIC/NIA - and trades 
unions, besides those already discussed in Chapter 4. These relate in 
the main to the role such organizations played in the origins and 
growth of trades unions. In order to arrive at a better understanding 
of all these relationships in the 1930's and 1940's it is necessary to 
touch briefly upon the nature and form of the relationship between 
(Indian) political organizations, workers and unions in the pre-1930 
period.
5.2 Indian Politics, Workers and Trades Unions in Natal (1890-1939)
'Indian politics' in South Africa, for much of the period until 1940, 
was dominated by moderate organizations such as the NIC founded by
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Gandhi in 1894 and the Transvaal British Indian Association 
(1904 - renamed the Transvaal Indian Congress in 1927). Swan has shown 
(1985, p.270) that early Indian politics in Natal and the Transvaal 
"were crucially shaped by the social and economic stratification of the 
Indian population", and that these politics were dominated by merchants 
and traders and (later) western educated white collar workers seeking 
to maintain "their relatively privileged position in the economic 
hierarchy" (p.270). At virtually no time in the period 1894-1914 
(except briefly in 1913/14) were the problems, of what Swan calls, the 
underclasses even on- the agenda of Indian political organisations such 
as the NIC, unless as an opportunist ploy to safeguard trader 
interests. A perusal of the membership list of the NIC compiled by 
Gandhi in 1895^ reveals this preponderance of merchants and traders. 
Given the generalized anti-Indian hostility which had begun to build up 
from c1885, the commercial elite fought stubbornly to protect their 
commercial interests by attempting to distinguish and distance 
themselves from the indentured and ex-indentured labourers. As Swan 
points out (p.44), "their politics far from unifying the Indian 
community as has been asserted in the past, were directed specifically 
towards attaining white recognition of the fundamental differences 
between the two major social groups in the community: merchants and 
workers."
The annual subscriptions of £3 for membership of the NIC further 
reflected the desire to limit membership to more prosperous Indians. 
Instances of political action and protest were restricted to times when 
proposed legislation threatened trader interest. In form, such 
protests were limited to letters, petitions and deputations to relevant 
government officials - both in Natal and in London. Long periods of 
inactivity were only intermittently punctuated by such piece-meal 
protest. Even Gandhi's attempt to "radicalize" the dominant trader 
ideology through his passive resistance campaign in the Transvaal 
proved largely unsuccessful. This campaign was directed at Transvaal 
government legislation (the Asiatic Law Amendment Act) that was 
designed to prevent the ingress of Indians not already domiciled there 
and the compulsory registration and 'finger-printing' of all Indians.
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However, in 1908, the Transvaal Government tied the issue of 
registration to the removal of trading licenses. As a consequence the 
support that Gandhi was able to engender from the traders by convincing 
them that the principle of racist legislation, once entrenched, would 
be likely to adversely affect their vested commercial interests, 
dissipated rapidly. It was only in 1913/14 that the campaign against 
this legislation, the Immigrants' Restriction Act of 1907 and the £3 
tax" was more successfully undertaken. And for this success much was 
owed to the consequences of the call by Gandhi for a strike on the 
Northern Natal coalfields (see also Chapter 1). For, quite unexpect­
edly (and unintentionally) the strike "spread like a cane fire through 
the vast, brutally oppressed workforce of the coastal sugar 
plantation", (Swan, 1982, pp. 19,20) and then to other industries in 
and around Durban^. The negotiations that led to the Indian Relief 
Act of 1914 was therefore consequent upon the support that Gandhi 
received from these workers and the abolition of the tax, the repeal of 
certain discriminatory laws and the ending of the indentured labour 
system was largely due to the spontaneous efforts and actions of Indian 
workers themselves. However this support was not channelled through an 
organized working class, as such organs did not exist at that time.
In general, many Indian political organizations of this period (NIC, 
NIA, CBIA), but especially the NIC, had little contact with 
(indentured) Indian workers, were largely out of touch with worker 
problems, and made little or no attempt to organize or mobilize these 
workers - even in support of their own political demands.
By the end of the First World War the beginnings of some form of an 
organized Indian trades union movement may be detected. (See also 
Chapter 1 p.6) The involvement of Indian political organizations such 
as the NIC, in the formation, growth and activities of the early Indian 
unions such as the Durban Indian Workers' Industrial Onion (DIWIU) and 
the Tobacco Workers' Union formed in 1917, was minimal. Much of the 
initiative and support for these unions came from White socialists such 
as Gordon Lee of the International Socialist League (ISL). The ISL 
had, from 1915, begun the task of organizing Indian
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workers - even producing worker pamphlets in Tamil and Telegu 
(Mantazaris, 1983, p. 117). Other unions, such as the Indian 
Printers' Union, the Indian Shop Assistants Union, the Durban Hotel 
Employees' Union and the Indian Dockworkers' Union operated 
independently of the DIWIU and the ISL. Mantzaris (p. 125) has studied 
these early unions closely and it is apparent from his study that they 
concentrated their efforts primarily on the concrete demands of the 
day, and did not assume any direct relationship with the political 
practices of organizations such as the NIC, which were outside their 
class origins. These unions therefore did not serve as a vehicle of 
integration of their members into the larger body politic. Neither, 
except for the moral support they lent to the Indian tobacco workers in 
their 1920 strike, is there evidence of the NIC's involvement with 
these Indian trades unions in any substantial way. It would appear 
that the interaction between the unions and political organizations in 
the Indian 'community' was thus insignificant and peripheral during 
this period.
Despite the pioneering efforts of Lee (and his successor Bernard 
Sigamoney), Indian trades union activities declined in the early 
twenties. The lack of a significant industrial base, of experienced 
organizers to continue Lee's work and the generally repressive anti­
worker climate of the time may have all contributed to this. However, 
the stimulus provided by the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and 
the Wage Act of 1925 led to an increase in union activity and organ­
ization as Indians saw these acts as opportunities for entering into 
negotiations with employers in order to improve their wages and working 
conditions. Mainly separate Indian unions rather than non-racial 
unions were formed, partly because many 'White' trades unions refused 
to accept Indian workers as members, and partly because Indian workers 
felt that their interests would best be served by forming separate 
unions and undercutting White workers (Ginwala 1974, p. 390).
In this period (1925-1930), and following the revival of Indian 
political organizations and activity in response to the Class Areas 
Bills, the negotiations surrounding the Cape Town agreement (1927) and
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the recolonisation scheme, Indian political figures began to assist in 
the organisation of Indian workers. Ginwala notes (1974, p. 389) that 
around this time the names of those who were to form the CBSIA in 1933 
featured frequently as speakers at meetings at which the formation of 
trades unions were being discussed. And VS Sastri, the Agent-General 
for India in South Africa, was largely instrumental in persuading the 
NIC to take an active part in promoting Indian trades unions. This 
followed complaints to the Government of India delegation to the Round 
Table Conference that Indian workers were finding it difficult to take 
advantage of the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act and the 
Wage Act because they were poorly organized and because they could not 
get the support of White labour. Thus in 1928 the NIC called a 
conference to discuss the promotion of Indian trades unions and arising 
from this the Natal Workers' Congress (NWC) was formed - bringing 
together unions in various industries^. In welcoming delegates to 
the conference, S Rustomjee, president of the NIC, noted that the 
inauguration of a trades union congress was a "step forward" directed 
towards the amelioration of the lot of the Indian workers in South 
Africa, and Sastri observed that "the Indian worker must accept the 
principle underlying the Industrial Conciliation Act" and they "should 
not fail to appeal to the Minister of Labour who was bound to render 
them some kind of assistance". (Natal Mercury 3/12/28, p. 6)
The NWC as a body, however, did not survive long (although some of the 
individual unions then formed continued to function), and the contact 
of the political leadership with the trades unions grew weaker. 
(Ginwala 1974, p. 345) It has also been contended that the unions 
brought into being under the NWC were conservative unions dominated by 
so called "boss-boys".^ The leadership of the Natal Liquor and 
Catering Trade Employees' Union, for example, was in the hands of 
head-waiters who paid little attention to the grievances (and who 
opposed the active participation) of other workers in the industry. 
For some years thereafter co-operation between the unions and political 
organizations diminished. And in general, trades union activity 
declined sharply in the Great Depression (1929-1933) and unemployment 
amongst Indians rose dramatically.
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5.3 Indian Politics in Natal (1939-1948)
At the end of the Depression, especially with the growth of secondary 
industry in Greater Durban and the increasing employment of 
semi-skilled Indian workers in these industries, trades union 
organization and activity amongst Indian workers was again stimulated. 
The earlier chapters of this study have dealt with these developments. 
Hence we need to examine the nature of the relationship between these 
unions and the political organizations operating in Natal, especially 
in the 1940's. Before proceeding to this analysis, however, it is 
necessary to survey, very briefly, the major issues and changes which 
occurred on the political front in the period 1939-1948. (See also 
Appendix G)
By 1939 the first attempt to break the stranglehold of trader power in 
Indian political organizations was made. Dissatisfied with the 
conservative Indian politics of the time, a new generation rose to 
challenge for positions of leadership in the political organizations 
such as the NIC. In that year and largely as a result of pressure 
from this emerging new group, a majority in the NIC and the Colonial 
Born and Settlers Indian Association^ (CBSIA) - which was formed in 
1933 in direct opposition to the trader ideology of the NIC - merged to 
form the Natal Indian Association (NIA). The more conservative 
elements, however, preferred to stay out of this new organization and a 
group led by AI Kajee continued to operate under the name of NIC. 
Within the NIA a more progressive or 'radical' grouping, which came 
under the direct or indirect influence of the Communist Party and the 
non-European United Front (NEUF), loosely constituted themselves as 
the 'nationalist bloc'® and sought to influence the direction of 
Indian politics from within the NIA. Thus in a specially prepared 
statement issued in June 1940 they comment: "What we need today more 
than ever is a militant voice of the masses that would recognize the 
fundamental basis of mass action. They urged the association to 
"concentrate its energy in the organization of mass struggle as the 
only effective weapon to combat the repressive measures in the 
country". However, within a year they withdrew support from the NIA
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after seven of their members were expelled, and campaigned against the 
accomodationist policies of the NIA and the Kajee NIC.
The major political issues of the time related to questions of trading 
and residential segregation of Indians (in response to so-called Indian 
penetration), participation in the war, and the struggle for mass 
organization. On these issues the nationalist bloc totally rejected 
segregation proposals and the colour-bar policies of the Government, 
while the 'accomodationists' agreed to some form of voluntary residen­
tial segregation. The nationalist bloc first opposed the war effort 
labelling it an imperialist venture, but later, with the entry of the 
Soviet Union into the war, they came round to almost complete support 
for the war. Both groups, for reasons of political expedience, sought 
peripherally to address themselves to some of the problems faced by 
Indian workers - low wages, unemployment and job reservation. The 
conflicts and the tussles for support that followed are, as Swan 
comments, "most clearly demonstrated in the continuous process of 
amalgamation, dissolution and reamalgamation that Natal Indian politics 
underwent between August 1939 and October 1945.” (1982 p.23) Thus in 
1943 the Kajee-NIC, NIA and the nationalist bloc merged as the NIC in 
common opposition to the Trading and Occupation of Land Restriction Act 
(the Pegging Act) which sought to freeze all further inter-racial 
(White-Indian) property transfers for three years. However, the 
nationalist bloc in the NIC, with the support of trades unions, some 
social/cultural groups, the CPSA (Durban District), and the liberal 
study group amongst other organizations formed the Anti- Segregation 
Council (ASC) as a pressure group within this newly constituted NIC. 
After intensive campaigning for the support of the Indian working 
class, they eventually ousted the accomodationists at a mass meeting 
held at Curries' Fountain and took control of the NIC in October 1945.
Although many of the younger generation who spear-headed this 
realignment in Indian politics were well-educated and came from wealthy 
trading or middle class backgrounds (for example, GM Naicker and Y 
Dadoo) others, such as Billy Peters, G Ponen, MP Naicker, HA Naidoo and 
PM Harry, were workers and trades union leaders with little formal
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education. Of this group some brought to Natal Indian politics the 
experience and ideology gained from their participation in 
organizations such as the Communist Party, the NEUF and trades unions. 
It is thus not surprising that a high level of interaction amongst 
members of these organizations is to be found. HA Naidoo, for example, 
was not only the secretary of the Natal Sugar Field Workers Union and 
vice-president of the Distributive Workers Union, but also the chairman 
of the NEUF(Natal), chairman of the CPSA (Durban District) and a member 
of the nationalist bloc of the NIA/NIC. PM Harry, George Ponen, Billy 
Peters, C Amra, and DA Seedat similarly held positions in many of these 
political and worker organizations. The secretaries/organizers of most 
of the new wave of Indian unions formed after 1937 were members of the 
CPSA or the nationalist bloc/ASC, or both.
Many misconceptions, oversimplifications and some elements of 
.'romanticism' have entered into explanations of these interactions. 
Thus the precise nature of the relationship between Indian workers, 
their unions, the Indian political organizations and factions, and the 
Communist Party in the period 1939-1948 has to be examined carefully. 
As this study is concerned primarily with Indian workers and trades 
unions, we need to consider from this perspective:
i) The nature of the so-called radicalization of Indian political 
organizations and the extent to which this was consequent (as has been 
claimed) upon a rising working class consciousness that made itself 
felt on the political scene via the Indian trades union movement of the 
period: and
ii) The influence of the nationalist bloc/ASC and the CPSA on the 
Indian trades union movement; and the effect of such relationships that 
did exist between the CPSA, and the nationalist bloc/ASC on the one 
hand and the unions on the other, on the structure, organization and 
development of the fledgling Indian trades union movement. We 
concentrate here not so much on the effect of the intervention of 
political organizations on the struggles of workers (as this has 
already been examined in Chapter 4), but on the extent and nature of 
the assistance that political organizations provided in the origins and 
growth of the trades union movement in Durban in the 1930's and 
1940's.
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5.4 Indian Politics and Trades Unions (1939-1948)
Although these two issues are interrelated, let us begin by examining 
the influence of Indian workers and the trades unions on Indian 
political organisations (NIC/NIA) in the 1940's. Among the better 
known views on this relationship are those of Ginwala (1974), Pahad 
(1972) and Johnson (1973). Swan's (1982) analysis of these 
relationships, arising mainly from her study of the Transvaal Indian 
working class, is still in progress and is not dealt with here, 
although references to her views are made in the course of this 
analysis. Ginwala and Pahad sought (among other issues) to explain the 
basis for the ' radicalization" of Indian political movements at this 
time, and although various reasons are advanced to explain this 
process, such as socio-economic factors, the influence of the CPSA, the 
role of the intelligentsia (Pahad, p.234) and the impact of the 
nationalist movement in India (Ginwala p.413), for Ginwala and Pahad an 
important input was that of the so-called 'radical/militant trade union 
leadership' and the growth of 'working class consciousness'. Their 
views are summarised below. (our emphasis throughout)
i. In Ginwala's view,
the greatest radical influence ... was the growth of 
working class consciousness. (1974, p.414) ... The
growth of trade unions and working class consciousness 
in Natal was eventually to have decisive political 
repercussions ... trade unionists who were dissatisfied 
with the aims and methods of political organizations of 
the Indian people entered the political arena and 
influenced events there, (p.398) ... In 1944 a delegate 
conference representing trade unions, NIC branches, 
educational, sports and religious societies met and 
denounced the latest of the Agreements (the Pretoria 
Agreement) between the government and the SAIC ... this 
was the first conference of the Anti-Segregation Council 
(ASC) which won control of the NIC in October 1945. 
(pp.418/9)
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ii. For Pahad, the growth of trades unions and the benefits which 
workers began to experience from belonging to trades unions
acted as a catalyst in bringing about the greater 
participation of the workers in the Indian political 
movement on the side of the radicals. MP Naicker lays 
great stress on this and points out that the trade 
unions were the backbone of the ASC ... (1972, pp. 
240/41)
later he adds
that the militant leadership of the radicals in the 
trade union and political arena coupled with the close 
contacts and relationships with other union leaders and 
rank and file members significantly contributed to the 
"radicalization" of the Indian political movement.
(p. 240) ... This contact was vital in making it 
possible for the radicals to build a mass organization 
in their fight against the moderates, (p. 240)
iii. A somewhat different view is to be found in Johnson's (1973) 
discussion of the relationship between workers, the trades unions and 
the NIA/NIC. Thus he writes
Twenty-five Indian organizations joined the 
Anti-Segregation Committee [sic] in April 1943. 
Seventeen were trade unions, while the others 
represented a variety of social and religious groups.
(p. 63) ... The Anti-Segregationists were well prepared 
to contest for control of the NIC. They used the union 
organization to increase the membership of the NIC from 
about 17 000 in 1943 to 35 000 in 1945. (p. 66)
However, Johnson concludes that "if the Indian nationalists had 
generated considerable popular support, the depth of that support was 
not clear in 1945." (p.68) And he clearly attributes the failure of 
Indian resistance politics to the inability of radicals to translate 
the enthusiasm they engendered in 1945 into enduring political support 
thereafter.
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The following implications follow from these views - especially those 
of Ginwala (and to a lesser extent, Pahad):
i. That there was an already established 'working class consciousness' 
among Indian workers by the 1940's.
ii. That this 'working class consciousness' acted as a catalyst for the 
'radicalization' of Indian political organizations - as these workers, 
via their unions, entered the political arena to change the course of 
events there.
iii. That a crucial manifestation of this worker consciousness was the 
size and influence of unions as formal constituents of the ASC acting 
through delegates.
iv That the Indian political movement was thoroughly 'radicalized' by 
1945 with the takeover of the NIC by the 'radicals'.
In short, Ginwala, in particular, is unambiguous in stressing the 
primacy of 'working class consciousness' and the trades unions in the 
'radicalization' of Indian politics in the 1940's. In view of the 
importance of her work - and we do not wish to underplay the
significance of her work in the historiography of Indians in South 
Africa - it is critical to subject her interpretation of events in 
these crucial years to further inquiry. Our investigation which - as 
will be seen - is clearly at odds with parts of Ginwala's 
interpretation, emerges from close and critical interviews with some of 
the leading surviving members of the NB, ASC, CPSA and the trades 
unions - men such as AKM Docrat - (a member of the NB, ASC and CPSA); 
Billy Peters, a member of the NB, secretary of the CPSA (Durban
District - between 1943-1946), and an organizer/secretary of numerous 
unions including The Durban Indian Municipal Employees Society, the 
Shop Assistants Union, the Indian Railway Workers Union); RD Naidu (a 
member of the NB, ASC and organizer/secretary of the Natal Baking
Industry Employees' Union); from interviews with numerous rank and file 
Indian workers of that period, from articles, pamphlets and documents 
of the political organizations that we have located in private 
collections, libraries and archives, and from reports in such
newspapers as the Guardian, Indian Opinion, Indian Views and 
The Leader.
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It is important, at the outset, to stress that we do not dispute some 
of the 'facts' which emerge from a study of the relationship between 
unions and political movements in the Indian 'community' during the 
1940's. Thus, for example, we do not disagree that
i. thousands of Indian workers did become members of the NIC in 
support of the NB/ASC stand;
ii. there were trade union leaders on the ASC;
iii. the NB/ASC spearheaded the takeover of the NIC in 1945; and
iv. this would have been virtually impossible without the support of 
the Indian workers.
However, to conclude from this, as especially Ginwala has done (or 
clearly implied) that the 'radicalization' represented a movement from 
a conservative merchant class politics to a politics expressing itself 
in defense of the aspirations and demands of the Indian working class 
or that the realignment of Indian political forces was achieved via the 
'growth of working class consciousness' is, in our view, to 
fundamentally misrepresent the case.
Our interpretation of these events between 1939 and 1948 is as 
follows. From 1939 the question of so-called Indian penetration into 
the White areas of Durban became a major political issue in the Indian 
community. Opinions were clearly divided as to the appropriate 
response to moves to segregate Whites and Indians. The recently formed 
NIA set up a committee in co-operation with the Durban City Council to 
dissuade Indians from acquiring property in White areas. In other words 
they accepted some form of voluntary segregation as a strategy to 
pre-empt legislative measures to force such a separation. At a meeting 
at the City Hall in late 1940, a majority of those present accepted the 
NIA strategy of co-operation with the Council and the principles of 
voluntary segregation. Some of the younger members of the NIA - who 
had joined the organization in 1939 - objected strongly to the strategy 
and opposed any form of residential or trading segregation and the 
policy of racial discrimination in general. Arising out of their 
defeat at this meeting, however, came the first attempts at mobilizing 
a broader section of the Indian 'community' on an inter-class basis 
against all forms of racial segregation and with the longer term goal
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of overthrowing the moderates in the NIA. This oppositionist grouping 
came to be known as the Nationalist Bloc (NB), and it included such 
persons as HA Naidoo, Monty Naicker, AKM Docrat, George Ponen, 
DA Seedat, Cassim Amra, MD Naidoo and Billy Peters, some of whom were 
already secretaries or organizers of the Indian trades unions set up or 
revived since the mid 1930's.
It was in pursuance of their strategy to mobilize mass support for 
these policies - policies rooted in an uncompromising opposition to the 
■colour-bar' and couched in the general rhetoric of 'democratic rights' 
- that the radical nationalists in the NB began to address Indian 
workers in factories in and around Durban. It was in this respect that 
the secretaries/organizers of the Indian trades unions (in the NB) 
played a vital role, having easy access to the workers in their unions. 
But this role/strategy nevertheless emanated from the think-tank of the 
NB and clearly from outside worker forums. As AKM Docrat explained:
If we (NB) were to hold a meeting, we rang up 
committee members who were in the unions, gave them the 
time and place of the meeting and expected them to bring 
along the quota of workers. Our relationship was purely 
that of voting cattle to put it crudely.11
Beyond this there were only the most tenuous structural or organic 
links between Indian workers, the unions and the NB.
In seeking this broader support the NB thus began the task of educating 
Indian workers in the basics of their political demands. From the 
evidence that we have heard, nearly all the debate and discussion 
centred around the so-called "colour-bar" - "jobs for all", "education 
for all", "homes for all", "equality for all" - such were the slogans 
of this campaign. To the many Indian workers burdened with the 
civilized labour policy and overt racial discrimination, the case that 
was being put to them at innumerable NB meetings in and around Durban 
in the early 1940's was nothing if not compelling, and represented a 
vision of a better life as full and equal citizens of the country of 
their birth.
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But it is vital to emphasize that the stand which the workers were 
beginning to support rested primarily on their status as a 
disadvantaged group discriminated against within South African society 
- as 'non-Europeans' (Indians). Issues related to these workers - as a 
class - were thus subsumed to the primary struggle for bourgeois 
democratic rights. To suggest that the 'radicalization' of Indian 
politics arose from their own ranks or to misrepresent their support 
for the NB policies as indicative of their political or 'class 
consciousness' is to overstate their role. For there were many factors 
which, at that time, militated against the growth of 'class conscious­
ness' amongst Indian workers. They were newly proletariarized, only 
just having entered industrial occupations from a background of 
indentured labour, without the benefit of a long-standing trade union 
or a working class tradition, poorly educated, largely illiterate, and 
carrying with them religious and traditional beliefs and customs which
were often obstacles to the recognition and development of their class
1 ?interests. On this last point Billy Peters comments :
Indian workers came into the (trades union] movement 
with supernatural beliefs - their background and 
environment - what they were fed with from youth. No 
matter how much of scientific knowledge you tried to 
equip them with, those religious and supernatural 
beliefs remained. They could not discard their past.
From this path you ask them to adopt a revolutionary 
outlook.
And AKM Docrat observes^:
The Indian worker had no tradition, except the 
background of indentured labour - so how could he 
possibly have known (then) about socialism or worker 
rights or worker power.
This much is strikingly clear from our interviews with Indian workers 
of that period. They joined trades unions primarily because of the 
benefits such as improved wages and working conditions which they 
perceived that the unions might gain for them, and for little more.
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Their union membership, their resistance to exploitation and the 
support for the democratic policies of the NB are, in our view, 
inadequate as evidence of their 'class consciousness'. (This is not to 
suggest that there may not have existed class practices in the nooks 
and crannies of Indian working class activity, but this is not the main 
point of our critique.)
As Geoffrey de Ste Croix notes (1984, p.100):
Class conflict (class struggle, Klassehkampf) is 
essentially the fundamental relationship between 
classes, including exploitation and resistance to it, but 
not necessarily either class consciousness or collective 
activity in common, political or otherwise, although 
these factors are likely to supervene when a class had 
reached a certain stage of development and become what 
Marx once called "a class for itself”.
Let us now return to the chronology of events and especially to the 
formation of the ASC and its relationship with workers and trades 
unions after 1942.
The level of political militancy generated by the NB between 1940-42 
could not be matched by the moderates in the NIA. By using various 
gerrymandering tactics, therefore, including refusals to call general 
meetings and elections, they attempted to keep the radical nationalists 
at bay. It was in a way the state, by proposing the "Pegging Act" in 
1943, that temporarily, though superficially, patched up the deep 
divide in the ranks of Indian political organizations. In common 
opposition to this Act, and in order to present a united resistance to 
any form of legal separation of White and Indian property, the NIA, the 
Kajee-NIC and the NB came together to form the new NIC in 1943 - the 
first time in many years that there had been a single Indian political 
organization in Natal. However, the underlying ideological and 
strategic divisions within the NIC were soon to surface publicly. For 
in the so-called Pretoria Agreement between Smuts and the moderates in 
the NIC (such as AI Kajee) voting rights at provincial level were
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proposed for Indians in exchange for moves to stop 'Indian penetration' 
into White areas. Such moves included the appointment of a licencing 
board to control the occupation by Indians of former 'White' homes. 
The radicals/progressives, who were unaware of these initial moves, 
challenged the principles underlying this agreement and out of this 
opposition the Anti-Segregation Council was born, and began to agitate 
for adult suffrage on a common voters' roll.
Ginwala, as we have noted, refers to the ASC as a "delegate conference 
representing trade unions ... which won control of the NIC in 1945" 
(1974 pp.418/419). This, coupled with her assertion that the greatest 
radical influence on the political organizations was the growth of 
'working class consciousness', (p. 414) makes it impossible to escape 
the implications that these 'class conscious' Indian workers mandated 
delegates to the ASC to 'represent' them. For the use of the words 
'delegate' and 'represent' leaves little room for conjecture. So again 
it is made to appear that the impetus behind the ASC opposition came 
from these workers via the union 'delegates'.
Johnson, in his discussion of the ASC writes about the "twenty-five 
organizations [which] joined the ASC in April 1943. Seventeen were 
trade unions while the others ..." (1973, p. 63) And Bagwandeen (1983) 
in an appendix (p. 356) reproduces a list of the so-called 'affiliated 
organizations' to the ASC (p.211)^4 Two questions arise from these 
views and references:
i. Was the ASC constituted as a body to which 'organizations' such as 
trades unions affiliated or joined (as opposed to individual 
membership)? and, secondly,
ii. In what sense did the so-called delegates to the ASC represent 
their organizations’ membership? This question, as it relates to 
workers and their unions, is fundamental to the notion of workers' 
democracy and lies at the heart of the argument about the nature and 
form of Indian workers' role in the radicalization of Indian politics 
in the 1940's.
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We put these questions to AKM Docrat who was a founder member and first 
secretary of the ASC. According to Mr Docrat, the ASC began as no 
more than a loosely co-ordinated group of about 12 individuals which 
subsequently, in seeking wider support, developed into an umbrella 
body. Other organizations, such as trades unions, 'joined' the ASC, but 
it still included the original individual members. It is, however, the 
second question which is critical. Did the trades union 'delegates' 
serving on the ASC receive a mandate from their workers to represent 
them at this political forum? On this question Mr Docrat^ 
indicated that the trades unionists on the ASC did not, in the strict 
sense of the word, (and the only sense that matters on the issue of
worker democracy) receive a mandate from their workers. Billy Peters 
16observed that the trades unionists who participated in the ASC 
did so largely in their personal capacities and only with the knowledge 
(as opposed to the mandate) of (other) members of their unions' 
executive committee. Clearly, therefore, the question of affiliation 
was not formally discussed and debated by the workers themselves. Yet 
'their unions' were, for all intents and purposes, 'affiliated' to the 
ASC. This interpretation is also borne out by SP Pillay^ who was 
secretary/organizer of the Laundry Workers' Union between 1940-44 
(though he was not a member of the MB, ASC or CPSA) and whose union 
was, according to the document reproduced in B a g w a n d e e n , a n  
affiliated organization of the ASC. As secretary/organizer of the 
union at the time of affiliation, he would surely have had knowledge of 
this had there been a process of formal discussion and debate amongst 
the workers on the issue of affiliation to the ASC. However, he states 
clearly that the union did not affiliate to the ASC in this way, but 
that the decision to affiliate was taken by the leadership of the union 
(who as individuals had close links with the ASC) without the mandate 
of the rank and file workers. Thus it would appear that the ASC, as an 
organization of 'affiliated' bodies, existed as such more on paper than 
in practice. For trades unions, which made up the majority of these 
affiliates, did not affiliate to the ASC as a result of a conscious, 
deliberate and independent decision emanating from workers themselves. 
In fact, the constitution of the Twine and Bag Workers' Union, the Tea, 
Coffee and Chicory Employees' Union, and the Natal
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Sugar Field Workers' Union - all affiliates of the ASC - did not have a 
clause that even required rank and file workers to give these unions a 
mandate on affiliation to political organizations (a clause which was 
to be found in Solly Sach's Garment Workers' Union). This was an 
omission which would have facilitated the Executive Committee's (or 
union officials' ) decision to affiliate to the ASC, which is what (we 
would suggest) actually occurred. However, this is not to imply that 
thousands of Indian workers did not 'support' the policies of the ASC. 
But it is crucial to underscore the fact that this support followed the 
efforts of the ASC to mobilize Indian workers, trades unions and other 
organizations around their policies - policies which were developed by 
the initiators of the movement without a mandate from anyone or any 
organization. Thus the bodies which 'affiliated' to the ASC - in 
whatever form this took - did so on the basis of an already established 
programme. None of these affiliates therefore influenced or shaped the 
policies of the ASC which later spearheaded the takeover of the NIC in 
1945. As AKM Docrat summed up:
the directional flow of influence ran, if anything from 
the ASC to the Indian workers and not from the workers 
(via the unions) to the ASC. The trade unions did not in 
any way influence the ASC. The direction came from the
ASC and not from the trade unions to us. The ASC was not
1 Qmoulded by working class ideology, action or reaction.
It is clearly inadmissable to extrapolate the political (or even class) 
consciousness of the trades unionists on the ASC to the mass of the 
Indian workers.
From this evidence it is clear that the nature of the relationships/
between Indian workers, their unions and political organizations and 
factions differs in crucial aspects from the Ginwala interpretation. 
Her interpretation fails to capture the real dynamics of the process 
and nature of the ' radicalization' which occurred. At the same time 
her analysis reveals (at best) a bizarre misunderstanding of these 
processes and (at worst) an 'unawareness' of the real meaning of
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worker democracy. Importantly, too, by unmasking the myth of Indian 
'working class consciousness' (as an influence on Indian political 
organizations) it becomes possible to understand better the decline - 
some would say failure - in political activism in the years that 
immediately followed. This is most clearly illustrated in the 1946-48 
passive resistance movement.
As Swan points out (1982, p. 25) the
passive resistance movement despite strong links with
2 1politically aware organized labour and despite the 
manifest grievances of Indian workers, mobilized only 
around 1000 of the 22 000 Indian trade union members.
It would require an extremely obtuse argument to explain why, if one 
accepts Ginwala's view, more than 22 000 politically - and class­
conscious Indian workers - (as distinct from their organized 
leadership), and who, by their own 'ideology' and actions, spurred the 
'radicalization' of Indian politics - abandoned their new leadership so 
quickly. William of Occam would have arrived at a better and more 
accurate explanation: namely, that there really was no such conscious, 
militant mass support arising independently from the workers 
themselves.
It remains, therefore, for us to pose an alternative and acceptable 
explanation.
The Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act (Ghetto 
Act) against which the passive resistance campaign was primarily 
directed, most closely and seriously affected those Indians who were 
financially able to purchase land in White areas for residential and 
investment purposes. As we discovered in our interviews with Indian 
workers of the period, the implementation of the Act (in so far as its 
property/land provisions were concerned) would have had little effect 
on them. (A view corroborated by AKM Docrat). And as Johnson points 
out, (1973, p.78) the "Act did not immediately affect the majority of
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less affluent Indians who had no plan for either living or investing
p 3outside existing Indian Ghettos".
Thus, although their support for the ASC and the 1945 NIC revealed 
their hopes for a more democratic South Africa - free of the colour-bar 
- the failure of the passive resistance campaign to sustain this worker 
support suggests that workers placed their more pressing and immediate 
problems before any "longer term considerations of the implications of 
segregation", as Swan discovered in her research into the Transvaal 
Indian working class (1982, p. 25). Many had supported the ASC campaign 
more out of "frustration and hope", as George Naicker admitted^ 
rather than any "real political understanding of the difficulties of 
the struggle". Clearly, by the mid 1940's, the worker (and political) 
organizations had hardly begun the task of addressing fundamental 
worker grievances such as low wages, poor working conditions, 
inadequate housing, education and the like. Given these circumstances, 
to have expected any greater empathy or committed support for these 
political struggles from the newly proletarianized and poorly educated
pCIndian working class - who, as AKM Docrat reveals, "were still 
feeling their way around" - would surely have been unreasonable and, in 
any case, incorrect. To have credited them with a 'consciousness' that 
supposedly led them to spearhead the 'radicalization' (whatever this 
might imply) of Indian politics in Natal in the 1940's is to engage in 
an ex-post-facto romanticization of their role.
In short, we would concede that there was a distinct shift in the 
predominantly accomodationist, merchant-dominated class politics of the 
pre-1945 NIA/NIC, to ostensibly more militant, aggressive and less 
accomodationist politics of the post-1945 period. But this is insuf­
ficient ground to characterize the shift as 'radicalization'.^ 
For radicalization, in our view, would be akin to the class politics of 
a working class movement. Ginwala's failure to clearly define the 
class content of the NB, ASC, post-1945 NIC politics and her assertion 
that the 'radicalization' was primarily the result of a rising working 
class consciousness, leaves room for some to conclude from her work 
that this was indeed a working class politics. We would argue that not­
157.
withstanding the importance of this break (shift) from the stranglehold 
of merchant dominated politics and the support these new progressive 
policies received from the Indian working class that it was in no way a 
working class politics. The distinction is, in our view, more than 
just semantic. Furthermore, the shift to less accomodationist politics 
rested fatally (for both the political movements and the unions) upon 
the shoulders of a hard core of dedicated and overextended individuals, 
including some trades unionists, acting together in loosely structured 
committees such as the NB and the ASC without a conscious, 
disciplined, organized and complementary thrust from Indian workers 
acting as a class. Finally, we would argue that the development of a 
working class consciousness presupposes, as a minimum condition, the 
establishment of sound democratic structures within working class 
organizations. Such structures would be essential to provide the 
channel for rank and file workers to assert themselves in the process 
of developing their own class-based politics rather than being 
subjected to the politics of organisations outside their class 
interests. Crucial and essential democratic structures of this nature 
were, as we have noted already, glaringly absent in the unions of the 
1930’s and 1940’s.
5.5 The Role of Indian Political Organizations in the Origins 
of Trades Unions.
We turn now to examine the role of Indian political organizations (and 
factions) in the origins and growth of trades unions in Durban in the 
1930's and 1940's. We have seen already that the "radical" wing of the 
NIA (the nationalist bloc) had, from about 1940, set about the 
'mobilization' of Indian workers. However, this 'mobilization', which 
took the form of meetings and rallies throughout Durban/Natal, 
reflected only an awareness of the pre-requisites for this faction’s 
political campaign. These included the need for mass support, and 
revolved around their political demands rather than worker politics or 
trades union issues. We have not found evidence to suggest that any of 
the Indian political organizations or factions in this period were - as
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organizations - directly linked with the establishment of Indian trades 
unions. Thus the formation of these unions occurred independently of 
Indian political organizations which contrasts with, for example, the 
role the NIC played in initiating the Natal Workers' Congress in 1928. 
Both AKM Docrat and Billy Peters confirmed this view. Mr Docrat 
explains, "The nationalist bloc/ASC never interfered with the 
workings of the trade unions. We never directed them to do anything 
except support our political platforms." And Billy Peters 
comments, °  "We did not anticipate or expect anything from the 
post-1945 Congress but that they continue their political work."
Many individual members of Indian political organisations/factions 
were, however, prominent trades unionists at this time. These 
individuals, such as RD Naidu, Billy Peters, HA Naidoo, G Ponen and 
others (some of whom were also members of the Durban District Branch of 
the CPSA), worked extremely hard and at great personal cost in setting 
up and organising many of the new non-racial industrial unions formed 
in Durban from the late 1930's. However, developments on the political 
front, especially from about 1942/3, appear to have affected their 
commitment to these unions. From 1943, the year the 'Pegging Act' was 
proposed, and with the repercussions of the Dunlop strike still fresh 
in their minds, the trades unionists in the NB/ASC found themselves 
increasingly concentrating on inter-class political struggles at the 
expense of shop-floor or organizational work in their unions. As Hemson 
comments:
At a time when Indian traders and land owners were 
coming under increasing pressure from the state, 
political mobilization in the struggles against 
segregation of the Indian community sub-ordinated Indian 
trades unions and workers to the defence of the Indian 
petty-bourgeoisie.(1979, p.339)
Many of the trades unionists who were closely linked to the NB/ASC/CPSA 
began to view workers' struggles as part of broader political 
struggles. In particular, the campaign against the segregation of
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Indians, and more generally, the nationwide campaigns against the 
segregationist policies of the state were seen in this light. Those 
trades unionists committed to the campaign assisted in the task of 
'politicizing' workers in an effort to win greater mass support for 
these policies. In these crucial (and still early) years, concrete 
organisational work in the unions was neglected in favour of such 
political campaigning.
The failure of the Dunlop strike (following the extremely 
intransigent policies of the state and of capital to non-racial worker 
resistance) "accentuated the tendency for political activists in the 
Indian community to be diverted from working class organisations 
towards political action in the defence of the Indian community" 
(Hemson 1979, p. 339). This kind of political action dominated the 
period 1942/3-1945 - but even after the 1945 takeover of the NIC by the 
'progressive or radical* ASC faction the relationship between this NIC, 
workers and unions did not change fundamentally.2® Clearly, too, 
this NIC was not an 'official1 or even de facto organ of the Indian 
working class. Billy Peters observes2  ^ "we [in the ASC] did not 
want the Congress to be only a working class organization. We wanted 
it to be a Congress of the entire Indian community."
5.6 The Communist Party and Trades Unionism in Durban
Burrows has suggested22 that the growth of Indian trades unions 
owed "much to the active communist element amongst workers and to the 
left wing sections of the Indian political bodies". Johnson comments 
"by the late 1930's the [communist] Party had considerable influence 
amongst the Indian working classes in Natal" (1973, p.47). And Ginwala 
writes "the links between the CPSA and Indian trade unions had grown 
as Indian workers alienated from the Indian leaders found assistance 
from communists in the techniques of trade union organization" 
(1974, p. 415).
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These unequivocal statements give rise to a number of critical 
questions. What, then, was the role of the CPSA? What part did it 
play in the growth of trades unionism among Indian workers in Durban? 
What form did this take? And what were the consequences for the unions 
of CPSA assistance? These are the issues we will now examine.
While the African membership of the Durban district branch of the CPSA 
almost disappeared by the mid 1930's following police action,33 the 
Party began to attract a number of young Indians to its ranks. HA 
Naidoo and George Ponen, who Eddie Roux recruited in 1934/35, were the 
first two Indians to join the party,34 and they were joined within 
the next few years by DA Seedat, MP Naicker, Cassim Amra and Billy 
Peters among others. Some of these men were soon to take up positions 
as secretaries/organizers of the new trades unions that were formed in
Durban in the late 1930's and 1940's. Many also became active members
of the 'radical' or progressive wings of Indian political 
organizations.
The entry of these men into the trades unions and political 
organizations in Durban was, as Billy Peters points out,33
influenced by the political education they received in the Party which, 
by that time, had come to accept "the primacy of the national 
liberatory struggle", (Pahad, 1972, p. 243)3S and hence the
importance of inter-racial co-operation and organization. The growth 
of trades unions among African, Indian and Coloured workers in the main 
centres of the country at this time offered new possibilities and sites 
for such co-operation. How, then, did these policies affect
developments in the trades union movement in Durban? Billy Peters,
who, between 1943-46 was the secretary of the Durban district branch of 
the CPSA, observes that "most of the trade union secretaries were CP
members. Without the guidance of the CP there would have been no
unions. Where would the knowledge and inspiration have come 
from."J And RD Naidu, also a Party member at this time, states
that "we in the CP had considerable influence on the trade unions
■5 Qexecutive committees." However, as Hemson points out "Although
the CP provided the stimulus and resources for these unions there was
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little central direction and control and a variety of tendencies 
developed," (1979, p.336) particularly when the organization of African 
workers was concerned, which ran counter to the rhetoric of CPSA 
policy, e.g. the formation of parallel unions for African workers in 
some unions 'under CP influence'. And not all the unions in existence 
in Durban at this time came under CP influence. Unions in the garment 
and furniture industries, to name just two, which employed significant 
numbers of Indian workers remained throughout this period outside the 
influence of the party. These unions strongly resisted any moves 
towards the pursuit of more 'radical' objectives2® and were 
actually opposed to closer co-operation between Indian and African 
workers.40
In the case of many other unions, despite the fact that they might have 
been led by CP members, and notwithstanding the 'inspiration and 
guidance' that these members received from the Party, it seems clear 
from the evidence we have heard that the party exercised little further 
influence - either structurally or in organizational terms. Billy 
Peters, for example, was careful to point out that although many trades 
union secretaries/organizers were CP members, these individuals had to 
abide by the constitutions of their unions and that this took 
precedence over any outside influence.4  ^ (We have, however, noted 
already that shortcomings in the constitutions of many of these unions 
made it relatively simple for political intervention to occur.)
Given the influences implied, the question which arises concerns the 
nature of the 'guidance or influence' which the CP provided in the 
origins and growth of (Indian) trades unions in Durban at the time. It 
would appear that much of this guidance to the organization and 
activities of trades unions was channelled through the Industrial 
Secretariat42 - a sub-committee of the Durban District branch of 
the Party. The functions of this secretariat were:
i. to help in the formation of unions,-
ii. to assist party members who were trades union officials in the 
preparation of speeches;
iii. to provide speakers for trades union meetings;
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iv. to assist in the distribution of Party literature - including 
pamphlets on trades union organization and administration45
v. to liaise with unions in which Party members were involved in order 
to obtain information on, to co-ordinate and to publicize the day to 
day struggles of workers; and
vi. to organize courses in political economy for 'interested persons'.
The extent to which the Party, via the Industrial Secretariat, actually 
assisted unions in these ways is unclear. Certainly, if there was a 
well co-ordinated effort at implementing these functions, the Party 
would have had considerable influence over the affairs, objectives and 
strategies of the trades unions. As we shall attempt to show shortly, 
we are not convinced that the Party had either the resources or the 
commitment to the class politics of the working class to have had a 
significant impact on the development and direction of working class 
organizations in Durban during this period. It cannot be denied, 
however, that individual members of the CP, including HA Naidoo, PM 
Harry, Billy Peters and RD Naidu had played, in the late 1930's and 
early 1940's, a prominent role in the revival or establishment of some 
trades unions. And the distribution of pamphlets on union organization 
such as those prepared by Party members44 may have been useful to 
local union organizers. But we would argue that there were several 
factors that militated against the Durban District Branch of the CPSA 
playing any more constructive or influential role in the organization 
and development of an independent trade union movement or in raising 
working class consciousness in Durban at this time - more especially 
after 1940.
First, despite Johnson's claim that the party had "considerable 
influence" in the Indian working class by the late 1930's, AKM Docrat, 
then a Party member, claims that the active membership of the Party in 
Durban at this time was too small to have effectively achieved such 
widespread influence. "There were only a few CP members - perhaps two 
dozen - and the CP in Durban had no fundamental say or influence on the 
unions or in the political struggles of the Indians."45 One cannot 
simply assume, as Johnson appears to have done, an instrumental
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link between membership of the Party by those few individuals and their 
influence over the mass of Indian workers. For besides the limited 
numerical strength, there were other factors which constrained their 
influence over Indian workers. For one, the very background and 
traditions from which the workers had only recently come would have 
been a major obstacle to the process of raising class consciousness 
among them - a fact which Billy Peters alluded to in a quotation given 
earlier (p.150). And in organisational terms neither the Party nor the 
unions had established the kind of worker education programmes which 
would have been essential to achieve success in this direction. The 
courses in political economy organized by the Party were conducted at 
night and were pitched at a fairly advanced level46 being directed 
mainly at a few Party members and at trades union secretaries (many of 
whom were Party members already) . This meant that few rank and file 
workers ever attended the programmes. In their public rallies the CP 
concentrated their efforts almost exclusively on demands for democratic 
rights, mobilising support for the war effort (after 1941), on 
countering black marketeering, etc47 - and hardly ever, except in 
their rhetoric, on issues which affected workers as a class.
Secondly, because the 'influence' of the CP appears to have been 
largely channelled via the efforts of individuals such as HA Naidoo, 
George Ponen, MP Naicker and Billy Peters, this influence - in 
whatever limited form it took - declined from about 1942/3 as these 
very same men began increasingly to concentrate on the political 
struggle being waged against segregation in the Indian community 
following the 'Pegging Act'. As Hemson notes "the emphasis shifted 
from working class organizations - in particular from the organizations 
of unregistered non-racial trade unions towards political action in 
defence of the Indian community" (1979, p.339).
And it must be understood that those Indians who joined the CP at that 
time did so more on the basis of the Party's non-racial character and 
expressed aim48 of ending racial oppression rather than on the 
basis of a commitment to socialism. Though some of the leading Indian
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CP members in the union movement were fairly knowledgeable on the 
principles and goals of 'Marxism-Leninism' and saw socialism as the 
ultimate objective of the struggle, the immediate and pressing issues 
were related to racial segregation and discrimination. Billy Peters, 
in commenting on his decision to join the Party in 1938, states that 
"it dawned on me to join an organization which, come what may, would 
get rid of discrimination. I couldn't tolerate it." He adds:
Do the workers of South Africa want socialism? Precisely 
no. What do they want? They want a slice of the pie.
That means that there was room for creative capitalism 
- we asked for a democratic South Africa. We know that 
the ultimate goal was socialism but we did not confuse 
the workers.
Given these goals and strategies, it is not surprising that when the 
forced segregation of Indians was proposed in 1943, the skills and 
efforts of these CP trades unionists began to be directed to the 
political struggle being waged by the NB/ASC - of which many trades 
unionists were members - against the moderate Indian political 
leadership, which appeared set on accepting some form of (voluntary) 
segregation. George Ponen, at the CP's 1943/44 conference,
specifically called upon the Party to support "the campaign against the 
'Pegging Act' which restricts Natal Indians from buying land in
ACkso-called European areas".
Thirdly, we would argue that any direct organizational assistance to 
workers and their unions from the Party or its members based on clear 
class lines and support for working class action, was affected by the 
Party's adoption of a broad multi-class anti-fascist popular 
f r o n t . A n d  especially, after the entry of the Soviet Union into 
the war, the CP concentrated on mobilising support for the war effort.
Thus on strikes, for example, the Party's policy as set out at its 
1943/44 conference was "towards a peaceful settlement of disputes and 
avoiding of any strikes or any other action that will hinder the war
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effort" (p.5) Hence the Guardian, which closely reflected the policy 
of the CP, initially did not support the strike action of African 
dockers in Durban in July 1942, and described the workers as being 
"engaged on vital work for the war effort and their refusal to work 
meant a serious hold up for the many ships tied up at the quaysides in 
the Bay".51
The CP concern that any working class action should not impede the war 
effort is even more dramatically revealed by its reaction to the strike
COof African and Indian workers at Dunlop in December 1942. The
secretary of the union concerned, the Natal Rubber Workers' Industrial 
Union, Mannie Peltz, was a member of the Durban District branch of the 
CPSA. And although Billy Peters,55 who in early 1943 became
secretary of this branch, accepts that workers were "being exploited", 
the Party was clearly opposed to the strike called by Peltz in protest 
against the imposition of a company union in the factory. This 
opposition held despite the fact that CP members served on the strike 
committee and rallied to the support of workers after the strike was 
called. At the meeting called on 17 January 1943 in support of these 
workers, both HA Naidoo and G Ponen, who were leading members of the 
Party, emphasized the possible damage the strike could have on the war 
effort. (They publicly blamed the Department of Labour for the 
problems at Dunlop). However, after the strike was over, a 'commission 
of enquiry' was set up by this branch to investigate the reasons for 
the strike and its failure. Billy Peters was chairman of the
'commission'. The commission found that Peltz had not exercised all 
the avenues of negotiation before calling the workers out on strike. 
According to Billy Peters, the commission was informed that Peltz had 
apparently sent a telegram to the Minister of Labour, Mr Madeley, 
explaining the workers' grievances, but upon not receiving a reply 
speedily, had led the workers into strike action. It emerged that 
neither the workers, nor the CP, nor the local committee of the SATLC 
had been kept sufficiently informed about these developments/ 
negotiations with the Minister. Billy Peters is clear on the point 
that if the Party had been informed there would not have been a strike. 
The Party would have pressed the Minister to intervene and Peters is
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confident that the Minister would have done so, especially as the 
industry was supplying material (rubber products) vital to the war 
effort. Peters regards Peltz's action as a "serious administrative 
weakness" and as far as the Party was concerned the matter was an 
"unforgiveable omission". No action was taken against Peltz, for as 
Peters observes, the enquiry was just for "future guidance". What 
emerges from this is the CP's preoccupation with ensuring that the 'war 
effort' was not jeopardized even though the issue of company unionism 
that was at the heart of the dispute represented a serious threat to 
the independence and development of working class organizations.
The effect on the unions of the political struggles in the Indian 
’community' and the CP's preoccupation with the 'war effort' is further 
illustrated in the following example. DA Seedat, secretary of the 
Indian Shop Assistants Union, a member of the CPSA and of the 
nationalist bloc of the NIA, actually apologized at a meeting of this 
union for "his inactivity in the union", owing to his efforts having 
been directed "towards other movements" (Indian Views 13/03/42). And 
commenting on the war, Seedat, at the same meeting, stated that unions 
should be strengthened to protect workers and to "guide them 
[presumably the workers] in the present catastrophe that the peoples of 
the world are plunged into". This reveals much about the priorities of 
the 'struggle' as seen from the perspective of a Party member in 1942.
Thus while the CP-inspired leadership of many of these unions continued 
to hold office throughout the war years, their diversion into questions 
outside the immediate concerns of working class and trades union 
politics and the subsequently diminished support of the CPSA in the 
defence and development of working class organisations meant that the 
vitally important task of establishing sound democratic organisational 
structures and a shop floor leadership in the relatively new unions, 
suffered a serious setback. When the mask of "official benevolence" 
(Hemson, 1979, p 319)^4 towards working class organisation and 
their actions, (motivated to some extent by the prerequisites of the 
war-economy) was dropped, the inherent structural weaknesses of the 
unions was exposed. The unions which some of these leaders had worked
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so hard to set up, continued to depend narrowly on their leadership and 
direction.
The consequences for the union movement in Durban of the state's 
"harassment" of CP members and sympathisers were to prove disastrous. 
AKM Docrat observes that the lack of shop floor leadership meant that 
when these leaders were later "named or listed", a large part of the 
union movement became defunct. Police action against these individuals 
began well before the Suppression of Communism Act was passed in 1950. 
The Guardian reports (26/9/46) that George Ponen, secretary of the 
Tobacco Workers' Union (Durban) and of the Tea, Coffee and Chicory 
Employees' Union, had all his union files, books and even receipt books 
confiscated, and the homes and offices of other prominent CP and local 
trades union figures including Errol Shanley, MP Naicker and MD Naidoo 
were raided and had materials removed from them. Numerous similar 
reports of police action against CP trades unionists in the years that 
followed were reported in the Guardian and Forward newspapers. On 20 
June 1950, the CPSA disbanded before the Suppression of Communism Act 
was passed. After this date and the passing of the Act, many trades 
unionists who were suspected of having been CP members were forced to 
resign their positions in the unions under the provisions of the
ECAct'-' which embodied the state's avowed intention "to ensure that 
Communists are not appointed to key posts in the union movement".55
This affected local trades unionists including Cassim Amra, who was 
the secretary of three unions,57 SV Reddy, an official of the 
Howick Rubber Workers' Union and of the Tin Workers' Union; TE Bhoola 
of the Tin Workers' Union;58 RD Naidu, Billy Peters, G Ponen (who 
was an official of numerous unions), MP Naicker, DA Seedat, MD Naidoo 
and Errol Shanley.59 These 'namings' or 'listings’ occurred 
throughout the 1950's and 1960's. Some, including Ponen, GG Naidoo and 
MP Naicker later left the country and went into exile overseas. 
Alexander and Simons write that those 'named' or 'listed' trades 
unionists "included some of the most energetic and capable organisers. 
One might add that they were also the staunchest advocates of equality 
and unity between workers of different racial groups and the most 
uncompromising opponents of government policy” (1959, p.17).
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Such state action, along with the failure to establish the foundations 
and traditions of democratic structures and the absence of a 
disciplined shop or factory-floor leadership, led to many of the unions 
which were formed or revived in the period since the late 1930's under 
the leadership of these individuals becoming effectively defunct. Some 
were deregistered. Others were taken over by a more 'moderate' 
leadership which, in the repressive atmosphere of the time, followed 
what Billy Peters calls the "path of least resistance", not daring to 
utter any statement or pursue any line of action which might have led 
to their arrest or listing. The decline in trades union activity and 
organisation in Durban that followed these developments is illustrated 
in the report submitted by Anna Scheepers to the National Executive 
Committee of the National Union of Cigarette and Tobacco Workers after 
she visited Durban in August 1951. In the report Ms Scheepers records 
that
from recent discussions I have had with trade union 
leaders I have come to the conclusion that there is a 
great need for organisation in general in the Durban 
area. There are branches there of a number of trade 
unions which have almost become defunct and others which 
are not functioning at all..."
and Mr Alec Wanless who is the honourary secretary of the
Sweet Workers Union informs me that the branch of the 
Sweet Workers Union exists in name only.^®
After a meeting with George Ponen (secretary of the Durban branch of 
the National Union of Cigarette and Tobacco Workers) Ms Scheepers 
explained to Ponen that "the NEC was not satisfied with the lack of 
organization and also that the NEC did not receive the information 
required from this branch in terms of the constitution (1951, p.2).
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SP Pillay recollects^1 that the following unions were 
de-registered, became defunct, or existed in name only after or by 
1950: Tea, Coffee and Chicory Industry Employees' Union; Broom and 
Brush Workers' Union; Soap and Candle Workers' Union (Durban Branch); 
Paint, Polish and Varnish Workers' Union; Twine and Bag Workers' Union; 
Rope and Mat Workers' Union; Brick and Tile Workers' Union; Sweet 
Workers' Union (Durban Branch); SA Brewery Workers' Union and the 
Mineral Water Workers' Union.
Even those unions with a leadership not suspected of being CP members 
or sympathizers (such as the Garment Workers' Industrial Union (Natal) 
and the Furniture Workers' Industrial Union (Natal)) were affected by 
these developments. Like the Durban Indian Municipal Employees' 
Society and the National Baking Industry Employees' Union (Natal), 
which were taken over by a 'less militant' leadership, these unions 
later affiliated to the 'moderate' Trade Union Council of South Africa 
(TUCSA) - a union federation which grew out of the dissolution in 1954 
of the South African Trades and Labour Council. It was a federation 
which, by accepting the principles of the Industrial Conciliation Act 
on the exclusion of African workers and the formation of separate 
parallel unions for Whites and 'non-whites' (Coloured and Indian), set 
the seal on the further racial division of the South African working 
class. In general, we would argue that these unions responded to the 
political pressures of the time by withdrawing further into their 
bureaucratic shells. They did so not because they were less political 
but because their lack of democratic structures and practices made them 
easily see the 'wisdom' of abandoning any pretence at militancy and of 
settling down to the business of 'defending their unions'.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY, ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
Sporadic instances of resistance and attempts at forming trades unions 
by Indian workers certainly occurred in the period before 1930. 
However, it was after the Great Depression, following rapid 
urbanization and their absorption into industrial wage employment that 
increasing numbers of Indian workers formed or joined trades unions.
Indian employment increased most notably in secondary industries such 
as food, clothing, textiles, metal and engineering and furniture, as 
well as in commercial and some service sectors, although the wage rates 
applicable to their mainly semi-skilled jobs were low and the threat of 
unemployment remained a serious problem, even through the early years 
of the war. These changed economic conditions had important 
implications for the newly proletarianised Indian workers in the 
Greater Durban area. For industrialization, urbanization, skill 
acquisition and the general instability of their economic and social 
conditions led directly to the formation (by the emerging Indian 
working class) of defensive organizations which would express directly, 
the demands and aspirations - however tentative - of this class.
Changes in the labour process, which saw the increasing use of semi­
skilled operatives, coupled with the racially exclusive policies of the 
mainly white skilled workers in craft unions such as the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union, led some newly proletarianized workers to form 
industrial unions on a non-racial basis in order to protect their 
interests. Other unions were mainly Indian in composition. The 
strength of organisation across industries was often weak as some 
unions (such as the Natal Rubber Workers Industrial union) were heavily 
concentrated in one or two factories. In addition, the lack of a clear 
CPSA policy (the CPS A provided some of the stimulus to unionism in 
Durban in the late 1930’s) on the development of non-racial unionism, 
and the response of the state and capital to non-racial worker 
resistance created the conditions that led to divisions in working 
class organisation and resistance in Durban, especially after the
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failure of the Dunlop strike of 1942/3. In some cases unregistered 
non-racial unions succumbed to these pressures by forming separate 
parallel unions for Africans.
As many as 68 trades unions with Indian membership existed in the 
period 1930-1950. Many of these unions had a short-lived existence. 
In some industries unions were formed, went defunct and were then 
revived under new names, so that the figure of 68 unions represents an 
element of double or even multiple counting. In 1943, 34 trades unions 
with Indian members existed in Durban. Both in terms of size (number 
of members) and numbers (number of unions per industry) unions with 
Indian membership were concentrated in the food and services sectors as 
well as in clothing and textiles.
Our analysis of the structure of these unions and their potential for 
broad-based control and democracy - factors which we consider of 
fundamental importance in the evaluation of the historical role of 
(Indian) workers and their organizations - revealed that many of these 
unions in Natal in the 1930's and 1940's lacked adequate and democratic 
constitutional structures. Two major organizational problems emerged 
from our analysis of the constitutions of these unions. These related 
to the failure to incorporate shop stewards in any meaningful sense 
into the structure of the unions and the absence of concrete links 
between the factory floor and the various union committees. 
Consequently a broad-based and diffused leadership structure, extending 
from the shop floor into the union, responding to worker interests and 
with a greater sense of accountability to this base was almost entirely 
absent in many of these unions. It is our contention, arising from 
this study, that only when shop-floor representatives of rank and file 
workers are integrated, as leaders, into every level of the 
deliberative and decision-making process of the union, would it be 
possible to begin promoting higher levels of democratic practice and 
consciousness. However, it is not simply our criticism that because of 
the structural limitations of these unions they were unable to evince 
democratic and informed practices in the rank and file. Our principal 
criticism is that the absence of clear democratic procedures militated
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against the independent class activity of this working class and 
subsumed its capacity to act under organizational and political 
precepts unrepresentative of the objective demands of this nascent 
working class movement, except on general questions. Thus our 
assessment was not primarily concerned with whether unions acted 
constitutionally or not but with the consequences of clearly less than 
democratic internal structures for independent working class 
development, action and strategy.
These consequences are most evident from our analysis of worker action 
in this period. Although we attempted to provide as complete a 
schedule of Black (ie. including Indian) worker action in Natal in this 
period as possible, we concentrated most closely on three major strikes 
involving Indian workers, viz. the Falkirk, Dunlop and Laundry workers 
strikes of 1937, 1942/3 and 1945/6 respectively. We have, in Chapter 
4, already assessed these strikes in terms of the various issues to 
which they gave rise. In particular, our analysis was directed towards 
understanding the implications of the form of working class militancy 
at this time for the future of non-racial industrial unionism in 
Durban. The reaction of craft unions, the state and capital to such 
working class action was also assessed, as was the role of 
organisations such as the SATLC, CPSA and the various Indian political 
groups, in support of working class struggles. The major conclusion 
which emerged was that the development of an independent non-racial 
movement at this time was both suppressed and stunted by a combination 
of factors. Capital's response to the growth of unions and of working 
class activity was particularly severe. And although the peculiar 
demands of a war-time economy forced the state to adopt a somewhat 
mediatory role, its actions and policies were, nevertheless, generally 
inimical to workers and their representative organisations. Structural 
incongruities within the SATLC and the inability of this union 
federation to resolve internal conflicts on the question of non-racial 
unionism further limited the growth of a strong, united and disciplined 
working class movement. Moreover, the nature and form of the 
intervention by certain (Indian) political organizations and the 
theoretical and political view (on unions) by some union leaders
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undermined the independence of worker organisation and resistance in 
this period. Most importantly, however, the organisational structure 
and capacity of these unions left little possibility for the rank and 
file to assert themselves. The limitations referred to in Chapter 3, 
ie., the absence of clear democratic structures in the unions of this 
period and of a dynamic relationship between the membership and their 
leaders in relation to the specific' issues of the time, militated 
against the internal cohesiveness of the unions' actions and resulted 
almost directly in their subordination to the policies of political 
organisations such as the Kajee-NIC, which were often at variance with 
working class priorities and even interests. There was therefore an 
infusion of the class ideology of the Indian petty bourgeoisie and 
trader classes into the programme of these unions and this was possible 
precisely because of the nature and level of the structural development 
of many of the unions of this period. However, we do not wish to imply 
that the mere existence of such democratic structures within unions 
will magically resolve questions about the long-term development and 
historical role of the working class. For a whole range of 
conjunctural factors (such as those which we have just mentioned in 
relation to the experience of worker organisations in Durban in the 
1930's and 1940's) are likely to affect the capacity to which working 
class organisation and resistance may proceed, whether or not 
democratic structures exist. But is is our contention that a 
fundamental, minimal consideration in the advancement of a working 
class movement is the presence of those democratic internal structures 
and shop-floor leadership which would begin to enhance and support its 
organising capacity and the development of its own class-based 
politics.
In Chapter 5 of this study we examined aspects of the relationship 
between Indian workers, their unions and the political organisations of 
the time, including the CPSA and the NIC/NIA. Our analysis revealed 
that while the resources and initial impetus for unionism came from 
leading members of the Durban branch of the CPSA, various factors 
limited the nature and form of the CP's role in the advancement of 
independent working class organisation and resistance and in raising
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worker consciousness. The organisational strength and capacity of the 
Durban District branch of the CP was extremely limited. In addition, 
there was an increasing concentration by the mainly Indian CP trade 
unionists after 1942/3 on the political struggles being waged against 
the segregation of Indians, to the detriment of organisational work in 
their unions. Moreover, the adoption by the CP of a broad multi-class 
anti-fascist popular front and their subsequent concern that working 
class action should not impede the war effort led them to oppose 
strikes and other instances of worker action. This policy of the CP 
was clearly in conflict with the interests and development of the 
working class, as some of the issues that led to strike action 
represented a serious threat to the independence and organisation of 
the working class.
We found no evidence to suggest that Indian political organisations or 
factions in this period were directly linked as organisations with the 
establishment of (Indian) trades unions. However, many individual 
members of Indian political organisations were prominent in leadership 
positions in the trades unions. From c1943, the year the "Pegging Act" 
was proposed, these trades unionists (many of whom were also members of 
the Durban CPSA) found themselves increasingly concentrating on 
inter-class political struggles at the expense of shop-floor or 
organisational work in their unions. Many of these unionists who were 
closely associated with the Nationalist Bloc/Anti-Segregationist 
Counci1/CPSA began to view workers struggles as part of broader 
political struggles - in particular the campaign against the proposed 
segregation of Indians and in general the campaign against the racial 
policies of the government. In these crucial years, concrete 
organisational work in the unions was neglected in favour of such 
political campaigning.
It has been contended (Ginwala, 1974) that the realignment 
('radicalisation') in Indian political forces in this period, which 
culminated in the take-over of the NIC by the 'radical' wing of this 
organisation was achieved primarily by the growth of trades unions and 
of 'working class consciousness*. Our enquiry suggests that while
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there was a distinct and important shift from the predominantly 
merchant-dominated class politics of the pre-1945 NIC to an ostensibly 
more militant, aggressive and less accommodationist politics of the 
post-1945 NIC, these are insufficient grounds to characterise the shift 
as a radicalisation, for radicalisation in our view would be akin to 
the class politics of a working class movement. Clearly this is not 
what occurred in this period. Neither (we discovered) was this shift 
initiated or developed within working class forums. For Ginwala to 
have credited these newly proletarianised Indian workers with a 
consciousness that supposedly led them to spearhead the radicalisation 
(whatever that might imply) of Indian politics in Natal in the 1940's 
is to engage in an ex-post romanticisation of their role. The 
emergence of an Indian working class and their resistance to 
exploitation, which took the form of joining trades unions and 
engaging in direct action in support of their demands for higher wages 
and better working conditions is in itself insufficient evidence of 
their consciousness. For class consciousness is not an intrinsic, 
self-evident or necessary characteristic of a working class, but simply 
a potential that may or may not be realised. We would argue that the 
development of working class consciousness (that is, of the identity of 
workers as a class in opposition to capital and with a vision/programme 
of an alternative society) is closely tied to the existence of a 
disciplined working class movement, democratic in its content, 
controlled by its members and with a clearly defined class perspective. 
The absence of generalised democratic structures, of adequate worker 
education programmes, the ease with which union actions and strategies 
were infused with the petty-bourgeois politics of Indian political 
organisations and the ill-defined politics of the CPSA (ostensibly the 
party of the working class) were among the factors which together acted 
in a way that limited, constrained, impeded, repressed, in short, 
controlled the development of a working class consciousness amongst 
these newly proletarianized Indian workers. We are of course not 
suggesting that the coinciding presence of these factors would in 
themselves be sufficient to generate class consciousness. Those 
factors or conditions that inform a class conscious proletariat have 
not been examined specifically in this' study.^ We are here simply
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pointing to those factors which are likely to have constrained or 
controlled the development of the class consciousness of Indian workers 
in this period.
Our criticism of the nature of the relationship between trades unions 
and political organisations in this period (and the consequences of 
this intervention) does not at all imply that in our view unions should 
remain apolitical (i.e. concerning themselves with securing their 
pecuniary demands only) or that unions are incapable of political 
action. The crucial issue turns on the theory and content of this 
politics, and the programmatic demands expressed by the concrete 
practice of working class organisations, including trades unions. The 
fact that a working class politics failed to emerge over this period we 
have studied resulted from the limitations, both structural and 
political, of the organisations that ostensibly represented working 
class interests. We have already dealt extensively with the structural 
limitations. The political limitations flowed from the particular 
content of the politics and political campaigns workers were asked to 
support - a content that related to protests against trading and 
residential segregation and the demands for general (bourgeois) 
democratic rights.
In a sense this kind of "politicising" Indian unions may for some 
analysts represent an advance from the sterility of economism. But 
this advance (even if we were to concede that it was one) must be 
viewed from the point of view of the class aspirations and class 
independence of this nascent working class. What attitude should the 
working class have had towards this kind of politics? Under what terms 
should they have supported these political programmes and at what cost 
to their class aspirations? These issues which we consider vital to 
the politics of the working class were never addressed.
Two final points need to be made. First, we should like to make clear 
that the criticisms we have levelled against the leadership of many of 
the unions of this period have not been made on moral grounds. We do 
not doubt the immense input of many of these leaders. Their untiring
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efforts and dedication to the social and economic upliftraent of 
(Indian) workers and to the political causes they espoused is 
abundantly clear from our research, especially from our interviews with 
men such as Billy Peters, RD Naidu and SP Pillay, who sacrificed so 
much for what they believed in.
Secondly, there may be those who would argue that our analysis of these 
developments in the 1930's and 1940's has been made with the wisdom of 
historical hindsight and that we appear to have expected more from 
workers and their leaders than was objectively possible given the 
relative undevelopment of this proletariat and the complexity of the 
conditions under which their struggles were conducted. We would reject 
such a charge for at least two reasons. In the first instance, because 
we would concur with Raphael Samuels' view that:
Meaning is only made manifest retrospectively and this 
is not only a matter of knowing what happened - the 
historians peculiar if sometimes ambiguous advantage of 
hindsight but also of being able to offer new 
interrogations of the past on the basis of present day 
pre-occupations and experience. (1981, pp.xlv/xlvi)
We would argue in addition that there is no optimal or predictable set 
of conditions that determine the potential for working class 
organisations and resistance,^ and that, for example, greater 
attention to the building of democratic organisational structures may, 
(notwithstanding the complexity of the prevailing circumstances) not 
only have been possible but may have buttressed these unions against 
the pressures they needed to cope with in the post-war period. It is 
on the basis of these views, that our critical analysis of this 
particular category of labour and its representative organisations has 
been made. And yet despite this we hope not to have underplayed those 
constraints that (i) shaped the nature and form of working class 
organisation and resistance and (ii) determined the form of workers 
influence on the realignment of (Indian) political forces in this 
period.
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Introduction
Footnotes
1. The terms "race”, "race group", or racially based descriptive 
nomenclature such as "Indian", "Coloured", and "African" are used 
in this report only because they are unavoidable in the South 
Afri-can context, e.g. in referring to legislation or when quoting 
from other sources; or where it is necessary for the purpose of 
clarity of meaning to distinguish between such "groups". The term 
"Black" will be used to describe- Africans, Coloureds and Indians 
collectively. This usage in no way implies that the authors or the 
Institute for Social and Economic Research accept the racist 
connotations of such terms.
2. Guardian 23/10/41.
3. Guardian 21/1/41.
4. Guardian 21/1/41
Chapter 1 1
1. See e.g. Legassick (1977); de Kiewiet (1951).
2. See e.g. Marks and Atmore (1980).
3. Swan [Tayal] (1978).
4. This was necessitated by the structural limits placed on surplus 
value production arising from considerations such as the prevalence 
of low grade ore, the cost of machinery and equipment and the fixed 
price of gold.
5: Indian Opinion 9/6/1906; 11/05/1907; 28/01/1911; 04/03/1911.
6. See Chapter 2 of this study for details on this point.
7. African workers were excluded from the definition of employee laid
down in the Industrial Conciliation Act and thus could not belong 
to registered trades unions. As a result unions with White,
'Coloured' or Indian membership (or some combination thereof) that 
wished to register but had an African membership could form a 
"parallel" African union to overcome these problems of 
registration. Such parallel African unions may have been 
administered jointly with the registered union.
8. Report of the Department of Labour (1945) UG 9 1947, p.19.
9. A schematic outline of the major trades union federations in South 
Africa (1910-1964) is presented in Appendix B.
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Chapter 2
1. Various aspects of the early history of Indians in Natal are dealt 
with in the following works (among others): Ginwala (1974); Swan
(1980); Ferguson-Davie (1977); Palmer (1957); Arkin (1981); Choonoo 
(1967); Burrows HR (1952); Joshi (1942); Pachai (1971).
2. See pp.22-26 of this chapter for details on this point.
3. Burrows JR (1959, p.6)
4. Burrows HR (1940, p.29)
5. Ginwala (1974, pp.55-60) and Padayachee and Haines (1982, 
pp.18-19).
6. Burrows HR (1952, p.12). The remainder were classified as 'domestic 
and dependent'.
7. See Swan [Tayal] (1984) for details on the Natal strike of 1913.
8. Burrows HR (1952, p.15)
9. Burrows HR (1952, p.21)
10. Reports of the Protector of Indian Immigrants (various issues 
1924-1933).
11. Indian Opinion 14/12/34.
12. For the growing manufacturing sector a more pliable and docile 
working force was essential. In general, the strategy was to 
weaken the working class as a whole by entrenching racial divisions 
within its ranks. Thus the Industrial Conciliation Act (1924), the 
Apprenticeship Act (1922) etc. all aimed at incorporating White 
workers in a complex system of official bargaining and arbitration 
while African workers were excluded. (See Innes, 1984, pp.127-128).
13. Report of the Industrial Legislation Commission (1951, p.4).
14. Bozzoli (1972, p.210).
15. Lewis (1982, p.478)
16. Official Yearbooks of the Union of South Africa (various issues).
17. official Yearbooks of the Union of South Africa (various issues).
18. Official Yearbooks of the Union of South Africa (various issues).
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19. Katzen M (1961, p.132).
20. As Burrows comments (1959, p.176) the absence of figures for the 
years 1930/31 and 1931/32 makes it impossible to determine this 
precisely.
21. Arkin (1981,p.191).
22. Report of the Industrial Legislation Commission of Enquiry (1951, 
pp.22-23).
23. See e.g. Bell (1984, pp.2-3); Simkins (1976).
24. Mabel Palmer Collection. File No 28. Killie Campbell Library, 
(c1930). We are grateful to Ms Uma Mesthrie, formerly of the 
Department of History, University of Durban-Westville, for making 
us aware of this information.
25. Indians Abroad Directory (1934).
26. Indian Opinion 23/10/31.
27. Reports of the Protector of Indian Immigrants (various years).
28. Webb (1938, p.47).
29. Although these rates do not again apply to Indian workers only, by 
excluding skilled workers (included in Burrows' figures) they are 
likely to be better approximations than Burrows' data.
Chapter 3
1. We say 'at least' because Table 3.1 which is derived from Table 3.2 
includes only those unions whose dates of registration/establish- 
ment are known (see also Note 1 to Table 3.2).
2. We examine the reasons for this decline in trades union 
registration/establishment after 1945 in chapter 4,5 and 6 of the 
study.
3. Katzen (1961, p.175)
4. Katzen (1961, p.175). The figures for unionized Black workers are 
derived from Table 3.2.
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5. Billy Peters was the secretary of the CPSA (Durban-District branch)
between 1943-1946, and an organiser/secretary of numerous unions 
including the Durban Indian Municipal Employees' Union, the Shop 
Assistants' Union, and the South African Railways and Harbour 
Indian Employees’ Union. RD Naidoo was the organiser/secretary of 
the National Baking Industry Employees' Union (Natal) and a member 
of the CPSA (Durban District Branch). Both these men were closely 
associated with the origins and development of (Indian) trades 
union in Durban between 1935 - 1950, and are therefore well
qualified to comment on the formation and operations/activities of 
(Indian) unions in general in this period. SP Pillay was the 
organiser/secretary of the Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Workers' 
Union between 1940 - 1944, and vas instrumental in reviving this 
union in 1949/1950 after it had collapsed in 1946. He still serves 
as secretary of this revived union.
6. RD Naidu (1984).
7. SP Pillay (1984).
8. The organisational activities of this union were confined mostly to 
the Transvaal. However it was one of the 'radical' unions of this 
period and we include it in our analysis for purposes of 
comparison.
9. One would have thought that this is management's problem, not the 
shop stewards or unions.
10. Ringrose (1951) makes this point when discussing trades union 
democracy and comments that venues of meetings do have an effect on 
attendance. Writing about African workers in particular he notes 
"Generally speaking it is only urbanized Natives who are 
sufficiently interested in trade union activities to want to attend 
meetings, and most of these urbanized Natives live in peri-urban 
areas which have few or no transport facilities after business 
hours." ( p . 7 4 ) .  Members of the Natal Sugar Industry Employees' 
Union held meetings in Durban, but the membership was scattered all 
over the coast and inland. As a result, on average only 10% 
attended meetings. On the other hand the Rope and Mat Workers' 
Union held meetings for members of a Hibberdene factory at or near 
the factory for which there was a 100% attendance (Ringrose, 1951, 
P - 7 4 ) .
11. SP Pillay (1984).
12. Billy Peters (1984).
13. It is not clear to the researchers exactly how many unions had 
their own newspapers or newsletters. Certainly the Laundry Union 
did not as Mr SP Pillay attests to. Mr Billy Peters, however,
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informs us that the industrial seretariat of the Durban committee 
of the CPSA collected information on worker grievances and other 
related matters and channelled this for publication to the Guardian 
newspaper.
14. Twine and Bag Workers' Union; Tea, Coffee and Chicory Industry 
Employees' Union; South African Railway and Harbour Indian 
Employees' Union; Natal Sugar Field Workers' Union.
ar
15. Report to NEC of the NUCTW (August 1951) - NUCTW Papers AH 1328, 
William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand.
Chapter 4
1. Hemson (1979, p.302); Ginwala (1974, pp.395-397); Annual Report of 
the Department of Labour UG 30 1938.
2. Although the focus of this report is on Indian workers and trades 
unions, this table of worker action includes strikes involving 
Black workers (i.e. African,.Coloured and Indian) in Natal. This 
arises from the fact that the sources from which the table has been 
derived do not always give a breakdown of workers by 'race'. Often 
the sources refer to 'European' and 'Non-European' workers without 
further dividing the latter category into African, Coloured and 
Indian. Where this breakdown is available the figures for each 
'race group' are given. The major part of the analysis that 
follows concentrates on those strikes involving Indian workers and 
their unions. Hemson (1979) and Tichmann (1983) discuss African 
worker action in this period more fully. It should also be pointed 
out that although every effort was made to make this information on 
worker action complete (and accurate), we do not claim to have been 
totally successful in this respect - mainly because of the paucity 
of primary documentary evidence. Thus, e.g., in addition to the 
difficulties arising from providing a breakdown of workers by 
'race', it is not always clear whether or not trades unions were 
involved in each of the strikes that occurred. Further, in many 
cases no information exists on the number of workers involved in a 
strike, or on the duration of the strike, or the outcome of the 
strike.
3. For South Africa as a whole the number of strikes/disputes in 1942 
was higher than in any other single year since 1920 (Ringrose 
1951, p.30).
4. It should also be pointed out that there were many disputes in this 
period that were settled before strike action was resorted to. The 
extent of worker resistance as measured by strike action only is 
therefore an underestimate of working class activity.
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5. We have not been able to verify this due to the incompleteness of 
the primary records and documents.
6. Natal Mercury 4/5/37. -The actual number cannot be determined
precisely. The NISWU say the number involved were 'over 400'. 
Ginwala gives the following figures: 500 Indians and 400 Africans 
(1974, p.397). This appears somewhat exaggerated. The Natal
Mercury gives the following figures: 312 Indians and 82 'Natives'.
7. Memo of the NISWU. TUCSA Papers AH 646, DC 8.30. University of 
the Witwatersrand (hereinafter NISWU memo).
8. NISWU memo.
9. Natal Mercury 4/5/37
10. Natal Mercury 4/5/37
11. Natal Mercury 4/5/37
12. Natal Mercury 4/5/37
13. Natal Mercury 5/5/37
14. NISWU memo
15. Natal Mercury 27/5/37; NISWU memo.
16. NISWU memo
17. NISWU memo
18. Natal Mercury 26/5/37
19. Natal Mercury 27/5/37
20. See e.g. Ringrose (1951, p.25); Hemson (1979, p.303) and Annual 
Report of the Department of Labour UG 30 1938.
21. Natal Mercury 26/5/37
22. Natal Mercury 26/5/37
23. Natal Mercury 27/5/37
24. Natal Mercury 27/5/37
25. NISWU Pamphlet. TUCSA Papers AH 646. Dc 8.30. University of the 
Wiwatersrand (hereinafter NISWU Pamphlet).
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26. NISWU Pamphlet.
27. Natal Advertiser 1/6/37
28. Natal Advertiser 1/6/37
29. Telegram from NISWU to SATLC, TUCSA Papers, AH 646. Dc 8.30.
30. Natal Advertiser 2/6/37
31. Natal Advertiser 6/6/37
32. Natal Advertiser 5/6/37
33. Letter to the SATLC 8/6/37, TUCSA Papers.
34. Letter to the SATLC 8/6/37, TUCSA Papers.
35. In a report in the Natal Advertiser of 7/6/3 7 it is stated that 
"150 native and coloured men have already been signed on ... A 
further 40 Indians were taken on at the Falkirk Iron Works this 
morning."
36. Indian Views 11/6/37; Natal Advertiser 8/6/37.
37. Statement of Resolutions of the Natal Indian Congress: re Jacobs
Dispute 6/6/37. TUCSA Papers AH 646. Dc 8.30 . University of the
Witwatersrand.
38. Speech EM Paruk, TUCSA Papers AH 646. Dc 8.30 . University of the
Witwatersrand.
39. Indian Views 11/6/37. We may note here that the Agent General also 
spoke at this meeting. What he said had even less consequence for 
the workers involved in this dispute:
My presence here should not be misunderstood ... My duty 
is to act in co-operation with the Union Government to 
find a settlement to such questions which might require 
settlement. The present dispute is an industrial 
dispute. The Govt, of India is not concerned with it so 
long as it remains essentially an industrial dispute.
(Indian Views 11/6/37)
40. Indian Views 11/6/37
41. Natal Advertiser 8/6/37 and 9/6/37
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42. Letter from the Durban Committee of the SATLC to the General 
Secretary of the SATLC 22/6/37. TUCSA Papers AH 646. Dc 8.30. 
University of the Witwatersrand.
43. Letter from the Durban Committee of the SATLC 22/6/37 (as above).
44. We are of course not suggesting that the presence of more 
democratic structures and the non-involvement of political 
intervention of this type would in themselves have been sufficient 
to resolve this or any other dispute. For our view on this point 
see p.136 of this chapter.
45. Hemson (1979, p.336 and p.375 fn)
46. Hemson (1979, p.336)
47. Before this, however, War Measure 9 of 1942 was passed that 
prohibited strikes in industries declared to be 'essential'; 
provided for compulsory arbitration; and applied to all 'races'.
48. SATLC: 13th Annual Report 1943 (p.75)
49. SATLC: 13th Annual Report 1943 (p.75)
50. Schedule of (Indian) trades unions in Durban tabled by the Minister 
of Labour on 16/2/43. Parliamentary Archives. These appear to be 
membership figures before the strike commenced.
51. Guardian 21/1/43
52. Indian Views 19/2/43; Indian Opinion 25/12/42.
53. Government Gazette 25/9/42. (Arbitrator TC Cronin). It would appear 
that the award was for some reason published in September 1942 but 
the agreement made earlier in the year - see e.g. letter by AI 
Kajee to Minister of Labour (Indian Views 29/1/43) which refers to 
the award being made nine (9) months ago. This could, however, 
just be an error.
54. See letter by Dunlop to NIC (Indian Views 19/2/43; Daily News 
9/12/42)
55. Indian Views 19/2/43
56. Guardian 21/1/43
57. Guardian 21/1/43
58. SATLC: 13th Annual Report 1943 (p.74)
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59. Schedule of (Indian) trades unions in Durban 16/2/43
60. SATLC: 13th Annual Report 1943 (p.74)
61. Guardian 21/1/43
62. Natal Mercury 9/12/42
63. RD Naidu (1984)
64. Natal Mercury 9/12/42. RD Naidu (1984) has alleged that the pickets 
were attacked by the police and also by "hired thugs".
65. Daily News 11/12/42
66. Guardian 21/1/43
67. Leader 23/1/43
68. Daily News 4/1/43
69. The Daily News reports that they numbered between 140-180 (6/1/43).
70. Daily News 6/1/43
71. We have not been able to trace what happened to the remaining 
accused.
72. Daily News 12/4/43
73. Rand Daily Mail June 1943 (exact date unknown - located in the 
'Press Clippings file of the TUCSA Papers AH 646)
74. RD Naidu (1984)
75. RD Naidu (1984)
76. RD Naidu (1984)
77. Natal Mercury 18/1/43
78. Guardian 21/1/43
79. Guardian 21/1/43
80. Guardian 21/1/43
81. Indian Views 29/1/43
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82. Indian Views 29/1/43
83. Indian Views 29/1/43
84. although the NRWIU was not affiliated to the SATLC, it would appear 
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the SATLC 1943)
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86. SATLC: 13th Annual Report 1943 (p.78)
87. Ginwala (1974, p.397)
88. Daily News 18/1/43
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developments 7 years later, by the divisional inspector of labour 
for Durban. We are not able to corroborate his assertion that 
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90. RD Naidu (1984)
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92. Billy Peters (1984)
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151. Guardian 10/1/46. In fact, Alec Wanless questioned, in 
Parliament, the role of the police in the laundry workers strike. 
Wanless alleged that there was "a political branch of the CID” 
about which he was concerned:
Not in relation to the investigation of sabotage 
but I am concerned with the activites of those 
gentlemen in regard to the activities of trade 
unionists who on occasion are engaged in perfectly 
legitimate strikes, and the particular strike I 
have in mind and that I want to draw the Minister's 
attention to is the laundry workers' strike in 
Durban and the treatment that was meted out to 
trade unionists during that strike. [House of 
Assembly Debates Vol.57, 1946-1947, cols.7030-7031]
152. SP Pillay (1984)
153. SATLC: 16th Annual Report 1946 (p.23)
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155. Indian Opinion 4/1/46
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162. SP Pillay (1984)
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165. The general secretary of the FNETU was J la Guma who was a leading 
theorist in the CPSA at that time and who championed the 'Black 
Republic' slogan and rejected Bunting's policy of reliance on 
White workers. (Lewis 1978, p.134)
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166. Other issues arising out of the relationship between (Indian) 
workers, trades unions and political organisations such as the 
CPSA, NIC, NIA are discussed in Chapter 5 of this report.
167. RD Naidu (1984)
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Chapter 5
1. See e.g. Swan [Tayal] (1980); Swan (1982); Ginwala (1974); Pahad 
(1972); Johnson (1973); Bagwandeen (1983) among others. See also 
Appendix G.
2. We are indebted to Mr Hassim Seedat for letting us examine this 
membership list of the NIC.
3. It is of interest to note that it was only in 1911/12 that Gandhi 
and the NIC included the abolition of the £3 tax (on unindentured 
Indians over 15 years) on the political platform. This was largely 
in response to the fact that the CBIA had placed the demand for the 
abolition of the tax high on their political agenda. As Swan 
[Tayal] (1982, p.19) observes "the possibility that the CBIA might 
mobilize the mass of the people, radicalizing Indian politics and 
endangering the uneasy co-existence which the traders had 
established with the Natal Government was sufficient for the 
Congress to hastily include the abolition of the tax on their own 
political platform." However, later in 1913 when the decision to 
include indentured Indian labour in the passive resistance campaign 
was being debated by the NIC, a substantial part of the NIC 
leadership who were opposed to this proposal defected from the 
campaign and Gandhi and a few of his supporters joined most of the 
CBIA group to form a new organisation called the NIA (see Swan 
1982) .
4. See Swan (1984); Beal and North Coombes (1983).
5. See Table 3.2.
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6. Billy Peters (1984).
7. See Appendix G.
8. The Non-European United Front (NEUF) was a non-racial political 
alliance formed in Cape Town in 1938 to mobilize mass popular 
support.
9. The leading members of the nationalist bloc (NB) were: HA Naidoo; 
G Ponen; Billy Peters; Monty Naicker; AKM Docrat; DA Seedat; 
E Moolla; Dr Goonam; Dr Chetty; NG Moodley; MD Naidoo; G Singh and 
C Amra.
10. Indian Opinion 28/6/40.
11. AKM Docrat (1985).
12. Billy Peters (1984).
13. AKM Docrat (1985).
14. See Appendix F.
15. AKM Docrat (1985).
16. Billy Peters (1984).
17. SP Pillay (1984).
18. Bagwandeen (1983, p.356).
19. AKM Docrat (1985).
20. See, e.g., Johnson (1973).
21. We presume that Swan is referring to the leadership of organized 
labour.
22. This Act "divided Natal into 'controlled' and 'uncontrolled' areas. 
Indian acquisition of land in controlled areas was prohibited, 
unless a special exemption was received. No restrictions were 
placed on uncontrolled areas, but these were already largely Indian 
areas. The Act also prohibited Indians who had purchased but not 
occupied land in white areas from occupying it after January 21 
1946. In terms of the Act, Indians were, for the first time, 
granted representation in the South African Senate and Assembly. 
They were to elect two whites to the Union Senate and three to the 
Assembly and were to be directly represented in the Natal 
Provincial Council. The NIC rejected the representation provisions
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as discriminatory and this part of the Act was never injilemented." 
(Johnson, 1973, p.741)
23. See also Swan (1982).
24. George Naicker (NIC activist) quoted in Johnson (1973, p.81).
25. AKM Docrat (1985).
26. See on this point Swan (1982).
27. AKM Docrat (1985).
28. Billy Peters (1984).
29. See Dunlop strike Chapter 4: 4.3.
3 0 . B i l l y  P e t e r s  (1 9 8 4 ) .
31. Billy Peters (1984).
32. Quoted in Ginwala (1974, p.398).
33. See Hemson (1.979, Chapters 4,5).
34. See Simons and Simons (1983, p.504); Luckhardt and Wall (1979, 
p.54).
35. Billy Peters (1984).
36. See also Hemson (1979, Chapters 4,5); Mon (1944); Simons and Simons
(1983) .
37. Billy Peters (1984).
38. RD Naidu (1984).
39. See e.g. 50th Anniversary Brochure of the Garment Workers' 
Industrial Union; Hemson (1979, p.340).
40. Hemson (1979, p.340).
41. Billy Peters (1984).
42. MP Naicker interviewed by Pahad (1972, pp.243/4); Billy Peters
(1984) . This information was obtained from Mr Billy Peters, 
secretary of the Durban branch of the CPSA (1943-46).
43. For example, Ray Alexander: Trade Unions and You (1944).
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44. Alexander (1944).
45. AKM Docrat (1985).
46. Billy Peters (1984).
47. Leader 13/10/45; Indian Opinion 17/7/42.
48. See Andrews (1940).
49. "Comrminists in Conference": 1943/44 Conference of the CPSA (p.7).
50. See Hemson (1979, pp.288,302, 305, 320) for the effect of this 
popular front on working class organisation in Durban in the 
1940's.
51. See Hemson (1979, p.332).
52. See Chapter 4: 4.3 on Dunlop strike.
53. Billy Peters (1984).
54. Hemson is here referring to African unions but his criticism is 
equally applicable to the Indian unions.
55. The Suppression of Communism Act (1950) gave the government the 
authority to remove 'named' or 'listed' communists from official 
positions and even membership of trades unions.
56. Undated report "Communists in South African Trade Unions." 
Hartwell Labour Collection, AD 1456, 3:10, University of the 
Witwatersrand. Note also that HA Naidoo, who had played an 
important role in trades union organisation in Durban in the late 
1930's and early 1940's, left Durban in 1943 to join the editorial 
committee of the Guardian in Cape Town. In 1951 he left South 
Africa for England.
57. Argus 9/12/53. TUCSA Papers. AH 646: Press Clippings File.
58. Alex Hepple (1954, p.61). The Howick Rubber Workers' Union was a 
SACTU affiliate (1955).
59. Various press clippings in the private collection of Mr AKM Docrat. 
Mr RD Naidu was as recently as 18/12/1970 charged under the 
Suppression of Communism Act for acting as general secretary of the 
Engineering Industrial Workers' Unions. This is indicative of the 
severity of the Act in so far as its restrictions on named persons 
serving as trades unions officials.
195.
60. Report submitted to the National Executive Committee of the 
National Union of Cigarette and Tobacco Workers by A. Scheepers on 
a visit to Durban August 1951. NUCTW Papers, AH 1328, University 
of the Witwatersrand.
61. SP Pillay (1984).
Chapter 6
1. See e.g. Marshall (1983)
2. See e.g. Sirianni (1980)
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Appendix A
General Literature - Indian Workers and Trades Unions
The general works that deal exclusively or partly with Indians in South 
Africa and include some account of Indian workers and trades unions can 
be divided into three broad categories. In the first category are 
works such as Ringrose (1948, 1951); Smith (1945) and Burrows (1952), 
which outline - without detailed analysis - such issues as the types of 
unions with Indian membership, the kinds of actions which workers 
undertook, the size of the unions, whether they were registered or not, 
the industries they organised in, whether they were local unions or 
branches of national unions, and, in some instances, how long they 
lasted. These works are mainly descriptive and while they are
extremely useful for reference purposes they do not discuss the 
historical context in which unions were formed, why workers organised 
in the way they did and a host of other organisational issues that 
confronted these trades unions.
A second category of writers such as Pahad (1972); Ginwala (1974); 
Johnson (1973) and Bagwandeen (1983) concentrate on the nature and 
character of the political response of Indians in South Africa in 
different periods. While these works are useful to understanding the 
rise (and decline) of Indian political movements, they do not 
comprehensively portray the role of the Indian working class in the 
total context of the South African social formation and in relation to 
the issues of the particular periods they were concerned with. In
Ginwala, for example, Indian trades unions - their structure and 
actions - are not systematically analysed, whatever the title of her 
thesis may imply and despite the role she attributes to the Indian 
working class in the realignment of political forces. In large measure 
the working class and its organs form the backdrop to the machinations 
of the Indian political organisations. In contrast to these works. 
Swan's (1982) paper on the ideology of organised Indian politics in the 
'Gandhi era' and in the 1940's places greater emphasis on and more 
careful attention to conflicting class interests, class politics and 
the interactions between Indian political movements and Indian workers.
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Both in form and content Swan's (1982) study - which is still in 
progress - represents in our view a radical departure from the 
perspectives of the other works which concentrate on the political 
response of Indian South Africans.
A third category which emphasizes the role of the masses and the 
vitality of working class action in economic and political issues 
includes the works of Roux (1964); Simons and Simons (1983); and 
Luckhardt and Wall (1979). However, these are general texts on the 
formation of the working class, their trades unions and struggles. As 
such there is no systematic treatment on the formation of the Indian 
working class in the 1930's and 1940's, although their unions and the 
various campaigns they joined or supported are briefly discussed.
APPENDIX B
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SOUTH AFRICAN TRADES UNION FEDERATIONS c1911 - c1965
1911 -  1924 1925 - 1932 1933 - 1939 1940 - 1945 1945 -  1950 1951 1965
MANY STRIKES 
BUT NO STABLE 
WORKER
ORGANISATIONS 
WERE FORMED 
FOR BLACK 
WORKERS.
CAPE FEDERATION OF TRADES 
1913 ~ 1930________ ‘ N
SOUTH AFRICAN 
INDUSTRIAL 
FEDERATION 
1911-1922
INDUSTRIAL AND 
COMMERCIAL 
WORKERS UNION 
1919 - c1927
INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIALIST LEAGUE 
UNIONS
c1917 - c1920 
EG INDIAN WORKERS 
INDUSTRIAL UNION
SOUTH AFRICAN 
TRADES UNION 
CONGRESS 
1926-1930
SOUTH AFRICAN TRADES 
AND LABOUR COUNCIL 
1930 -  1949
^ ^ O U r
TRAl
SOUTH AFRICAN 
FEDERATION OF 
TRADES UNIONS 
>1950 -  ^
SOUTH AFRICAN 
. C onfederation 
^  OF LABOUR
1954 TO PRESENT
SOUTH AFRICAN 
iDES AND 
LABOUR COUNCIL 
1949 - 1954^'
TRADES UNION 
COUNCIL OF
^  C outh Africa 
1954 TO PRESENT
FEDERATION OF 
NON-EUROPEAN 
TRADES UNIONS 
1928 - 1931
NATAL WORKERS 
CONGRESS 
1928 -  C1932
SOME OTHER UNIONS
i. AFRICAN CLOTHING 
WORKERS UNION
ii. AFRICAN LAUNDRY 
WORKERS UNION
ill. NATAL IRON 
AND STEEL WORKERS 
UNION
JOINT COMMITTEE 
OF AFRICAN 
TRADES UNIONS 
1940
V ^COUNCIL OF NON -EUROPEAN 
TRADES UNIONS 1942 - 1954
FEDERATION OF FREE 
AFRICAN TRADES 
UNIONS OF SOUTH 
AFRICA 1959 -1965
FOOD AND CANNING WORKERS 
UNION 1941 TO PRESENT
SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONGRESS OF TRADES 
UNIONS
1955 TO PRESENT (?) 
(effectively ceased 
to function in 1964)
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APPENDIX C
Additional Tables To Chapter Two
Table C.1
The Age Structure of the Indian Population of Natal 1921-1951 (%)
Age Group 1921 1936 1946 1951
0 - 1 4 43.5 46.7 47.4 48.0
15 - 64 54.8 51.1 50.2 49.8
65+ 1.5 2.1 2.0 2.1
Source: Burrows, J.R. (1959, p. 14).
Note 1 : that the proportion of the population under 15 increased
throughout this period while the proportion in the working 
age group 15-64 fell. These changes are due to the high rate 
of natural increase and to the effects of the termination of 
indenture in 1911, which would have had the effect of 
reducing the proportion of adult males especially.
Table C.2
Masculinity Rates of the Indian Population of Natal 1921-1951 (%)
Census Years
1921 130.9
1936 112.1
1946 106.4
1951 104.9
Source: Burrows, J.R. (1959, p. 7).
Note: that the sharp decline in the masculinity rate may be attributed 
to: a) a high rate of natural increase and the high death rate of 
the older male population.
b) As Burrows notes: in 1911 the immigration of Indians was 
restricted to the wives and dependants of already 
domiciled Indians and this would have favoured females.
c) Burrows also suggests that considerably more males than 
females returned to India under the Union Government 
repatriation scheme.
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Table C.3
Indian Education : Primary and Secondary - Natal
1921 1923 1928 1936 1946
Enrolment 7203 8224 11636 21772 35427
%age school age children
in school 21 - - 44 60
%age school age boys in school 38 - - 62 75
Number of schools 47 48 67 95 142
Teachers employed 230 266 363 604 1072
Source: Burrows, H.R. (1947, p. 175).
Note: i) although these figures indicate an appreciable growth in
quantitative terms a majority of Indian school-going 
children did not complete a primary course in the period 
under review. Only in 1973 was compulsory education for 
Indians introduced (Burrows, 1952, p. 40) and Padayachee 
(1979, p. 110).
ii) these figures indicate that the proportion of children in 
schools though growing was low especially for the 1920s and 
1930s - a factor which resulted in a relatively under- 
educated Indian labour force through the 1940's and 
1950's.
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APPENDIX D ___________________________________________
______________ I TRACES UNIONS IN NATAL WITH INDIAN MEMBERgEEP 1
NAME OF UNION TYPE ESEAB DE-REE NOTES
1. BUILDING AND ALLIED WDFKERS UNION C c1916 THIS WAS ALREADY A NATIONAL ONION 
BY 1948. IT APPEARS THAT THE 
DURBAN BRANCH MVY ONLY HAVE EEEN 
ESTABLISHED IN 1942.
2. INDIAN PRINTERS UNION
(a) MEMBERS IAIER INCORPORATED 
INTO THE SA TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 
(1929).
(b) NOT AN AFFILIATE TO THE ISL 
BACKED INDIAN WORKERS INDUSTRIAL 
UNION.
23/7/1917 DISSOLVED
C1929
MANTZARES (1983) REFERS TO THIS 
UNION AS THE INDIAN TYPOGRAPHICAL 
UNION.
3. INDIAN WDPKERS INDUSTRIAL UNION 3/1917 THE IMKKTO1TCNAL SXKU3T 
LEAGUE (ISL) FORMED THIS UNICN, 
WHICH EEPR2SEN3ED INDIAN VOTERS 
IN VARIOUS FACTORIES.
4. TOBACCO WORKERS UNION c1917 FORMED B7 THE ISL
5. DURBAN HOTEL EMKOHES UilCN c1917
6. BAKERS VAN UNION c1919
7. INDIAN SOP ASSISTANTS ONION C1919
8. INDIAN DOCKWCRKERS UNION C1919
9. NATAL 2KJP ASSISTANTS AND 
COMMERCIAL UNION
C1919 WE HAVE NOT EEEN ABLE TO ESTAB­
LISH WHETHER THIS UNION WAS THE ; 
SAME AS THE INDIAN 9K0? ASSIST­
ANTS UNION CR m o . IT £®Y EE THE 
SAME UNION ERRONEOUSLY INFERRED 
TO. |
10. SUGAR MILL WORKERS UNION 01919
11. PIEIEFMARITZBUR3 MUNICIPAL 
WORKERS UNION
C1923
12. INDIAN FUKOTUKE WORKERS UNION
13. SOOTH COAST JUNCHCN AND DISTRICT 
BOTLDItG WORKERS UNICN
I C1924
1925
DEFUNCT
C1927
Notes 1 .These are the trades unions with Indian membership established before 1930 but vhich as far 
as can be ascertained were no longer in existence by 1930. Those unions famed after 1930 
or formed before 1930 tut vhich continued to exist and function for sore tirre in the period 
1930-1950 are listed in Table 3.2 of Chapter 3.
Sources: Mantzaris (1983)
Ringrose (1948)
The International (various) 
Indian Opinion (various)
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(C O N S T ITU T IO N  FOR A  LOCAL TRADE U N IO N .)
APPENDIX E "MODEL CONSTITUTION"
N .B .  -- Th e m a r g in a l  r e f e r e n c e s  a r e  t o  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  
A c t  I n  t e r m s  o f  w h ic h  I t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  
c o n s t i t u t i o n s  c o n t a in  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  
i n d i c a t e d ,
C O N S T I T U T I O N  
OF THE
UNION
1 .  NAME.
‘fh e  name o f  t h e  U n io n  s h a l l  h e  t h e . , ...........
. . . . . . . .  ................................... ...................U N IO N .
2 . OBJECTS.
S e c t i o n  1 
d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  " t r a d e  
u n io n "
Th e o b j e c t s  o f  t h e  u n io n  s h a l l  b e s -  
( a )  t o  r e g u l a t e  r e l a t i o n s  b e tw e e n  m em bers and t h e i r  
.^ e m p lo y e r s  and  t o  p r o t e c t  a n d  f u r t h e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
o f  m em bers i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e i r  e m p lo y e r s ;
( c )  t o  e n c o u r a g e  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  d i s p u t e s  b y  
c o n c i l i a t o r y  m e th o d s ;
( d )  t o  p ro m o te / "  s u p p o r t  o r  o p p o s e  a s jn a y  b e  deem ed  
e x p e d ie n t " ,  a n y  p r o p o s e d  l e g i s l a t i v e  o r  o t h e r  
raeap^rfes a f f e c t i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  m em bers ;
( e )  t o  u s e  e v e r y  l e g i t i m a t e  m eans t o  In d u c e  a l l  
p e r s o n s  who a r e  e l i g i b l e  f o r  m em b ersh ip  t o  
b ecom e  m em b ers ;
( f )  t o  a s s i s t  m em bers i n  o b t a in in g  e m p lo y m e n t ;
( g )  t o  p r o v i d e ,  w hen  d eem ed  n e c e s s a r y ^ l e g a l  
a s s i s t a n c e  t o  m em bers;
. ( h )  t o  c o - o p e r a t e  w i t h  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  o f  e m p lo y e r s  and 
/ o r  e m p lo y e e s  on  a n y  I n d u s t r i a l  C o u n c i l  o r  
C o n c i l i a t i o n  B o a rd  w h ic h  may b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  
d e a l  w i t h  m a t t e r s  w h ic h  a f f e c t  m em bers .
I n i t i a l s , . .................... ................
a).... :::::::::::::::::
\ £ > n f U  / h i  , { i ‘f  // A  VC f /k
—P—
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( .1 )  t o  do  , s u c f r 'S f K e r " l a w f u l - 't h in g s  as_m av
appea l*  t o  b e _ i n - t h e •I n t e r e s t s  o f  m em bers .
S .  MEMBERSHIP.
S e c t i o n  1 .  
( D e f i n i ­
t i o n  o f  
T ra d e
U n io n } and
S e c t i o n
SU )
_ E m p lo y ees , e n g a g e d  i n  t h e ................... , . . , .  v  . . . .  • .
A  . ............................ . . . . . . . . . . . a ' . . .  i n s e r t  c h a r a c t e r
o f  un d e r t a k in g .  In d u s t r y , t r a d e  o r  o c c u p a t i o n )  s h a l l  be 
e l i g i b l e  f o r  m em b ersh ip  o f  t h e  U n io n .
( s )  E x c e p t  a s  D i* o v id e d  I n  s u b s e c t i o n  ( 8 )  a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  
m em b e rsh ip  s h p £ i  b e  l o d g e d  i n  w r i t i n g  w i t h  t h e  s e p r l r t a r y  and 
s h a l l  b e  a p e M ip a n ie d  i n  ea ^ h '-C a se  b y  t h e  e n tta n tJ e  f e e ,  
p r e s c r i j i e a  i n  s e c t i o n  4£ar? o f  t h i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n  a n a . . . . . . . . .
w e e k p > / m o n th s ' s u b s c r i p t i o n .
( 3 )  A p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  m em b ersh ip  s h a l l  b e  c o n s id e r e d  b y  th e  
e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it te e  w i t h i n . . .  *VfAK~}-.. . . .  .w e e k s / roen ths o f  
r e c e i p t  t h e r e o f  by t h e  S e c r e t a r y .
( 4 )  I f  -a d m ljrO ion  t o  m em b ersh in ^ i-s  r e f u s e d  b y  th d - e x e c u t i v e  
c o m m it t e e ^ C n e  a p p l i c a n t  concparfled  s h a l l  b e  n o t i f i e d  and 
s h a l l  h a v e  t h e  r i g h t  o f  a jp x fa i t o  t h e  n e x t ^ f e n e r a l  m e e t in g  
o f  p ile  u n io n .
( 5 )  An  a p p l i c a n t  t o  whom a d m is s io n  t o  m em b ersh ip  I s  
r e f u s e d ,  s h a j j f^ b e  e n t i t l e d  r e fu n d  o f^ - th e  e n t r a n c e  f e o
and s u b s p j? fp t io n  p a id  b y  h tlh  on  a o p l ip a i r fo r u
( 6 }  E v e r y  member s h a l l  b o  p r o v id e d  w i t h  a  m em b ersh ip  
c a r d  b y  t h e  s e c r e t a r y  who s h a l l  e n t e r  o n  su c h  c a r d  t h e  
e n t r a n c e  f e e ,  s u b s c r i p t i o n s ,  l e v i e s  and f:Ln es_  p a id  by  th e
o f _ s e c i i o n - 4 ( 3 ) - e f _ t h l S “ 5bfiS ’t i t u t i o n - j —i-s -e x s m p t—fr-oiu.. th e  
p a ym en t o f  s u b s c r i p t i o n s ,  e n d o r s e  su ch  f a c t  on  h i s  c a rd  i n  
r e s p e c t  o f " f e a c h  p e r i o d  f o r  w h ic h  t h e  s u b s c r i p t i o n  i s  n o t  
p a y a b l e .
( 7 )  E v e r y  m em ber s h a l l  n o t i f y  t h e  s e c r e t a r y ,  i n  w r i t i n g ,  
o f  h i s  p o s t a l  a d d r e s s  and a n y  c h a n g e s  t h e r e o f .
( 8 )  An e m p lo y e e w f io  h a s  r e s i g n e d j> r 'b e e n  e x p e l l e d  f r o m
t h e  u n io n  may b o ^ r e - a d m i t t e d  t o  ip e tn b ersh ip  o n  su ch  ,c o n d i t i o n s  
a s  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it t e e  m a y ^ d s te rm in e . W h ere , an  a p p l i c a n t  
f o r  r e - a d r p t s s io n  c o n s id e r s  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f i x e d  b y  t h e  
e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it te e  u n r e a s o n a b le ,  he may a p p e a l  t o  th e  n e x t  
g e n e y O l m e e t in g  o f  t h e  U n io n ,
( 9 )  W h e n e v e r  an  a p p e a l^ ' l s  l o d g e d  I n  t e rm s  o f  s u b - s e c t i o n  ( 4 )
o r  s u b - s e c t i o n  ( a ^ o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n , x t f i e  a p p e l l a n t  s h a l l  b e  
a f f o r d e d  an  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  s t a t e , h l s  c a s e  p e r s o n a l l y  t o  a 
g e n e r a l  m e e t in g ,  and  may i f  hp^Oo d e s i r e s  c a l l  w i t n e s s e s  i n  
s u p p o r t  o f 'a n y  s ta te m e n t_ ,m a d e  b y  h im .
Initial
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ENTRANCE Pli'gS AND SUBC'OH IPT10NS
.........S e c t io n  9 ( a )  ( 1 )  An e n t r a n c e  f e e  o f .
s h a l l  b e  p a y a b le  o n  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  m em b ersh ip }
( 2 )  A s u b s c r ip t i o n  o f  i r . .............
p e r  w eek/m en th  s h a l l  b e  p a y a b le  b y  e a c h  member t o  a  / .
th e  u n io n .  The s u b s c r ip t i o n  s h a l l  b e  p a id  
. mo n t h l y  i n  a d v m  c e  t o  t h e  s e c r e t a r y  o r  t o  su ch  o t h e r . f  
p e r s o n  a s  may b e  a u t h o r i z e d  b y  th e  u n io n  t o  r e c e i v e  i t .
( 3 )  A member s h a l l  b e  ex em p t f r o m  paym en t o f  
th e  a f o r e s a i d  s u b s c r ip t i o n  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  w eek/m onth  d u r in g  w h ic h  h e  i s  -
f e r n . .
on  a c c o u n t  o f  i l l n e s s .
( a )  u n em p lo ye d  f o r .
( b )  u n a b le  t o  w o rk
o r  m ore d a y s ,  o r  
. . ,  .o n  m n ro i d a y s
5 .  MEETINGS.
S e p t i o n '9 ( c ) /  ( 1 )  A g e n e r a l  m e e t in g  o f  members o f  th e  U n ion
s h a l l  o r d i n a r i l y  b e  h e ld  a t  l e a s t  o n c e  e v e r y , , / . . , . . . . . . .
m on ths on  a  d a t e  t o  b e  f i x e d  by th e  C h a irm a n ,
S p e c i a l  g e n e r a l  m e e t in g s  s h a l l  b e  c a l l e d  w h en e ve r  
d e s i r e d  b y  a  m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  e x e c u t i v e  c c m m lt tq e  op
u pon  a  r e q u i s i t i o n  s ig n e d  b y  n o t  l e s s  t h a n . , , . f S ? . ..........
m em bers o f  th e  u n io n  i n  good  F in a n c ia l  S ta n d in g .
( 2 )  N o t i c e s  o f  g e n e r a l  m e e t in g s  s h o w in g  th e  
b u s in e s s  t o  b e  t r a n s a c t e d  t h e r e a t  s h a l l  b e  g i v e n  t o  
m em bers i n  w r i t i n g  b y  th e  S e c r e t a r y  n o t  l e s s  th a n
. . . . ' . Y / V M f r t . _____. . .  .d a y s  b e f o r e  th e  d a c e s  o f  such
m e e t in g s  p r o v id e d  t h a t  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  s p e c i a l  g e n e r a l  
m e e t in g s  su ch  s h o r t e r  w r i t t e n  n o t i c e  a s  may be 
d e c id e d  b y  th e  c h a irm a n , may b e  g i v e n .
( 3 )  Th e a n n u a l g e n e r a l  m e e t in g  o f  th e  u n io n  s h a l l
b e  h e ld  i n  th e  m onth  o f . . . . . . . . . . . ............... , i n  ea ch
y e a r  o r  a s  s o o n  a s  p o s s i b l e  t h e r e a f t e r .
( 4 )  I f  t h e  C h a irm an  so  d e c id e s ^  a l l  m o t io n s  a t  a 
g e n e r a l  m e e t in g  s h a l l  b e  fejltrbed t o  w r i t i n g  and 
s h a l l  b e  d e l i v e r e d  t o  t h e ^ c r e s ld in g  o f f i c e r  t o  b e  
c o n s id e r e d  u n le s s  s e o o n d M A  A l l ' i p i b t e r s  fo r m in g  th e  
s u b j e c t  o f  m o t io n s  a M l l  W n l e s s 'o t h e r w i s o  p r o v id e d  h e r e in  
s h a l l^ b e  v o t e d v u g h r fb y  show  o f  hands and s h a l l  u n le s s  
o th e rw is e ^  p r o v id e d  b e  d e c i « e d \ b y  th e  v o t e s  o f  a 
m a j o r i t y  o f^ K h o k e  p r e s e n t  A c c e p t  in  th e  c a s e  o f  e l e c t i o n s  
when t l ie ^ d a n d id a Y e s  up t o  th e  r e q u i r e d  num ber r e c e i v i n g  
th e  h ig h e s t  num bA- o f  v o t e s \ s h a l l  b e  d e c la r e d  e l e c t e d .
( 5 )  No member s h ^ l l  b e  a lld w h d  ) t o  sp e a k  f o r  l o n g e r
t h a n . .......... .. 1 , . » .m in u te®  on \ a n y  m a t t e r  u n le s s  a
m a jo r i t y  o f  t h o s e  pres.s.rj.iw 'agrdes,
( 8 )  A l l  m a t t e r s  •<Sn\which t h i \  c o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  
s i l e n t  s h a l l  b e  d e c id e d  on  m o t io n  b y\ a  m a jo r i t y  v o t e  
o f  th e  members p r e s e n t  a t  a g e n i a l  m e e t in g .
I n i t i a l s .
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■ a  : ‘i ^ iUi
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a d d (o «(z  'o' 
v.
r U  £■ f t  •> ---. (i 
___<-
LuXtoiTI /k u v J C y
(7 1  The e x e c u t i v e  C om m ittee  sh aJ1 o r d i n a r i l y  
m ee t a t  l e a s t  o n c e  e v e r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . .m onth,
on  a d a t e  t o  be f i x e d  by th e  C h a irm an . S p e c ia l  
m e e t in g s  o f  th e  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m itte e  s h a lJ / b e  
c a l l e d  b y  th e  ch a irm a n  w h en eve r  ha deem s i t  a d v is a b le  
o r  u pon  a  r e q u i s i t i o n  s ign ed , b y  n o t  l ^ s s  th an  
m em bersX ^ f th e  c o m m it te e .
(0 >  Members o f  th e  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it te e  s h a l l  be 
n o t i f i e d  i n h e r i t i n g  o f  th e  tiru e  uM p la c e  o f  
m e e t in g s  o f  th e  c o m m itte e  by  t W / s c r d t a r y  a t  l e a s t  
. . . . . . . . . . . .  A \ . . . . .d a y s  b e fo .r e it th e  d a t e s  o f  su ch
m e e t in g s ,  p r o v id e d  t h a t  s h o r t e r ' n o t i c e  m ay, i n  th e  
d i s c r e t i o n  o f  th e  ch a irm a n , be/ g i v e n  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
s p e c i a l  m e e t in g s .X  To e v e r y  n b t i c e \ p f  m e e t in g  an 
a gen d a  s h a l l  b e  a t t a c h e d .  A l l  m a t t e r s  f o r  c o n s id e r a t i o n  
by  th e  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it t e e / s h a l l  b e  \ e c id e d  on m o t io n  
d u ly  s e co n d ed  and v o t e d  upon  by  show  \ f  hands
( 0 )  I h e  quorum f o r  a n y / g e n e ra l m e e t in g  s h a l l
be.... A  ............. ./members in good financial standing
and f o r  \ne“ t ln g s  o f  th e  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it t e e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,
m em bers. \  I f  w i t h in .  A . . . .  A . . . . .  .m in u te s  V f  th e  t im e
f i x e d  f o r V in y  m e e t in g  a  quorum i s  n o t  p r e s e n t ,  th e  
m e e t in g  s h a l l  s ta n d 7 a d jo u r n e d l t o  th e  same d&y i n  th e  
w eek  f o l l o w i n g ,  e.V t h e  same t im e  and p la c e ,  aria a t  
su ch  a d jo u rn e d  m e e t in g  o f  v ;h ich  w r i t t e n  n o  t i n t  s h a l l  b e  
g i v e n  th e  members p r e s e n t  s h a l l  fo rm  a quorum .
(IC O  A t  e v e l y \ g e n e r a l  m e e t in g  th e  m in u te s  o f  th e  
l a s t  p r e c e d in g  g e n e r a l  m e e t in g  s h a l l  b e  r e a d  b y  'th e  
s e c r e r a r v  zmd s ig n e d  b y  th e  p r e s id in g  o f f i c e r  a f t e r  
c o n f i r m a t io n .  M in u te s  o f  m e e t in g s  o f  th e  e x e c u t i v e  
c o m m itte e  s h a l l  b e  s i m i l a r l y  d e a l t  w i t h  b y  th a t  b o d y .
( l l )  / Th e p r o c e e d in g s  o f  any m e e t in g  s h a l l  n o t  be 
i n v a l i d a t e d  by  r e a s o n  o f  th e  n o n - r e c e ip t  by  suiy member 
o f f  th e  n o t i c e  o f  m e e t in g .  .
c O J b
6 . EXECUTIVE COMMITTER.
(.1 )  ( a )  The m anagem ent o f  th e  a f f a i r s  o f  th e  u n io n  
b e tw e e n  g e n e r a l  m e e t in g s  s h a l l  b e  v e s t e d  in  an 
e x e c u t i v e  c o m m itte e  c o n s i s t in g  o f  th e  .c h a irm a n . th e ./  /,- -Lc 
v ic e - c h a ir m a n  and •S.'v/.f.tH' .4 ura
VJrasm who—s h a l l  ho - t»~TTT.r : f }—m e e t in g
o f  th e  u n io n  on. n o m in a t io n -d u ly - s e c o n d e d ..a n d -v o te d  
u p o ia -e y -s tra trS T "h a n d 's . T h ey  s h a l l  h o ld  o f f i c e  u n t i l  
s th © -n e x t~ s n n u a i- -G e n e r a l-M e e t in g ^  and be e l i g i b l e  f o r  
r e - e l e c t i o n  on  t e r m in a t io n  o f  t h e i r  p e r io d  i f  
o f f i c e .
_ ( b )  V a c a n c ie s  o c c u r r in g  on  th e  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it te e
.  s h a l l  b e  f i l l e d  a t  t h o f l i d f R u s u i n g 'g en g r a l 1 mew t i n g , 
A-membey pa p o in te d  t q - f l i J .  a  v c a h u y ~ s fra l X~ liO ld  -n f f t c  e 
fb c _ th c - .u n e x a ir  "d  p n r t l o n - o f - t h o - p e r i o d  o f - o f f i c e - o f - h i s  
p r e d e c e s s o r * - -
l  i U  * *  ~  1 U Initftale* * *............
A)V
//'
'• E ’ KcmJ.nKt.ions l o r  m em bership o f  th e  e x e c u t iv e  
commit t e e  s h e l l y  t o —th e —i>rov"t#^.eoe~of-eu-h.
■' ' J j0  o f  "
rret a r y
th e  d a te  o f
s»b^anit_to the p i-ef-mw^-of--sub— ee-t
t h i s  f '.ir t , 1..r .J— lia _Q .v l g e o  - i l l -  v r l f l T T g '  ' " l i b—t .H
at, -1 -es-*r,—.-r-w ”  rrp : rrr  twys/reefer he I ort 
>f t.bT "arTitw i"' r c n e ra  i- lu e e d n a .
-or.
. o j  A raemoer o f  th e  e x e e u fi  #<» o n -m iI t e e  sh a ll, v a c a te
h is  s e a t  in  any one o f  th e  f o l l o w in g  c ir c u m s ta n c e s : -
( a )  on  r e s i g n a t io n ,  su sp en s ion  o r  e x p u ls io n  
from  m em bership o f  th e  u n io n ;
( b )  on  a b s e n t in g  h im s e l f  w ith o u t  th e  p e rm is s io n  
o f  th e  e x e c u t iv e  com m ittee  from  th r e e  con­
s e c u t iv e  g e n e r a l  m ee tin g s  o r  m ee tin g s  o f  
th e  co m m itte e ;
(.c )  on r e s ig n in g  by  g iv in g -  ■ . .w e e k s 1 /roovt.he
w r i t t e n  n o t i c e  t o  th e  s e c r e t a r y .
( d )  on c e a s in g  t o  be in  good f in a n c ia l  s ta n d in g ,
( 4 )  The e x e c u t iv e  com m ittee  s h a l l ,  s d l i jm  l  to  tlld  gfc'uuiul. 
d X e e c t io n —tind—c o n t r o l—o f -  g en e ra l—m eet,ingsT -and—to —th e  
p rn v t s ir in '' o f  ha' e power -
( a )  t o  recommend th e  unlolS1 s p a r t l c ip a t l o n y t n  th e  
e s ta b lis h m e n t  o j> fin  I n d u s t r ia l  councls f c r  a 
c o n c i l la t lo n ^ b t ia r d  u nder th e  p ro y tb x o n s  o f  th e  
in d u s t r ia js 't fo n c l l  la  t lo n  A c t ,  1 9 > f , . end s u b je c t  
t o  th e ^ B o n s t i tu t io n  o f  a n y jw d u s t  r i a l  C o u n c il
to A h fte rm in e  th e  U n ion ’ s " r e p r e s e n t a t io n  th e reo n .
( b )  t o  en ga ge  and d is m is s  em p loyees  o f  th e  u n io n , 
t o  f i x  t h e i r  rem u n era tio n  and t o  d e f in e  t h e i r
t h e i r  d u t i e s ;
( c )  to  a p p o in t  from  t im e  t c  t im e  such  su b -com m ittees  
as i t  may deem f i t ;
f d )  to  a d m it o r  r e fu s e  t o  adm it p e rson s  t o  member­
s h ip  o f  th e  u n io n , t o  f i x  th e  c o n d it io n s  under 
w h ich  fo rm e r  members o f  th e  u n ion  may be r e ­
a d m itted  t o  m em bership , and t o  suspend, f i n e  
o r  e x p e l  any member f o r  cau se a p p e a r in g  s u f ­
f i c i e n t  t o  a m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  e x e c u t iv e  co m m itte e ;
( e )  t o  i n s t i t u t e  o r  d e fen d  l e g a l  p ro c e e d in g s  by o r  
a g a in s t  th e  u n io n , o r  on b eb ,,l f  o f ,  o r  e g a in s t  
In d iv id u a l  members;
Dection 9(e) (f) to acquire, eltlidr by purchase, lease or other­
wise any movable or immovable, -property cn behalf 
of the unlort, and to sell,-let, mortgage, p^r 
otherwise/deal with or depose of any mcjsftbla 
or Imaioi'able property belonging to tbsxlnion, 
provided that no immovable propertyydnnll be 
acquired or sold or mortgaged or lex or leased 
for a period lopjfer than five year's, unless 
et least-. . . -  days'/written notice of I n  tent 1 o p s  t0 do so has beep given to each 
member oi/the union by the secretary. If 
during jtnls period not lesp/than ,members
demand::i.n writing fist y w  Hot be taken on 
Llic/prnposed srt’on, |.nlJot r-hn’l bo taken,
If)’ I 1 f j1 $ . ....
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(  g )  t o  d ea l, w i t h  d is p u t e s  b e tw e e n  members en d  
t h e i r  e m p lo y e r s  and t o  en d e a v o u r  t o  s e t t l e  
d is p u t e s  b y  c o n c i l i a t o r y  m eth od s ;
( l )  t o  o p en  and o p e r a t e  on  a b a n k in g  a cco u n t 
i n  th e  name o f  th e  u n io n ,
( j )  t o  do  su ch  o t h e r  t h in g s  a s ,  I n  th e  o p in io n  
o f  th e  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it te e , a p p e a r  t o  b e  in  
th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  u n io n ,
V . OFFICERS,
a f t e r  a p p r o v a l  b y  th e  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it te e ,
a d e l i b e r a t i v e  v o t e ,  b u t s h a l l ,  in  th e  e v e n t  
o f  e q u a l i t y  o f  v o t i n g ,  h a v e  a c a s t in g  v o t e .
( i )  A  s e c r e t a r y  s h a l l  b e  a p p o in te d  by
b a l l o t  a t  th e  an n u a l g e n e ra l,  m e e t in g ,  s h a l l  
h o ld  o f f i c e  u n t i l  th e  n e x t  an n u a l g e n e r a l  
m e e t in g  and. s h a l l  be e l i g i b l e  f o r  r e - a p p o in t -  
m en t. He may r e s i g n  on  g i v i n g , . , , , , . . . . . , ,  
m onths * n o t i c e  in  w r i t i n g  t o  th e  e x e c u t i v e  
c o m m it te e  and may b e  su m m arily  d is c h a r g e d  by  
th e  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it te e  f o r  s e r io u s  n e g l e c t  
o f  d u ty  o r  m is c o n d u c t . I n  th e  e v e n t  o f  th e  
o f f i c e  b ecom in g  v a c a n t  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  com­
m i t t e e  s h a l l  a p p o in t  a  te m p o ra ly  in cu m ben t 
v;ho s h a l l  ho.'.a o f f i c e  u n t i l  th e  n e x t  an n u a l 
g e n e r a l  m e e t in g .
a c c o u n ts  i n  su ch  fo rm  nr may b ; p r e s c r ib e d  
b y  th e  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it te e ; r e c e i v e  
r e q u i s i t i o n s  f o r  m e e t in g s ;  i s s u e  n o t i c e s  o f  
m e e t in g s ;  co n d u c t a l l  c o rr e s p o n d e n c e  o f  th e  
u n io n , k e e p in g  o r i g i n a l s  o f  l e t t e r s  r e ­
c e iv e d  and c o p ie s  o f  th o s e  d is p a t c h e d ,  and 
a t  ea ch  m e e t in g  o f  th e  15xecut.lt e  co m m itte e
! leepl"' assistance^!: 
! affecting ttejnr am;
■^ Xo member, 
e ployment
S e c t io n  9 ( b )
The duties of the officers shall be;-
 
s i g n  a l l  ch eq u es  on  th e  b an ic in g  a c c o u n t  o f  
th e  u n io n , g e n e r a l l y  e x e r c i s e  s u p e r v is io n  
o v e r  th e  a f f a i r s  o f  th e  u n io n  and p e r fo rm  
su ch  o t h e r  d u t i e s  as by  u s a g e  and custom  
p e r t a in  t o  th e  o f f i c e .  He s h a l l  n o t  h a ve
( a )  C h a irm an . -  The ch a irm an  s h a l l  p r e s id e  
a t  a l l  m e e t in g s  a t  w h ic h  h e  i s  p r e s e n t ,  
e n fo r c e  o b s e r v a n c e  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  th e  
u n io n , s ig n  m in u te s  o f  m e e t in g s  a f t e r  
ip c o n f i r m a t io n ,  e n d o rs e  a l l  a c c o u n ts  f o r  paym ent
3 e c t lo n  9 ( f ) ( i i )  The s e c r e t a r y  s h a l l  k e e p  p r o p e r  book s  o f
Initials
t  ' 208.
o
read  thsr co rresp o n d  en f*r y h le h  hr's-’  ^  
t a k e n -^ la c e  s i f ic e  t h c . p f c ^ w . ^ i f i e e t f u g ’; 
o tu m d  a l l  m eet in s / ,s n d  •j'ocora  m inu tes 
o r  th e  p r w e e d i i> r » j  k e ep  a r e g i s t e r  o f  
members, r e c o r d  t h e r e in  e v e r y  member ! s 
a d d re s s , dace  o f  e n ro lm e n t, e n tra n c e  f e e  
p a id  and, in  r e s p e o t  o f  e v e r y  week/raonth. 
th e  s u b s c r ip t io n s  and any l e v i e s  and f in e s  
p a id  by  such member, and i n  th e  e v e n t  o f  
th e  r e s i g n a t io n  o r  e x p u ls io n  o f  a member 
th e  d a t e  t h e r e o f ;  c o l l e c t  e n tra n c e  f e e s ,  
s u b s c r ip t io n s ,  f in e s  and l e v i e s ,  is s u e  
o f f i c i a l  r e c e i p t s ' f o r  a l l  moneys r e c e i v e d ;
bank a l l  moneys w ith in . . ........... . . . . . . .............
days  o f  r e c e i p t ;  subm it r e p o r t s  in  r e g a rd  
t o  th e  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  u n ion  
t o  th e  e x e c u t iv e  com m ittee  n o t  l e s s  than  
once e v e r y  th r e e  m onths; p re p u re  th e  
b a la n c e  s h e e t  and s ta te m e n t  o f  incom e and 
e x p e n d itu re  r e f e r r e d  t o  in  s e c t io n  8(7.1 
o f  t h i s  c o n s t i t u t io n  and p e r fo rm  such 
o th e r  d u t ie s  as th e  e x e c u t iv e  com m ittee 
o r  a g e n e r a l  m ee tin g  may d i r e c t .
He s h a l l  a tte n d  a l l  m e e t in g s  o f  th e  
e x e c u t iv e  com m ittee  and a l l  g e n e r a l  
m e e tin g s  b u t s h a l l  have no v o t in g  pow er.
( 2 )  A c t ing Cha i r man. -  In  th e  e v e n t  o f  t te th e  
chairm an and th o - v la n  ch vtrm aa b e in g  u n a b le , e i t h e r  
t e m p o r a r i ly  o r  p e rm a n e n tly , t o  p e r fo i 'm  t h e i r  d u t ie s ,  
th e  e x e c u t iv e  com m ittee  s h a l l  a p p o in t  a member o f  th e  
u n io n  t o  a c t  as ch a irm an  u n t i l  th e  ch a irm an  o r  v i c e -  
chairm an i s  a b le  t o  resum e h is  d u t ie s  o r  u n t i l  the 
n e x t  e l e c t i o n  as th e  c a se  may b e .
i
8 . F IH AffCE,
( 1 )  A l l  amounts due t o  o r  c o l l e c t e d  on b e h a l f  o f  th e  
u n io n  s h a l l  be p a id  t o  t h e  s e c r e t a r y  who s h a l l  d e p o s i t  
them  in  such bank as may be d e c id e d  upon by th e  
e x e c u t iv e  co m m itte e .
( 2 )  The fu nds o f  th e  u n ion  s h a l l  be a p p l ie d  t o  th e  
payment o f  e x p en ses , th e - «^ o - fB it i^ ? r -o £ - is # .9 ir? r ty  and
■such o th e r  pu rposes  as may be d e c id e d  upon' 
by th e  e x e c u t iv e  com m ittee  ' o r -e - f-e n e -r s l-m e e t iu B -o r  UomdCtl' 
by—oew bers—v o t in g —b y -b a i- lo - i, /(H J a < ^ L n > J
( 3 )  Ho s in g l e  it e m  o f  e x p e n d itu re  In  e x c e s s  ..of £ , ...................
( o t h e r  th a n  the^-rem u nera tion  o f  c r a p lo y e e s -S f 't  he u n io n ) 
s h a l l  be njet^'from  th e  fu nds o f  th e  u n ion  u n le s s  such 
e x p e n d itu re  i s  a p p roved  by th e  members v o t in g  by b a l l o t ,
( 4 )  Paym ents, o th e r  th an  th o se  s p e c i f i p d ' i n  sub­
s e c t io n  ( 3 )  o f  t h i s  s e c t io n ,  s h a l l  r e w i r e  th e  p r io r  
a p p ro v a l o f  th e  e x e c u t iv e  comm ittee*''and s h a l l  be made 1;./ 
cheque s lgn ed ^ b y  th e  chairracn^arkl th e  s e c r e t a r y  e x c e p t  
when th e  anpufit in  q u e s t i o n 's  l e s s  th an  £1 , when 
payment jpay be made f r o m - w t t y  cash.,
( 5 )  I n i t i a l s . . . . . . . .....................
I
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( 0 )  Funds r e q u ir e d  f o r  a p e t t y  cash  a cco u n t, 
w h ich  s h a l l  be k e p t  in  such fo rm  as th s  e x e c u t iv e  
com m ittee  may d e te rm in e , s h a l l  b e ,p r o v id e d  by th e  
d ra w in g  o f  cheques s ig n e d  by  t h e •chairm an and th e  
s e c r e t a r y .  U n ispa  a g e n e r a l  m ee tin g  a p p ro v e s , 
ch equ es araountifSg in  th e  a g g r e g a te  t o  more than  
- * ( • . . .  o . s h a l l  n o t  be drawn d u r in g  any 
one montb,pfn r e s p e c t  o f  p e t t y  ex p en ses ,
( 6 )  A g e n e r a l  m ee tin g  may a t  any t im e , w ith  a 
v ie w  t o  s e c u r in g  fu nds f o r  any p a r t i c u la r  pu rpose
im pose a l e v y  n o t  e x c e e d in g  £ .............d u r in g
Bny p e r io d  o f ; ................ .... .weejsS/raonths on  each
member, o r  £ , .  y 'f . . . . . . . . . . . . .p ef- month on  each
member f o r  a p e r io d  n o t  e x c e e d in g ............................
m onths, prm pfded th a t  n o t i c p f o f  th e  p rop osed  l e v y  
a p peared  ifi th e  agenda fo r ^ th e  m ee tin g .
( 7 )  A b a la n c e  s h e e t  and a s ta tem en t o f  incom e
and e x p e n d itu r e  in  r e s p e c t  o f  ea ch  y e a r  e n d in g . . . . . . . .
s h a l l  he a u d ite d  by  tw o p e rso n s  a p p o in te d  by a ■gene r a l  
m eeting-. The a u d ito r s  s h a l l  be a p p o in te d  from  
am ongst p e rson s  o th e r  th an  th e  members o f  th e  
E x e c u t iv e  Com m ittee o r  th e  o f f i c e - b e a r e r s  and o f f i c i a l s  
o f  th e  U n ion  and t ru e  c o p ie s  o f  th e  a u d ite d  b a la n c e  
s h e e t  and s ta tem en t o f  incom e and e x p e n d itu r e  f o r  
ea ch  y e a r  and o f  th e  a u d i t o r ’ s r e p o r t s  th e r e o n  s h a l l  
b e  a v a i l a b l e  a t  th e  U n ion ’ s o f f i c e  f o r  in s p e c t io n  by 
members who s h a l l  be e n t i t l e d  t o  make c o p ie s  t h e r e o f  
o r  t o  ta k e  e x t r a c t s  th e r e fr o m ,
( 8 )  A member, who r e s ig n s  o r  i s  e x p e l le d  from  
m em bersh ip , s h a l l  have no c la im  on  th e  fu nds o f  th e  
u n io n .
. 9 . REPRESENTATION ON INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS 
OR CONCILIATION BOARDS, _____ '________
( 1 )  A g e n e r a l m ee tin g  may a t  any t i ja e  d e c id e  th a t  
th e  u n ion  s h a l l  becom e a  p a r ty  Xoy4x\ in d u s t r ia l  c o u n c il  
o r  a p p ly  f o r  a c o n c i l i a t i o n  boapa i n  te rm s o f  th e  
I n d u s t r ia l  C o n c i l i a t i o n  A c t ,  1?!37,
( 8 )  C an d id a tes  f o r  e l e c t i o n  as r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  
on  any such c o u n c i l  o r  hdard may be n om ina ted  a t  th e  
m e e tin g  end th e  e le c tL d n  s h a l l  ta k e  p la c e  by b a l l o t ,
( Z )  R e p r e s e n t a t iv e # 'c n  an In d u s t r ia l  C o u n c il may 
be rem oved by  a a m ie ra l m e e tin g  and may r e s i g n  on
g i v i n g . . . . . . . . ye.......... ...........weeks/m onths’ n o t ic e
t o  th e  e x e c u t iv e  c o m m itte e , o r  such n o t i c e  as may be 
p r e s c r ib e d  in  th e  c o n s t i t u t io n  o f  th e  I n d u s t r ia l  
C o u n c il .  /
( 4 )  T n y t h e  e v e n t  o f  th e  r e s ig n a t io n  o r  d e a th  o f  a 
r e p r e s e n t a t iv e  o r  h is  rem ova l by a g e n e r a l  m ee tin g  
th e/ vu can cy  s h a l l  be f i l l e d  by th e  e x e c u t iv e  
c ju a n it te e  p en d in g  th e  n e x t  g e n e ra l m e e tin g .
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(6 ;  R e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  s h a l l  h a v g ^ ft t l i  pow er t o  e n te r  
in t o  a greem en ts  on - e h n i g ^ f  th e  n i t o n ,  and such u g r ? .-  
m ents s h a l l  n o t  begntr^ect to  r a t i f i c a t i o n  by  th e  
E x e c u t iv e  C o m m itt e e o r  a g e n e r a l m e e t in g .
10 . BALLOTS,,
E s s e n t ia l  t o  
s t a t e  manner 
in  w h ich  
b a l l o t  i s  to  
be con du cted  
i f  s e c t io n s  
6 (4 )  ( f ) ,  8 (3 )  
9 f S ) and 14 o f  
t h i s  d r a f t  a re  
a d op ted , v id e  
S e c t io n  o f  A c t .
( l )  In  a d d i t io n  to  th o s e  ca se s  in  r e s p e c t  o f  w h ich  
th e  ta k in g  o f  a b a l l o t  i s  com pu lsory  in  term s o f  t h i s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a b a l l o t  on  any q u e s t io n  s h a l l  be 
to k e n  i f - ci g enar.a l-m ee t in g .,o r . ■ t  h<% e x e c u t iv e  com m ittee 
sQ -d e c ld e r—a zu iU s h a ll-a ls e -  b e - ta k e n  -
( a )  i f  demanded in  w r i t in g  by n o t  l e s s  
th a n . . A y . ... ..m em bers o f  th e  
u n io n  i n  good  f in a n c ia l  s ta n d in g , 
o r
( b )  on  any p r o p o s a l t o  d e c la r e  o r  ta k e  
p a r t  i n  a s t r i k e .
(2)
, , J
f  '
t  r i f t  i , v  1 '
f  '  j
(B a il o t s  s h a l l  be condu cted  i n  th e  f o l l o w in g  manner
( a )  I k j t l c e  o f  a b a l l o t  s h a l l  be g iv e n  to  
eaShymember o f  th e  u n io n  in  w r i t in g  by 
th e  s ^ a r e t a r y , a t  l e a s t  th r e e  day s 
b e fo r e  t h e b a l i o t  i s  t o  b e  ta k en , 
p r o v id e d  tnjrfc^a b a l l o t  may be ta k en  
w ith o u t  n o t i e e N j t  any g e n e r a l  m ee tin g  
on  th e  d e c is io n  oSya m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  
members p r e s e n t }  ' s .
( b )  tvio S c ru t in e e r s  s h a l l  b e ^ a p p o in te d  by 
th e  e x e c u t iv e  com m ittee  o r  a g e n e ra l 
m ee tin g  t o  s u p e r v is e  any b a l l o t  and 
to  a s c e r t a in  th e  r e s u l t  t h e r e o f }
( e )  B a l l o t s  s h a l l\ b e  con du cted  a t  th e  p la c e ,  
on th e  d a te  and. d u r in g  th e  hou rs ae may 
be s p e c i f i e d  in \ th e  n o t i c e  r e f e r r e d  to  
in  p a ra g ra p h  ( a ) \ f  t h i s  s u b - s e c t io n }
( d )  b a l l o t  p a p ers  s h a l lN je  p ro v id e d  by the 
e x e c u t iv e  co m m ittee . \ p n e  b a l l o t  paper 
o n ly  s h a l l  be is s u e d  oX dom and at. th e  
p la c e  and d u r in g  th e  houivs f i x e d  f o r  t.he 
ta k in g  o f  th e  b a l l o t ,  t o  ehch  member who 
i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  v o t e ;  \
( e )  each  v o t e r  s h a l l ,  in  th e  p re s en ce  o f  
th e  s c r u t in e e r s ,  be is s u e d  w ith  one 
b a l l o t  pa p er w h ich  he s h a l l  th ereu pon  
c o m p le te , f o l d  and d e p o s i t  i n  a c o n ta in e r  
p r o v id e d  f o r  th e  p u rp o s e .
( f )  b a l l o t  p a p e rs  s h a l l 'n o t  be d gn ed  o r  
marked in  any way a p a r t  fr o m  th e  mark 
r e q u ir e d  t o  be made by 'a  member in  
r e c o r d in g  h is  v o t e .  P a p e rs  b e a r in g
any o th e r  mai'ks s h a l l  be ? ega rd ed  as s p o i l t  
and s h a l l  n o t  be co u n ted ;
I n i t i a l :
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( g )  on  c o m p le t io n  o f  t h e  b a l l o t  o r  s o  sc 
t h e r e a f t e r  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  th e  r e s u l t  
t h e r e o f  s h a l l b a ^ a s c e r t a ln e d  b y  th e  
s c r u t in e e r j s ^ m  th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  th e
s e c r e t s  
o f f !
and made known th r o u g h  t h i s
( 3 )  The e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it te e  s h a l l  b e/bou n d  t o  t a k e  
a c t i o n  a c c o r d in g  t o  th e  d e c i s i o n  o f  a 'm a j o r i t y  o f  th e  
m em bers v o t i n g  b y  b a l l o t .
( 4 )  No b a l l o t  I n v o l v i n g  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  o r  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  I n  a  s t r i k e  s h a l l  b e  t a k e n  u n t i l  t h e  
m a t t e r  g i v i n g  o c c a s io n  t h e r e f o r  h a s  b e e n  d e a l t  w i th  
a s  p r o v id e d  I n  s e c t i o n  6 5  o f  t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  C o n c i l i a t i o n  
A c t ,  1 9 3 7 .
1 1 . F IN E S .
3 W h e re v e r  I n  t h i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i s l o n  I s  
made f o r  t h e  lp ip t l s l t i o n  o f  a  f l t ^ ' c m  a  m em ber, su ch
f i n e  s h a l l n o t  e x c e e d . . . . . .  ................. ..
i n  t h e  c e f ie  o f  a  f i r s t  o f f e n c e ,  a n d . . , . , ............... ..
i n  r ^ s ^ e c t  o f  e v e r y  fu r t h e r  o f f e n c e .
1 2 . D IS C IP L IN E .
( l )  A member may b e  s u s p e n d e d , f i n e d  o r  e x p e l l e d  a s  
may b e  d e te r m in e d  b y  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  c o m m it te e  -
( a )  i f  h e  f a i l s ,  w i t h i n . . . . . Q . . . . . .d a y s
o f  demand i n  w r i t i n g  b y  t h e  s e c r e t a r y ,  t o  
p a y  s u b s c r ip t i o n s ,  f i n e s  o r  l e v i e s  w h ic h
a r e  m ore t h a n . . . . . .  j S. .............m on th s
I n  a r r e a r j
( b )  i f  h e  i n f r i n g e s  an y  o f  th e  te r ra s  o f  t h i s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  o r  a c t s  i n  a  m anner w h ic h  
i s  d e t r im e n t a l  t o  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  
u n io n ;
p r o v id e d  t h a t  t h e r e  s h a l l  b e  a  r i g h t  o f  a p p e a l 
a g a in s t  s u s p e n s io n , th e  im p o s i t i o n  o f  a  f i n e  o r
N o t i c e  o f  an y  su ch  a p p e a l  s h a l l  b e ^ g iv e n  t o  th e
s e c r e t a r y  i n  w r i t i n g  w i t h i n . . . . . . . / . ............... . . . . d a y s
o f  th e  d a t e  on  w h ic h  th e  d e c i s i o n  o f  th e  e x e c u t i v e  
c o m m it te e  was co m m u n ica ted  t o  th e  p e r s o n  c o n c e rn e d .
?.c.
( 2 )  No member may b e  s u sp en d ed , f i n e d  o r  e x p e l l e d  
u n les s "  h e  has  b e e n  a f f o r d e d  an  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  s t a t e  
h i s  c a s e  p e r s o n a l l y  a t  a  m e e t in g  o f  th e  E x e c u t iv e  
c o m m it te e ,  o f  w h ic h  h e  has  r e c e i v e d  n o t  l e s s  t h a n , .
........................... ...................................... . d a y s 5 n o t i c e  i n  w r i t i n g
fr o m  th e  S e c r e t a r y .  Th e m a t t e r  w ith  w h ich  th e  member 
i s  c h a r g e d  s h a l l  b e  s e t  o u t  i n  su ch  n o t i c e .
Initial
S a o t lo n  9 (h )
faction 9 (3 'I 
read with 
Section 14.
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! P l  A member who has appeared  b e fo r y ^ c h e  e x e c u t iv e  
• 'om in lttee in- a cco rd a n ce  w ith  s u b - s e c t io n  (Si) 
c f  t h i s  s e c t io n  s h a l l ,  i f  he i s f f i 3 s a t i s f i e d .  w ith  th e  
d e c i s i o n  o i  th e  e x e c u t iv e  com prfttea  and has lo d g e d  
a i l  ap p ea l in  th e  manner h e r e in  p r o v id e d ,  h ave th e  
r i g h t  t o  r e s t a t e  h is  c a s e  p e r s o n a l ly  t o  th e  
g e n e r a l m ee tin g  w h ich  c o n s id e r s  th e  m a t t e r ,
(4(i A member shall be entitled to call witnesses 
in support of his case, when attending a meeting of 
the executive committee cHS-a—ganev-al- meeting-in 
tcuam_af_Biib-sacti.on.XS}. or_jsubTsection (3) 
of--thls-seeiiloa—as. t. he-case-Hia-v-be.
(5) Any decision taken by the executive committee ______ •.
.in terms of this section shall, when an appeal .has ¥
been lodged, be' sub lent to ratification or otherwise J.
by a general, meeting. _i_*
(6) Open expulsion of a member, all'moneys due 
to the union such member shaU^become payable.
If payment^tfereof is not r a r d s ^ w i t h i n . , 
days, ihe""executiV9 commifebde may take such steps as 
it dejetfis necessary to secure- t settlement,
7)' ia) A member shall cease to be entitledobtf any 
of the benefits of membership '.nclud tagtfcgright to vote 
and shcrUs'be deemed to be out of gocdbJbfnaneiai standing,
(i.) if the subscriptions cr other ebargps due 
by him to>iIe union nr2 more than three 
months^ i^rn arrear
(ii) during any period" while he is-under
suspensloEUlir'terms of this constitution.
(b) In the eve^-ifor the subscriptions or other 
charges due to the union by o member being more than 
three months in or rear, he shall contiMxue to be 
subject tawihe disabilities imposgd'Dy paragraph (a) 
of this^ub-section until all tpfdeears have been paid.
13. RESIGNATION;.’
A member nay resign by giving,. 
months’ r.oji^ e in writing to the .secretary, provided 
that noydsignation shall takepwcffect until-'?.!! moneys 
due tp^ 'Che union by the member oonce:.'ned'"l).uve been 
vnifK f
J-4. WJ.miNG_-.UP..
il) The Union shall be wound up if at a ballet
conducted in the manner prescribed in the constitution
not less than three-fourths of the total number of
members of the Union ingood financial standing vote
in favour of a resolution that the Union be wound
up cry—subject""to-the-provisions~of •Pectiovv-v.&j if
fer any reason the Union is unable to continue to function.
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'.J?> I.? e. r e s o lu t io n  f o r  th e  w in d in g  up o f  tho
• - - ' / -  /     / - i -  y
( i  ) The In s t —a p p o in te d  Chairm an o f  th e  U n ion  
c r  i f  he I s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e ,  th e  a v a i l a b l e  
members o f  th e  la s t - a p p p in te d  E x e c u t iv e  
Com m ittee o f  th e  U n ia ir  s h a l l  fo r t h w i t h  
t ra n s m it  t o  th o  I n d y s t r i a l  R e g is t r a r  
a p p o in te d  in  t e i ’r j r  io f th e  I n d u s t r ia l  
C o n c i l i a t i o n  A of/; 1987, a s ta te m e n t s ig n e d  
by him o r  th e m / s e tt in g  f o r t h  th e  r e s o lu t i o n  
a d op ted  o r  tfsre r e a s o n s . f o r  th e  U n io n 's  
i n a b i l i t y  to  c o n t in u e  t o  fu n c t io n ,  as 
th e  c a se  uray b e , and th e  a v a i l a b l e  members 
o f  th e  U n io n 's  l a s t  — a p p o in te d  E x e c u t iv e  
Com m ittee sh a lic^ a p p o in t a l i q u i d a t o r  t o  
c a r r y / o u t  th e^ w in d in g  u p . The l i q u id a t o r  
s h a ll:  n o t  h*r a member o f  th e  U n ion  and s h a l l  
be pa id  sy&ii f e e s  a s  may b e  a g r e e d  upon 
b e t  ween ,15im and th e  s a id  members o f  th e  
U n io n 's  la s t - a p p o in t e d  E x e c u t iv e  C om m ittee , 
S h ou ld  th e  p a r t i e s  f a l l  t o  a g r e e  upon, th e  
f e e s ’ t o  be p a id ,  th e  a e g is  tra t* s h a l l  f i x  
t h e ’ b a s is  on which, th e  l i q u id a t o r  s h a l l  ho 
p a id .
c a l l  upon th e  la s t - a p p o in t e d  o i f l c e - b e e r e r s  
o f  th e  U n ion  t o  d e l i v j t y ' t o  him th e  U n ion ’ s 
books o f  a ccou n t sh ew ing  th e  U n ion ’ s ,a s s e ts  
and l i a b i l i t i e s  t o g e t h e r  w ith  th e  r e g i s t e r  o 
members sh ew in g  fed’  th e  tw e lv e  ■vjrfhhe p r io r  
t o  th e  d a te  on  .w hich th o  r e s o lu t io n ,  f o r  
w in d in g -u p  was passed  o r  th e -d a t e  as from  
w h ich  th e  ljn 'lon  w a° " m M “  t o  c o n tin u e  
t o  fu n c t io n ,  as t t  y b e , h e r e in a f i o r
r e f e r r e j r t o  as the d is s o lu t io n ,  the
s u b s c r ip t io n s  pa id  mett.bs.r and h is
upon th e  s a id  o f f i c e - b e a r e r 's  to  hand o v e r  to  
him  a l l  unexpended funds o f  th e  U n ion  and 
t o  d e l i v e r  t o  him  th e  U n io n 's  a s s e ts  an:! 
th e  documents n e c e s s a ry  in  o rd e r  to  l i q u id a t e  
th e  a s s e t s ,
, i i i )  The l i q u id a t o r  s h a l l  tak e  the
n e c e s s a r y  s t e p s  to  l i  q u id s te  th e  d e b ts  o f  
th e  u n ion  from  i t s  unexpended fu nds and o r ,•
. ther monies realised fjom air/ as-etc. of the 
union and if the" sr.id funds and monies are 
Insufficient t,d pay all creditor? after the 
liquids tor* s /fees and the expenses of M in d iisg - 
up have bseyi met the order iiiAdiirh creditors 
shall be p^ ld shall, subject/to the 
provisions of paragraph (xYbe the same as 
that prescribed in any lay f o r  the time being 
In iovye relating to s b y i i is t . ' ib i i t ic n  of the 
assets ‘of an insolvent estate and tl>o
The l i q u id a t o r  so  apod I n te r  s h a l l
a d d re ss  as a t  th e
The l i q u id a t o r  s h a l l  a ls o  c a l l
l i q u i d a t o r 's
II
- I S -
l i q u i d a t o r ’ s fees and th e  eu psr^Ss of 
w in d in g -u p  s h a l l  ran k  in  o r d e i/ o f  p r e fe r e n :a  
a:; thou gh  ho w e l i . - . u i i i a j / l r  o f  :.r\ 
in s o lv e n t  estpJre end as-through. th e  
e v p e n r fs  ''rare th e  c o s tsw 'o f s e c u e s t r a t io n  <••• 
an in so ljfe su t e s t a t e .
(J .jJ  l i f t e r  th e  paym ents o f  a l l  d e b ts  it:
a cco rd a n ce  w ith  p a rag ra p h  (U r l>  th e  
r em a in in g  fu n d s , i f  a n y , s h a l l  be d i r t t i b u t e d  
b y  th e  l i q u id a t o r  am ong?* th e  members 
o f: th e  U n ion  who w ere  ih  good f in a n c i a l  
s ta n d in g  a s  at th e  d a te  o f  d is s o lu t io n  
and ouch member s h # ll  be awarded a sh a re  
in  p r o p o r t io n  to / th e  s u b s c r ip t io n s  
a c t u a l l y  p a id  J y  h im  An rasp ed ., o f  th e  
t w e lv e  mont.hr/4r.Meid ia i e l : ;  M 's s e e d in g  th e  
s a id  d a t e ,  d ' , /O) She liability of iMWbpyr vbsl: for. 
the purposes of this jjdctio.u bo limited 
the cunodnt of subsor/ptLons eu» by their s- 
the thdcn la terms/of this or: naff tut;. ■>'. 
as as the date o y it -so liltAon..
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1 6 . i i m w s .
Ary of the provisions of tU: s vr-v - 
may be repealed, amended or add el to in ;.uy inni'er 
by r arril.u t :1 f v  r f  a  gcnor I  ingml w , o f  Cv, l_; 
provided that at least f***i Unu 1 u jiTTT :. "f w
proposed alteration shall have been given to su? "I*
n^ Jru, b / 'l ■>s>W<rM^9 b o -^ Y
1 So amendment's o r  adds C lou s s m l  i n r «  s i ;  
force o r  e f f e c t  until c e r t i f i e d  in  terms, o f  sup- 
s e c t io n  (31  o f  s e c t io n  t e n  o f  she In d u s tr ia l .  
C o n c i l i a t i o n  A c t ,  1937.
 /
16. GhllBRM,.
Whenever it appears that t'xr- nghV 
inadvertence, .negligence or due tv mp ptiuir 
cause any of the terms of the constlij/slcn ha*'3 
net been observed by the members, els, ofl’icr-
bearera or employees of the Uni cRy4';i is •• remit 
of such non-observance, tbs Ititi.-pris liable b: 
function constitutionally in t-y/f respect, < *.tu»r 
wholly or partly, by reasor. yr -
■a' the non-erii-tencj/of t*;s Si- "itlvo
ioii.aittee through Icmss- ■■.!' lima a.id t-h; 
failure to eieat the. sr.cccss-n to tho 
said Executive Ccriraittoe as required by i 
, Constitution;
(b’i any vacancy in any office •■•*.i!ch tin- \tol-.~ 
is nudble at any time t.o fin. by rsen 
of Arne requirements of this coactitution. or
\
i \
initials,
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(c) any usher aat o' e i.r sums nan. :e;s arising by reason of such pdh- observance,
tny office-bearer, official cr vfi.ihe).* of thu Union may report the clrcuinstadoos to the Industrial Registrar appointed In terras of the Industrial Conciliation 1937, who may if g. is satisfied that the Ujtfion, but fur ruth non,. ’ observance would be cdpsble of functioning and. that the majority of members thereof are deaiJw , that it should cprftinue to function, issue sv.ch directions as W  the procedure to be observed * . order to ena^Jn such union to function, as he may deem desirable, provided that in so doing the Registrar shali devise a procedure which' shall a? nearly as possible, having regard to f-o clrcujHStance3, conform to the provisions of i.hli constitution and provided further that any act'.-, tnKon by the Registrar in terms hereof shall 
not prejudice any claim of a creditor of the qj< .
CHAIHMAW OF TUB t f t f ih i i
SRU1ETARy \ ) 1? THE’ UHIOM
Source: TUCSA Papers AH 646 Dd 17.115 University of the Witwatersrand
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APPENDIX F
Dr. G. M .  7^ aic\er,
CHAIRMAN.
Debt Singh,
SECRETARY.
AFFILIATED 
ORGANISATIONS.
National Baking Industrial Union 
(Durban Branch).
Durban Indian Municipal Employees' 
Society.
Natal Sugar Industry Employees' 
Unloa.
Tea, Coffee & Chicory Industry 
Employees' Union.
National Union o f Distributive
Workers (Durban B. Branch).
S.A. Tin Workers' Union. .
Box Workers' Union.
Laundry Workers' Union 
(Durban Branch).
Rope & Mat Workers' Union. 
Chemical Workers' Union (Natal). 
TWine &  Bag Workers' Union. 
Tobacco Workers' Union.
Paint, Polish & Varnish Workers' 
Union. _______
S.A.R. & H. Workers:.Union 
(Non-European).
Sweet Workers' Union 
(Durban Branch).
Brick & Tile Workers' Union.
i Natal Food & Canning Workers'
1 Union.
Mineral Water Workers' Union.
I Scap & Candle Workers' Union 
1 (Durban Branch).
Maritzburg Municipal Employees' 
Union.
Natal Sugar Field Workers' Union. 
Natal Dairy Workers' Union.
Durban Non-European Bus Workers1 
Union.
Communist Partv of S-A.
(Durban District).
•ndia League o f S. Africa.
Natal Biscuit Workers' Club. 
Liberal Study - Group.
St. Aldan's Club.
Overport Social Club.
Springfield Farmers' Association. 
Hindustan Youth Club.
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP25.231.
affiliates to the Anti-Segregation Council 
Source: Bagwandeen (1983, p.356)
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Appendix G
IC
1890
MAJOR NATAL-BASED INDIAN 
! POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS AND FACTIONS 
1890 - 1947
INDIAN COMMITTEE
COLONIAL BORN AND SETTLERS 
INDIAN ASSOCIATION
MODERATE/CONSERVATIVE FACTION
ANTI-SEGREGATION COUNCIL
CBIA
1911
CBIA COLONIAL BORN INDIAN 
ASSOCIATION
NATAL INDIAN ASSOCIATION
NIO NATAL INDIAN ORGANISATION
MERGERS
FACTIONS
•-- TAKE-OVERS
NIC
1945
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